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CONQUEST AND KULTUR

AIMS OF THE GERMANS
IN THEIR OWN WORDS



ISSUED BY
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION

The SECRETARY OF STATE
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GEORGE CREEL

Edition of January, 1918

Monograph

CONQUEST AND KULTUR

AIMS OF THE GERMANS IN THEIR OWN WORDS

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KEY TO REFERENCES.

- [A.].....Andler, Pan-Germanism, 1915. Translation of the pamphlet edition.
 [Archer].....Archer, Gems (?) of German Thought, 1917.
 [B.].....Bang, Hurrah, and Hallelujah, 1917.
 [G.].....Grumbach, Das Annexionistische Deutschland, 1917.
 [G.W.M.].....Germany's War Mania, 1914.
 [N.].....Nippold, Der deutsche Chauvinismus, 1913.
 [P.G.D.].....The Pan-Germanic Doctrine, 1904.

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FOREWORD.

The present war is in the last analysis distinctly a war between ideals and thus between the peoples who uphold them. On the one hand are the peoples who have faith in themselves and in each other and in the ordered ways of law and justice by which they have sought in the past to regulate both their domestic and their international relations. Upon the other hand are those whose ideals have been fixed for them by dynastic aims and ambitions which could only be translated into reality through subservience to authority and by the unrestricted use of force. The first group has long had a unity in its fundamental attitudes which it did not realize until the war endangered and revealed them.

The great self-governing nations, England and France, long ago passed on to America the best of what they had established or dreamed of establishing in the way of popular government. Our war for independence left our institutions and ways of thinking and acting distinctly English, and it aided the English in their own struggle to bring monarchy and political aristocracy into subordination to the will of the great English nation. It also revealed to us how much we had in common in our newer world ideals with the liberalism of that France which had already found its thought about human rights and relations in advance of the Bourbon institutions and ideas that governed it politically. It should never be forgotten that Burke and Chatham and Fox and Barré in England and Lafayette and Turgot and Beaumarchais in France held political ideas which made them the supporters of the American colonies and the intellectual comrades of Washington, Franklin, and Jefferson. Here in this America they saw their ideals molded into realities and recognized that we were fighting their battles and that a blow struck at autocracy's effort to rule America would shake its weakening hold upon both France and England. Together these three great nations have climbed upward toward the same sunlit heights. Their band has now become a goodly one, as the South American Republics, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Japan, China, and at last Russia have caught the vision.

In varied ways and in different tongues these peoples have

sought to realize and express their idea that government is an instrument devised by men for the benefit of human beings. They have held that liberty and law spring from the same soil, that reason is the only conqueror that does not rule slaves, that the state is an agency, not an end or an entity, and is something larger and better than any man only when it helps every man to be something larger and better, in some way more just, more humane, more enlightened, more thoughtless of self and more thoughtful of his fellow men. They have not permanently sought to restrict to one class as privilege what is the common property of all nor to deny to any nation because it is small that opportunity for self-realization which is the easy heritage of the more favored.

The democracy they have won for themselves, that has made citizens where before there were subjects, they have almost unconsciously come to feel must touch hands with other self-governing peoples and all must uphold an international law that expresses for all nations the ideals which each has found for itself.

In all these things America has allied its better thought with the better thought of the nations which have taken their place in this unorganized league of liberty, this enlarging commonwealth of justice, this newer polity of a common humanity. Its ideals, from the days of Otis and Adams and Henry and Washington through Monroe and Webster and Lincoln, have been interpreted to it over and over again and have echoed back to us in the language of Bright and Gladstone and Morley and Bryce, of Mazzini and Cavour, of Lamartine and Thiers and Gambetta. We in America have seen these other peoples rallying in this war to the defense of these ideals, the liberal world's common property. And now the call has come to us anew voiced in measured words that those who in the past have toiled and striven, have fought and fallen, would know as the spoken message of their silent sacrifice. This America of ours has heard the call and stands embattled for the ideals that represent a heritage, an achievement, a hope.

America knows what it is defending. Does it as clearly understand what it is fighting against? Does it realize that other peoples have had imposed upon them ways of thinking between which and our thought and the thought of all forward-looking people there can be no compromise? Does it know that the ideals of government which it struck down in its farthest

past, bringing new liberties to all English-speaking peoples—the ideals which France banished with the Bourbons and the Bonapartes, and Italy drove out with the Hapsburgs, ideals that crashed to earth in Russia but yesterday with the fall of the Romanoffs—does it know that these ideals now dominate the Teutonic powers and make them the fitting allies of the Turk in thought and purpose and method?

Three years of war as conducted by Prussian militarism have done much to acquaint us with the purposes and methods of the mediævally minded group which controls the Central Powers. Yet a full and convincing proof of the distortion of the purposes of a whole nation can come only from the utterances of those who planned and promoted the war. One may not draw an indictment against a whole nation, but it is at least permissible to allow its responsible leaders, intellectual and political, to define the creed according to which they have shaped the thought and action of the German people in the past generation. That is all this pamphlet does. Against such a confession the guilty can not enter a plea in abatement or avoidance, neither now nor hereafter. The pied pipers of Prussianism who have led the German people to conquest and to ignominy and to infamy are here given their unending day before the court of public opinion. It is a motley throng who are here heard in praise of war and international suspicion and conquest and intrigue and devastation—emperors, kings, princes, poets, philosophers, educators, journalists, legislators, manufacturers, militarists, statesmen. Line upon line, precept upon precept, they have written this ritual of envy and broken faith and rapine. Before them is the war god to whom they have offered up their reason and their humanity, behind them the misshapen image they have made of the German people, leering with bloodstained visage over the ruins of civilization.

There is no thinking human being who would not gladly blot out the whole ugly record of these pages both because of what it advocates and because of the untold anguish its translation into deeds has caused. But it can never be done.

Only its full and fair presentation can enable the American people to know what it is from which they are defending their land, their institutions and their very lives. Only from such a carefully documented self-revelation of German ideals can they fully know what they must overcome—not only they but the German people themselves, for no peace, no matter when it

may come nor what may be its terms, can ever make of Germany "a fit partner for a league of honor" until the German people have driven out the spirit which inspired these utterances made in their name.

There has been no dearth of material for this collection. The compilers collected three times as much as has been used and could find new passages of similar import as long as they had library facilities. It is hoped that this collection is sufficiently representative to convince the reader of the prevalency of some of the more dangerous German conceptions. It is in some respects unique, for many passages reproduced have not been used before for this purpose, at least not in English. Not the least interesting of them are the quotations from the Social-Democratic leaders in the Reichstag, who, before the war, stated the case against the German Government quite as plainly as it has been stated by the outside world since then.

It goes without saying that the compilers have availed themselves of other collections, notably of the four volumes of Andler's Pan-Germanism, of that scholarly compilation, Germany's War Mania, of William Archer's carefully edited Gems of German Thought, of Bang's Hurrah and Hallelujah, and of that little known but excellent anonymous work, The Pan-Germanic Doctrine. A collection recently made in this country, Out of Their Own Mouths, came too late to use. The two collections, however, of which most use has been made are Nippold's *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, a collection of jingo utterances compiled by a German professor at Jena before the war (see p. 127), and Grumbach's *Das Annexionistische Deutschland* (see p. 136).

The compilers have tried as far as possible to get back to originals, although helping themselves freely to translations they could verify. Other collections are acknowledged only where original citations could not be given. It is hoped that all citations are accurate and all passages correctly transcribed. We have to acknowledge the help received from the Minnesota, Harvard, Yale, and Columbia libraries, as well as from the Library of Congress. The rich collection of the New York Public Library has been of the greatest help.

Some pains and space have been used to include contexts, and to see that words were not wrested from their meanings.

It goes without saying that the most quotable passages have been taken. But it may be added that there are scores of German works where, though a brief quotable passage could not be found, the whole teaching is the necessity of aggression against other peoples.

The German writers whom the compilers have read have sought again and again to fan the flame of German hatred by quoting English utterances of a similar character, *three English utterances in all*, and only one of them comparable to the passages in this collection. Of French jingoistic utterances German writers have much to say and little to quote. They talk with greater vagueness of the ambitions of America. It is the unenviable distinction of the small dynastic, feudal, capitalistic, and intellectual groups in Germany, to which these ideas owe their origin, that they have made them nation-wide, systematic, and dominant.

Professors Notestein and Stoll, to whose labors and scholarship the form and content of this collection are due, desire to acknowledge the aid they have had in the work of collection, translation, and annotation from Professors William Anderson, Rupert Lodge, and Dr. Mason Tyler, of the University of Minnesota; Dr. James Wallace, of St. Paul; Professors D. C. Munro, of Princeton; George C. Sellery, of the University of Wisconsin; C. H. Hull, of Cornell; and Guernsey Jones, of the University of Nebraska.

GUY STANTON FORD, *Director,*
Division of Civic and Educational Co-operation.

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"And they fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say."

Vernon Kellogg in Atlantic Monthly, August, 1917.

CONQUEST AND KULTUR

SECTION I.

THE MISSION OF GERMANY.

"We are the salt of the earth."

Kaiser's speech, Bremen, March 22, 1905. Christian Gauss, *The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances*, 1915, p. 239.

"If you ask me 'How shall I build up the Kingdom of God?' my answer is: 'Be a good German.' Stand fast by the Fatherland. Do your duty and fulfill your mission. Seek to submerge yourself in German spirit, in German mind. Be German in piety and will, which simply means be true, faithful, and valiant. Help as best you can toward our victory; help to make our Fatherland grow and wax mighty."

Protestantenblatt, No. 13, 1915. [B., p. 134.]

"Germany's mission is to rejuvenate the exhausted members of Europe by a diffusion of Germanic blood."

A. Hummel, *Handbuch, der Erdkunde*, 1876 (a text for school children), quoted by Guiland, *Modern Germany and her Historians*, 1915, p. 154.

"We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty toward civilization to perform than the great Asiatic power.
* * * We * * * can only fulfill it by the sword."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, p. 258.

General Bernhardi is a German cavalry general who, after his retirement, turned to writing. Germans claim that his books had little circulation. His "*Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*," however, had gone into its sixth edition by February, 1913. *Die Post*, reviewing it in 1912, said that it "engaged the serious attention of our own political and—it need hardly be added—military circles. The great length of his book and its consequent high price prevented it from becoming a really popular book; but it was meant to be a book for the people." The book has frequently been referred to in the Reichstag debates and in the newspapers. There can be no doubt that Bernhardi expressed the feeling of a large part of the influential classes in Germany.

"Cease the pitiful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No longer wail to strangers, who do not care to hear you, telling them how dear to us were the smiles of peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips and how deeply we regret in our hearts that the treachery of conspirators dragged us unwillingly into a forced war. * * * That national selfishness does not seem a duty to you, but a sin, is something you must conceal from foreign eyes. * * * **Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. 'May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. * * * We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements and in proportion to them, is justified in asking and must obtain wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. * * * Now strikes the hour of Germany's rising power.**

"Not only for the territories that are to feed their children and grandchildren is this warrior host now battling, but also for the conquering triumph of the German genius. * * * **Now we know what the war is for: Not for French, Polish, Ruthenian, Lettish territories; not for billions of money; not in order to dive headlong after the war into the pool of emotions and then allow the chilled body to rust in the twilight dust of the Deliverer of Races. No! To hoist the storm flag of the Empire on the narrow channel that opens and locks the road into the ocean."**

Translation from Maximilian Harden in New York Times, Dec. 6, 1914. Harden is a German free lance, editor of Die Zukunft. He says in a keen and incisive manner what many Germans are thinking.

"Its [the war's] meaning and aim is the unification and purification of Germany in order that it may be qualified for its historical

task, to be the heart of Europe and to prepare for a realization of the hopes of European humanity. We are fighting the fight of light against darkness. We are not all good, but our will is bent toward the good. And to the upright of spirit God will allot success." This was his main idea as to the purpose of the war, and it was as if one could hear the clear voices of children singing: **"O Germany, high in honor, thou holy land of faith!"**

The Kaiser as reported by A. Fendrich, *Mit dem Auto an der Front*, 1915, pp. 142-143.

"The more it [German kultur] remains faithful to itself, the better will it be able to enlighten the understanding of foreign races absorbed or incorporated into the Empire, and to make them see that **only from German kultur can they derive those treasures which they need for the fertilizing of their own particular life** [And what glorious results will not victory bring to Germany herself?] * * * A victorious peace will mean the release of world-conquering energy for our industrial life * * * the losses suffered in the war, whatever they may come to, shall be made up, * * * the black-white-and-red flag shall wave over all seas, our countrymen will hold highly respected posts in all parts of the world, and we will maintain and extend our colonies. The whole world shall stand open to us, so that, in untrammelled rivalry we shall unfold the energy of the German nature."

Otto von Gierke, "War and Culture," in *Deutsche Reden in Schwerer Zeit* (1914). I, 93-96. The author is a most distinguished professor of law in the University of Berlin.

"For we are proud of it [German kultur] and know what it means for mankind. When our fatherland lay shattered on the ground Johann Gottlieb Fichte in his memorable Addresses to the German People, here in Berlin more than a hundred years ago, held up the Germans as the one people in Europe which had preserved its original racial purity and as a result its capability of taking on culture; and he found the transition from its former spirit of cosmopolitanism to flaming national enthusiasm in the thought that as this people is called to be the minister of universal culture it is in duty bound to preserve itself. And a half century later (1861), in the midst of the twilight which preceded our great dawn, Emanuel Geibel closed his fine poem, Germany's Mission, with the prophetic lines:

And German culture may bring healing to the nations.

"So think we. So may it come to pass."

Idem, pp. 99-100.

Since the time of Fichte the Germans have clung with growing pride to this notion that they are an original, uncontaminated race. This conception readily united with their philosophical and mystical conception of the State—or rather the Prussian or German State—not as a piece of machinery (after the American fashion, say, or the English) but as something living, almost divine. From this point of view it was only a step to the conception that they were a chosen people. They were chosen to create a new type of culture, they think, and impose it even on an unwilling world.

[Speaking of Belgium:] "The destinies of the immortal great nations stand so high that they can not but have the right in case of need to stride over existences that can not defend themselves, but support themselves shamelessly upon the rivalries of the great."

Hermann Oncken (Heidelberg), *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, September, 1914. Oncken is an eminent professor of modern history at Heidelberg.

"We feel ourselves to be the bearers of a superior kultur. We have no doubt that a defeat of our people would retard by centuries the development of mankind. On the other hand, we hope, by the victory of our arms, to bring about a new efflorescence of humanity through the German nature, which will thus prove itself fruitful of blessings for other nations as well."

Dr. Paul Conrad, *Stark in dem Herrn*, 1915, p. 41. Dr. Conrad is pastor of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Berlin.

"Germany is now about to become, mentally and morally, the first nation in the world. The German nation leads in the domains of kultur, science, intelligence, morality, art, and religion, in the entire domain of the inner life. * * * The world shall once again be healed by the German spirit; that shall be no empty phrase for us. All the deep things—courage, patriotism, faithfulness, moral purity, conscience, the sense of duty, activity on a moral basis, inward riches, intellect, industry, and so forth—no other nation possesses all these things in such high perfection as we do. And because it is so, because **Germany is the leader in the entire domain of intellect, character, and soul**—and in the end the world's judgment depends on these—because Germany is thus more and more becoming

the center of the world, therefore our neighbors look upon it askance and with envy. Thus this war is a war of envy and jealousy of Germany's leadership. It is a fight of hounds against a noble quarry."

Pastor W. Lehmann, Vom deutschen Gott, 1915. Sermon, August 9. [B., 73, 74.]

"Take heed that ye be counted amongst the blessed, who show declining England, corrupt Belgium, licentious France, uncouth Russia, the unconquerable youthful power and manhood of the German people in a manner never to be forgotten. * * * Brethren, make an end of this generation of vipers with German blows and German thrusts."

Pastor J. Rump, Kriegsbetstunden, 1914, II, 75.

"We have become a nation of wrath; we think only of the war. * * * **We execute God Almighty's will, and the edicts of His justice we will fulfill**, imbued with holy rage, in vengeance upon the ungodly. God calls us to murderous battles, even if worlds should thereby fall to ruins. * * * We are woven together like the chastening lash of war; we flame aloft like the lightning; like gardens of roses our wounds blossom at the gate of Heaven. We thank Thee, Lord God. Thy wrathful call obliterates our sinful nature; **with Thine iron rod we smite all our enemies in the face.**"

Poem by Fritz Philippi. [B., pp. 54-55.]

"**Fichte was right in calling us the people of the soul.** * * * [In the sense that] the depth of feeling common to us Germans has become a power controlling our activity and permeating our history, to a degree unknown to any other people. In this sense we have a right to say that we form the soul of humanity, and that the destruction of the German nature would rob world-history of its deepest meaning."

Professor R. Eucken, Die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des deutschen Geistes, 1914, p. 23. Eucken is professor of philosophy at Jena. He is perhaps best known in this country as the author of "Can We Still be Christians?"

"In the midst of the world war Germany lies like a peaceful garden of God behind the wall of her armies. Then the poet

hears the giant strides of the new armor-clad Germany; the earth trembles, the nations shriek, the old era sinks into ruin. Formerly German thought was shut up in her corner, but now the world shall have its coat cut according to German measure, and as far as our swords flash and German blood flows, the circle of the earth shall come under the tutelage of German activity."

Poem by Fritz Philippi, entitled "World-Germany." [B., p. 47.]

"There are races which are incapable of attaining a high humanity, incapable of influencing the world. Such nations are destined to hew wood and draw water for dominant nations. If they can not fill this inferior office, they must perish.

"To a far greater extent than the French and English—races continually talking of freedom—we Germans have made such progress in social equalization that we may consider ourselves far beyond the Romans; and this in spite of the hostile Western powers.

"We notice with anger and horror how the British Nation in its entirety has shown itself false, cruel, and criminal, just as the French have proved themselves in the treatment of their prisoners, barbarians.

"I for my part am convinced that the French are doomed to perdition, and I feel myself free of every emotion of regret. Politically, France may still exist for centuries, but the nation is so dependent for its life on admixture that after the life of a few generations it will be no more."

Professor Rudolph Huch, in *Tägliche Rundschau*, of Berlin. Quoted by Professor R. L. Sanderson and by the *Daily Chronicle*, of London. [N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, Mar. 4, 1917.]

"The whole history of the world is neither more nor less than a preparation for the time when it shall please God to allow the affairs of the universe to be in German hands."

From a speech by "an educational authority in East Prussia." Quoted by the *Dagens Nyheter* [Swedish daily], July 21, 1917.

"One can not rest neutral in relationship to Germany and the German people. Either one must consider Germany as the most perfect political creation that history has known, or must approve her destruction, her extermination. A man who is not a German knows nothing of Germany. We are morally and intellectually

superior to all, without peers. It is the same with our organizations and with our institutions."

"The European conspiracy has woven around us a web of lies and slander. As for us we are truthful, our characteristics are humanity, gentleness, conscientiousness, the virtues of Christ. In a world of wickedness we represent love, and God is with us."

Adolf Lasson, in two letters to a friend in Holland September, 1914. Bernadotte Schmitt, England and Germany, 1916, pp. 93-94. Lasson is a distinguished professor of philosophy in the University of Berlin. See also New York Times, October 29, 1914.

"Not to live and let live, but to live and direct the lives of others, that is power. To bring peoples under our rational influence in order to put their affairs on a better footing, that is more refined power."

Dr. Carl Peters, Not und Weg, 1915, pp. 13-14 [G. p. 343]. Dr. Peters is an eminent German traveler and writer on colonial matters, one of the founders of the Pan-German League, and an ardent advocate of colonial expansion.

Passages such as the above serve to answer Friedrich Naumann's naïve inquiry, "Why is it that we Germans of the Empire are during this war so little liked by the rest of the world?"

"The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and the physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur."

Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthropologie, 1903. Quoted by Andler, Le Pangermanisme philosophique, 1917, p. 273. Woltmann was a socialist and publicist.

"With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language."

Theodore Springman (a manufacturer) in Deutschland und der Orient, 1915 [G. p. 308].

SECTION II.

WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL.

"Now, people of Germany, ye shall be masters of Europe."
(Nun deutsches Volk wirst du Europa's Meister.)

The German poet, Hermann Stehr, in the first number of the *Neue Rundschau* after the war broke out, 1914, p. 1186.

"Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. **'World power or downfall!'** will be our rallying cry.

"Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confident intention of conquering and with the iron resolve to persevere to the end, come what may."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans., 1914, p. 154.

"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over."

Inclosure to letter No. 2, M. Étienne, minister of war, to M. Jonnart, minister for foreign affairs, Paris, Apr. 2, 1913. The French Yellow Book. From a Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army, Berlin, Mar. 19, 1913, an official secret report, which fell into the hands of the French minister of war.

"Our fathers have left us much to do. **The German people** is so situated in Europe that it **needs only to run and take whatever it requires.** The German people finds itself to-day in a plight similar to that of Prussia at the accession of Frederick the Great, who raised his country to the status of a European power. **To-day it is for Germany to rise from a European to a world power.**

"* * * Public policy prompted by the emotions [*Gefühlspolitik*] is stupidity. Humanitarian dreams are imbecility. Diplomatic charity begins at home. Statesmanship is business. Right and wrong are notions indispensable in private life. The

German people are always right because they number 87,000,000 souls. Our fathers have left us much to do."

Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts*, 1911, pp. 230-231. Tannenberg is probably a pseudonym. This work has been called "fantastic" by one Pan-German. It was more extreme than many of the Pan-German works only because it embodied all the various schemes of aggression.

"We are indubitably the most martial nation in the world. For two centuries German vigor upheld the decadent Roman Empire. Only Germans were able to combat the primitive might of Germans. In seven battles of the nations, in the forest of Teutoburg, in the Catalonian plains, at Tours, and at Poitiers, on the Lechfeld near Liegnitz, before Vienna against the Turks, and at Waterloo¹ we saved the civilization (*Gesittung*) of Europe.

"We are the most gifted of nations in all the domains of science and art. We are the best colonists, the best sailors, and even the best traders! And yet we have not up to now secured our due share in the heritage of the world, because we will not learn to draw salutary lessons from history. * * * **That the German Empire is not the end but the beginning of our national development is an obvious truth** which as yet is by no means the common property of Germans. It is recognized only by a few cultivated men."

Fritz Bley, *Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums*, 1897, pp. 21-22. Bley is editor of the "*Zeit-Fragen*" of Berlin. He has had experience in German colonial government.

"No more to be called the people of poets and thinkers in the contemptuous sense in which foreigners have given us the name—as if a timid tribe of irresolute dreamers, caught in the cobwebs of our brains—but to be again what our ancestors were, a people of deeds, that is the thought which thrills through all our more recent popular verse.

We are of the race of the Thunderer;
We will possess the earth;
That is the old right of the Germans—
To win land with the hammer.

"This right of the Germans arises, let it be said once more, out of German civilization, the best on earth. * * * For-

¹ The Germans claim the honors in this battle for themselves.

ward, then, into the fight for German aims and 'far as the hammer is hurled let the earth be ours.' "

Idem, pp. 27-29.

"Our German Fatherland, [to] which I hope it will be granted, through the harmonious co-operation of princes and peoples, of its armies and its citizens, to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman world-empire was, and that, just as in the old times they said 'Civis romanus sum,' hereafter, at some time in the future, they will say 'I am a German citizen.' "

Kaiser's speech, Imperial Limes Museum, Saalburg, October 11, 1900. Gauss, p. 169.

"But any political community not in a position to assert its native strength as against any given group of neighbors will always be on the verge of losing its characteristics as a State. This has always been the case. Great changes in the art of war have destroyed numberless States. It is because an army of 20,000 men can only be reckoned to-day as a weak army corps that in the long run the small States of central Europe can not maintain themselves."

Treitschke, *Politics* (1897), trans., 1916, I, 32. Von Treitschke was one of the most influential of Germany's historical and political thinkers; "Our great national historian," the Kaiser has called him. His lectures at the University of Berlin were crowded with students, students destined to be the thinkers and leaders of Germany; his pronouncements on German policy in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* determined opinion. He wrote history that glorifies the rise of Prussia, he acclaimed the union of Germany and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as he saw it realized through the Franco-Prussian War, he insisted upon the concentration of power in the German State, and on the dominant position of that state in Europe. He pinned his faith to the great state; its rights were paramount. Wars which molded separate fragments into one great political unit, even if wars of conquest, were justifiable. His works became cyclopedias of patriotism, and, because vigorously and entertainingly written, were and are widely read. Their aphorisms have become a part of German political scripture, their philosophy has been the text-book of German statesmen. Bernhardt quotes Treitschke with the same reverence with which he quotes Bismarck and Machiavelli.

"At the start the interests of commerce and of oversea politics go hand in hand; but it becomes a question which of the two will use the other for its ends. Whatever may happen, then,

this is certain: Nationality, culture, world power, and the German Empire itself stand and fall together."

Georg Fuchs, *Der Kaiser, die Kultur, und die Kunst*, 1904, p. 65.

"Your Royal Highness [Prince Ruprecht] has been able to convince himself how powerfully the wave beat of the ocean knocks at the door of our people and forces it to demand its place in the world as a great nation; drives it on, in short, to world politics.

"Germany's greatness makes it impossible for her to do without the ocean, but the ocean also proves that even in the distance, and on its farther side, without Germany and the German Emperor no great decision dare henceforth be taken.

"I do not believe that thirty years ago our German people, under the leadership of their princes, bled and conquered in order that they might be shoved aside when great decisions are to be made in foreign politics. If that could happen, the idea that the German people are to be considered as a world power would be dead and done for, and it is not my will that this should happen. To this end it is only my duty and my finest privilege to use the proper and, if need be, the most drastic means without fear of consequences. I am convinced that in this course I have the German princes and the German people firmly behind me."

Kaiser's speech, Kiel, July 3, 1900. Gauss, pp. 162, 163.

*"We must not forget that, fighting and conquering, we must on to the ever distant pinnacle or down into the abyss. In the crush and scramble of the peoples there is no standing still. The face of the earth is ever changing. * * * Peoples which once proudly sailed the high seas now only hug the shores, soon to disappear."*

Klaus Wagner, *Krieg*, 1906, pp. 248-49. Klaus Wagner is a Bavarian magistrate. His writings have been much used by the newspapers.

"Are we again on the point of a new partition of the earth, as the poet dreamed a hundred years ago? I believe not. I do not particularly wish to believe it. But at the same time we can not suffer any foreign power whatsoever—any strange Jupiter—to say to us, 'What are you going to do about it? All the room in the world has been taken!' We do not want to walk too close to any other power, neither do we want any other

power to trample on us, and we are unwilling to be shoved aside by any foreign power whether in a political or in an economic sphere."

Von Bülow, in the Reichstag, December 11, 1899, Reden, 1907, I, p. 90. Von Bülow was Minister of Foreign Affairs 1897-1900, Chancellor 1900-09.

"Like all nations with interests at sea, we are by our need of coaling privileges—a need most clearly indicated at the time of the Spanish-American War and like other needs at the time of the Spanish-American War written large—we are, I say, driven to the acquisition of bases and stations. * * * The range and extent of our oversea interests—here lies the kernel of the question—have been developed much more rapidly and much more intensively than the material means for protecting and advancing those interests, as this becomes necessary. *If ever the course of world history hastened to bestow upon an undertaking what I might call the historical seal of approval, then this was the case when, directly after the voting of the naval budget, first the Spanish-American War, then the disturbances in Samoa, and then the war in South Africa put our oversea interests at such different points in serious embarrassment, and fate proved it all before our eyes. You will understand, gentlemen, that in my official and responsible position I can not say much, and that I can not dot all my i's. You will all understand me if I say that fate showed us at more than one point on this globe how urgently necessary was the increase of our navy which took place two years ago, and how wise and patriotic it was of this high assembly to assent to the Government bill of that time [1898].*"

Von Bülow, in the Reichstag, December 11, 1899, Reden, 1907, I, 92-94. This address was delivered before the Reichstag upon the introduction of the second naval bill. It is easy to imagine what Von Bülow would have said had he been dotting all his i's. He would have told the Reichstag that, had Germany possessed a navy large enough America would not have been allowed to aid Cuba and acquire the Philippines. It will be recalled how reluctantly Admiral von Diedrichs kept hands off at Manila. The agreement with the United States concerning the partition of the Samoan Islands was made nine days before the delivery of this speech. It had been a distinct disappointment to the German jingo.

"Gentlemen, in spite of our old history, we are the youngest nation among the peoples of western Europe. We have come

late, very late into the arena. Now that we have come, there is need of haste."

Von Bülow in the Reichstag, November 19, 1908. Von Bülow's Reden, 1907-1909, III, pp. 142-143.

"A timorous people, which knows not how to use its elbows, may of course put a stop to the increase in its population—it might find things too narrow at home. The superfluity of population might find no economic existence. A people happy in its future, however, knows nothing of an artificial limitation; its only care can be to find room on the globe for a livelihood for other members of its own race."

Arthur Dix, *Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs*, 1901, p. 28. Dix, like other German writers on foreign policy and economics, laments that the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube, "German rivers," are in foreign territory (pp. 32, 33). The Danube, flowing east, seems to him to beckon German influence on, not only into eastern Europe but to Asia.

Dix is editor of the "Deutsche Bote" and the "Weltpolitik," two journals of Berlin. In internal politics he is a National Liberal, and he bases his arguments on the fact that imperialism will benefit the working classes.

"But can such a state of things continue forever? Can a great and rapidly increasing people like the Germans forever forego further progress and a further extension of its political power? Can we be satisfied forever with our present scanty colonies and with our endangered position in the center of Europe? Is it right for us to run the risk that the increase of our population may be lost again to our own country, as it used to be in former years, and perhaps serve to enhance the power of those States which are hostile to us? **Is it not our duty to open up new spheres of work which further the interests of our fatherland,** to all those intellectual forces of which there is a surplus in Germany, forces which so often strive in vain to find an outlet for their energy?

"It is not only our sacred duty as a nation to strive for the realization and accomplishment of all these purposes, but it will soon be found to be a necessity which will assert itself with elemental force. We shall then be compelled by the pressure exerted by the national will to exchange the policy of resignation and renunciation to which we have adhered all these years for a **policy pursuing positive aims**—the strengthening of our position

in the center of Europe; the final reckoning with France and England; the extension of our colonial possessions, in order to find new dwelling places under the German flag for the surplus of our population; the vigorous protection of Germans abroad; the acquisition of stations for our navy; the further development of our effective forces in proportion to the increase of the forces of our enemies. These are the tasks which we shall have to face in the near future."

Die Post, April 25, 1913. [N., p. 14.]

"We might say that the hostile arrogance of the western powers releases us from all our treaty obligations, throws open the doors of our verbal prison house, and forces the German Empire, resolutely defending her vital rights, to revive the ancient Prussian policy of conquest. * * *

*"All Morocco in the hands of Germany; German cannon on the routes to Egypt and India; German troops on the Algerian frontier; this would be a goal worthy of great sacrifices. * * **

"When we can put 5,000,000 German soldiers into the field we shall be able to dictate to France the conditions upon which she may preserve the empire of northern Africa—'New France'—with her brown Algerian troops. * * * We have entered upon a struggle in which the stake is the power and future of the German Empire."

Maximilian Harden, *Zukunft*, July 29, 1911, p. 151. Here is the principle of the "scrap of paper," before the phrase. It is an old Prussian principle. The Great Frederick when he marched into Silesia cried, "I take first; I shall always find pedants enough to explain the matter afterwards." "When Prussia's power is in question," said Bismarck, "I know no law." "All treaties," wrote Treitschke, the Prussian political theorist, "are concluded on the tacit understanding *rebus sic stantibus* [until conditions change] (New York, 1916, vol. II, p. 596). That is, to quote Hegel, Treitschke's great teacher, "the fundamental proposition of international law remains a good intention, while in the actual situation the relation established by the treaty is being continually shifted or abrogated." With the spirit of these words Prussian policy has generally been in accord.

"The war which seems approaching will decide our whole future. As far as we are concerned, the question is whether we are to maintain our present position in the political world and become a world power or whether we are to be pushed back and become a purely continental state of second rank. I trust that every German may bear that alternative in mind, and that it

may be quite clear to our Government how much is at stake. **All other considerations must recede into the background when the will to power and to victory is concerned.** Every individual German ought to be governed by the determination to win that victory, no matter how difficult this may prove to be."

From an article by General Bernhardi on "Unsere Zukunft" in Hannoversches Tageblatt, Dec. 28, 1912. [N., pp. 98-99.]

"If a permanent understanding [between England and Germany] is to be reached, Germany's interests must be safeguarded in every respect. * * *

"England would have to grant us an absolutely free hand in the domain of European politics and would have to approve in advance any increase of Germany's power on the Continent, as, for example, by a central European federation or by a war against France. She would have to cease throwing diplomatic obstacles in our way when we are engaged in the extension of our colonial policy, so long as we do not seek to further it at her expense. She would have to consent to any territorial readjustments in north Africa in favor of Italy and Germany. She would have to pledge her word not to obstruct Austria's interests in the Balkans nor to thwart Germany's economic aspirations in western Asia, and she would have to make up her mind to refrain from opposing, as she has done hitherto, the expansion of our naval power and the acquisition of coaling stations by the German Empire."

General von Bernhardi in Die Post, Dec. 23, 1912. [N., pp. 97-98.]

"So be it, and when the German Emperor is crowned with victory, then what he promised us in his youthful days will stand forth as a great accomplished fact. *'I am leading you to days of glory.'* Let us forget all our discontent of former times, and let us thank our fate, which has guided us through darkness into light. *Henceforth the German shall be the proudest and best man on earth*—that is the only spirit which is worthy of the great times in which it has been granted us to see and to create."

Karl von Winterstetten, Nordkap-Bagdad, das politische Programm des Kriegs, 1914, p. 40. Winterstetten is a pseudonym for Dr. Albrecht Ritter. His pamphlet Berlin-Bagdad: Neue Ziele, etc., has gone through 14 editions.

"From this it appears that, for Germany, this war is the decisive step toward a real world policy, which she was compelled to take because the Triple Entente, that syndicate of great land monopolists, prevented her from peaceful expansion, from obtaining the elbow room which she requires by peaceful means. *We must therefore look upon this war as necessary for two reasons—it is not only a question of finally repelling the advance of Pan-Slavism, but also of opening up a way for the German people to ascend to the rank of a world power. 'How can we obtain this second object of the war?'*"

Karl von Winterstetten, Nordkap-Bagdad, das politische Programm des Kriege, 1914, p. 17.

"We await in complete unity, calm determination, and confidence in God the hour that will render possible peace negotiations whereby the military, economic, financial, and political interests of the German Empire in all its extent, including the extension of territory which is necessary for all this are secure forever."

Dr. Spahn, former leader of the Centre Party, in the Reichstag, December 8 or 9, 1915. [London Times, Dec. 11, 1915.] The Centre (the Clericals) is the largest party in the Reichstag. Under the leadership of Erzberger it very recently (July, 1917) declared against the policy of annexation, though not unanimously.

"It is on the soil of Europe which has been fertilized by blood that there is growing up for us a German crop, and we shall still the tears of those who have given their dear ones if we can say to them: 'Thy son, thy husband has fallen for this greater and stronger Germany—**bloody sacrifices** have been offered, and more will fall; they **must provide the foundation for a territorial expansion of our country**, for boundaries in the East and West which will secure us peace for a generation.'"

The Deutsche Kurier of Aug. 4, 1915 [G. pp. 76-77.]

"We know it; the German eagle will victoriously unfold his pinions and ascend to a prouder height than ever. And we shall also know how to keep a firm hold for all time to come on the countries which are fertilized with German blood. Our ardent love for our German Fatherland makes us strong to make the greatest sacrifices. *But let us therefore also keep a firm hold on what we have won, and acquire in addition what we*

need. Beyond bloody war is splendid victory—let that be the watchword of this great time.”

Deputy Bassermann at a farewell gathering of the National Liberal Party, of the Central Committee of which he was president, quoted in *Vorwärts*, December 5, 1914.

“In reality, our imperialists are seeking to achieve something quite different. They also know, even if they do not say so to the stupid people (and Bernhardi’s book proves that this is so), that we have indeed the place in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail. But it is something else that they want. *They want the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for the world dominion of Germany*, and that at any rate, is what the others are not prepared to yield to them.

“The German Defense Association¹ (*Wehrverein*) has quite recently expressed this with all the lucidity that can be desired. In this manifesto we find the following words: ‘We need room and air for the further development of our German nationality. **The time for moderation is past.** Relentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we will dictate peace. **Only one peace can be thought of, a peace which assures the permanent leading world position of Germany.** * * * The criminal breakers of the peace, England, France, and Russia, must be so weakened that in future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the world.’”

I Accuse! by a German, 1915, p. 70. See note, p. 131.

“For all who have eyes to see and a mind alive to the world around them the great war has made clear our true situation. **We must insist on being a world power, or we cease to be a great power at all. There is no other alternative.** * * * Let no one here say that small States, too, can have a national life of their own. True, so long as the great States around them allow them to exist. But any day may see the end of their existence, in spite of all treaties to the contrary, and every day brings us fresh evidence how little assured is the existence of small States. * * * **Anyone who still retains belief in such things [treaties] is past all argument:** A man who has not learned wisdom from the events of the last two years is incapable of learning anything. * * * We can not do without alliances,

¹ See pp. 90-91, 92.

but we can only reckon upon them as promoting our own security so long as they are cemented by the greatest possible sense of common interest. Alliances by themselves are worthless. * * *

"If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream—that is, out of its reliance on the good will and honest dealing of peoples and States—it will have done us a great service. There are no ethical friendships between States in our day. There are only friendships of convenience. And friendships of convenience last just so long as the convenience itself.

"That is the sheet anchor of all foreign policy. What we desire for our future therefore is a strong, self-dependent Germany, strong enough to secure, that Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey shall find their greatest safety and prosperity through the German connection—and only through Germany."

Die Zukunft Deutschlands, by Oberstudienrat Dr. Georg Kerschensteiner, member of the Reichstag, in the Europäische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung, December 16, 1916. [Round Table, March, 1917.]

"We have become a flourishing, powerful empire, blessed with material possessions, and we have now won the right with sword in hand to make even greater demands. * * * Ever forward must be our watchword in the struggle of the peoples. We stand on the great divide. *World power for Greater Germany or downfall.*"

Benedikt Haag, Die Weltkommission Deutschlands im gegenwärtigen europäischen Krieg, 1914, pp. 65-66.

"Our forceful policy gets what it wants. And to-morrow Europe will learn to admire us."¹

Maximilian Harden in Die Zukunft, July 29, 1911, p. 149.

"If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the other world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that the will to world power has no limit."

Adolf Grabowsky in Das neue Deutschland, Oct. 28, 1914 [G. 213]. Grabowsky is editor of several periodicals and author of many books on political subjects.

¹ This was written at the time of the Moroccan crisis. See pp. 112-13.

SECTION III.

THE WORSHIP OF POWER.

"To compel men to a state of right, to put them under the yoke of right by force, is not only the right but the sacred duty of every man who has the knowledge and the power. In case of need **one single man has the right and duty to compel the whole of mankind**; for to that which is contrary to right they have, as against him, no right and no freedom.

"He may compel them to right. For right is an idea, absolute, definite, of universal validity; an idea which they all ought to have, and which they all will have as soon as they are raised to his level. This idea, in the meantime, he has in the name of them all, as their representative, by virtue of the grace of God which works in him. The truth of this idea he must take upon his own conscience. **He is the master, armed with compulsion and appointed by God.**"

Staatslehre: Fichte's Werke, 1845, I, iv, p. 436. Fichte (1762-1814), "the patriot philosopher," wrote the Addresses to the German People, which are very familiar to Germans to-day. He was an apostle of German unity.

"Life is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation at the least, and in its mildest form exploitation."

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 259. Nietzsche (1844-1900) has been called the "prophet of the mailed fist." Really he was not a lover of Prussia and its ways, but his ethics were imbued with militarism. He preached the gospel of pride and might, and while his vivid ideas were cast in figures, there is no doubt that they have been as fuel to the militaristic flame. Every German student knows his Nietzsche. His phrase, "the will to power," has been and is a catchword of many German political writers and statesmen.

"It is necessary, then, to choose between public and private morality, and, since the State is power, its duties must rank differently from those of the individual. Many which are incumbent upon him have no claim upon it. The injunc-

tion to assert itself remains always absolute. *Weakness must always be condemned as the most disastrous and despicable of crimes, the unforgivable sin of politics.*"

Treitschke, *Politics*, 1916, I, pp. 94, 95.

"You must in ceaseless labor offer all the powers of body and soul to the building up and development of our troops, and, just as my grandfather labored for his land forces, so, undeterred, I shall carry through to its completion the work of reorganizing my navy in order that it may stand justified at the side of my army and that *through it the German Empire may also be in a position to win outwardly the place which she has not yet attained.*

"When both are united I hope to be in a position, firmly trusting in the leadership of God, to carry into effect the saying of Frederick William I: *'If one wishes to decide anything in the world, it cannot be done with the pen unless the pen is supported by the force of the sword.'*"

From the Kaiser's speech, Jan. 1, 1900. Gauss, pp. 156-157.

"By what right, then, do the States nowadays exist? War has given Prussia, Silesia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hanover—where did rights leave off and where might begin? Did the German Confederation and the sovereign powers which formed it exist by right? During the past 25 years [before 1899] the European powers have divided up Africa amongst themselves—by what right? In the next century they will partition Asia—by what right? What could a court of arbitration do in this case, where there is no law?"

Hans Delbrück, *Erinnerungen, Aufsätze, und Reden*, 1902, p. 515. Delbrück is professor of history at the University of Berlin and editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*. On foreign policies he is accounted a moderate and is one of the most influential German publicists. See note, p. 71, and note, p. 55.

"I am going to pronounce a blessing on this war, the blessing which is on all lips, for we Germans, no matter in what part of the world we are, all bless, bless, and bless again this world war."

Hermann Bahr, *Kriegsseggen* 1915, p. 19. Bahr is a magazine writer, and stage manager of the Deutsches Theater in Berlin.

"Hence when we saw the miracle of this mobilization—all Germany's military manhood packed in railway trains rolling through the land, day by day and night after night, never a minute late, and never a question for which the right answer was not ready and waiting, * * * when we saw all this, we were not astonished, because it was no miracle; it was nothing other than a natural result of a thousand years of work and preparation; it was the net profit of the whole of German history."

Idem, pp. 22-23.

"[The Prussian State] is indeed like the woolen shirt, which irritates but furnishes warmth; it was forced to assume rough and harsh characteristics, created by bitter necessity. In constant pitiless discipline and fulfillment of duty, the people and their princes became great; the State remained long deprived of all that makes life rich, joyous, and beautiful. The peculiar marks of militarism which gave Prussia her individuality remain with her to-day, for the reason that the prerequisites for the existence of Germany as a State are more and more found to be the same as those which were once the deciding factors for Prussia."

Dr. Wilhelm Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War*, translated by W. W. White-lock, 1916.

SECTION IV.

WAR AS A PART OF THE DIVINE ORDER.

*"Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusitania, whoever can not conquer his sense of the gigantic cruelty to unnumbered perfectly innocent victims * * * and give himself up to honest delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive power—him we judge to be no true German."*

Pastor B. Baumgarten, in the pamphlet series entitled "Deutsche Reden in Schwerer Zeit," 1914-15. [Archer, p. 186.]

*"Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars, and the short peace better than the long. I do not advise you to work, but to fight. I do not advise you to compromise, and make peace, but to conquer. * * * Let your labor be fighting and your peace victory. You say that a good cause hallows even war. I tell you that a good war hallows every cause."*

Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, the chapter "Of Wars and Warriors."

"But it is not worth while to speak further of these matters, for the God above us will see to it that war shall return again, a terrible medicine for mankind diseased."

Treitschke, Politics, I, 69.

"The biological importance of war is due to the progressive development of humanity. It is evident that its mental and moral force gives the victory to a nation. That force can be found only among people possessed of a strong vitality and of a progressive civilization. Progress makes for victory. If it were not for war we should probably find that inferior and degenerated races would overcome healthy and youthful ones by their wealth and their numbers. The generative importance of war lies in this, that it causes selection, and thus war becomes a biological necessity. It becomes an indispensable

regulator, because without war there could neither be racial nor cultural progress."

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans., 1914, pp. 110-111. The German title is *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk*.

" * * We Germans and Christians are also taught by honor and duty that there can be no peace for the souls of the dead or the living until a conflict is settled by the victory and triumph of our arms. * * * Pagan belief and Christian faith alike teach us that we should give our lives for our brothers, for our fatherland, for our Kaiser and his Empire, for the victory of our arms, in order that there may be peace for the living and rest for the dead. Therefore war is the most sublime and most holy expression of human activity."*

Jungdeutschland-Post, a weekly paper for juvenile readers, Jan. 25, 1913. [N., p. 1.]

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common. In the cloud palace above sit the heroes, Frederick the Great, and Blücher, and all the men of action—the Great Emperor, Moltke, Roon, Bismarck, are there as well, but not the old women who would take away our joy in war. When here on earth a battle is won by German arms and the faithful dead ascend to heaven, a Potsdam lance corporal will call the guard to the door and 'Old Fritz' [Frederick the Great], springing from his golden throne, will give the command to present arms. That is the heaven of Young Germany."

Jung-Deutschland, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913. [B., p. 212.] Such are the doctrines taught to young boys of about the same age as our Boy Scouts.

"If the 'Twilight of the gods,' which has been brooding so long over the European race and 'kultur,' is to disappear at last and to give way to the dawn of day, we Germans, above all others, must cease to look upon war as our destroyer. The

enemies of our race have dinned this doctrine into our ears until we have almost come to believe it ourselves. *We must bring ourselves at last to see in war our savior again*, a physician who may not be able to deliver us from all the ills of body and mind, but without whom such relief is absolutely impossible of accomplishment."

Tägliche Rundschau, Nov. 12, 1912. [N., p. 23.]

"It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests upon the army."

The German Emperor, in connection with laying the corner stone of a church in Berlin. [G. W. M., p. 93.]

"The most important heritage which my noble grandfather and father left me is the army, and I received it with pride and joy. To it I addressed the first decree when I mounted the throne. * * * And leaning upon it, trusting our old guard, I took up my heavy charge, knowing well that the army was the main support of my country, the main support of the Prussian throne, to which the decision of God has called me.'

Speech of the Kaiser to the Royal Guard, 1898. Gauss, pp. 121-23.

"Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy."

Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 1915, p. 88. Sombart is professor in the Handelshochschule in Berlin, and one of the leading German economists.

"One single highly cultivated German warrior of those who are, alas, falling in thousands represents a higher intellectual and moral life value than hundreds of the raw children of nature whom England and France, Russia and Italy oppose to them."

Professor Haeckel (Jena), *Ewigkeit: Weltkriegsgedanken*, p. 36. Haeckel is one of the best known zoölogists in the world.

"What they call barbarism, history will call primitive strength.

* * *

"We proclaim—no, we do not proclaim, but it reveals itself—the religion of strength."

Adolph Deissmann, *Deutsche Reden in Schwerer Zeit*, I, p. 305. Deissmann is a professor of New Testament exegesis in the University of Berlin.

"Must kultur rear its domes over mountains of corpses, oceans of tears, and the death rattle of the conquered? Yes; it must. * * * The might of the conqueror is the highest law before which the conquered must bow."

Karl A. Kuhn (of Charlottenburg), *Die wahren Ursachen des Kriegs*, 1914, p. 11.

"* * * *The sharper we make our good sword*, the more obstinately we insist on our demands once they are made, and the more foreign nations see that a determined people stands behind our Government, *the better is the outlook for the preservation of peace*. That is apparent in the recent occurrences in the Balkans.¹ Why did not Russia strike at Austria? Only because Germany stood firmly behind her ally. *Then, let us make an end of trying to buy peace by toadying*. It is of no use, and it lowers our standing abroad."

W. Eisenhart, *Deutschland Erwache!* 1913, pp. 51-52. The author proceeds to complain of the German's generosity in relieving the victims of flood or famine in other countries, as another species of toadyism. There is need enough at home; and, besides, Germans get no thanks. In Norway, where the Kaiser and the Germans did much to relieve the distress incident to the burning of Alesund, the summer resort much frequented by Germans, the English, he complains, are really more welcome. Throughout the book the author insists on the necessity of Germans being more German and more independent in attitude toward foreigners. In the last twenty years there has been much of this in German books, newspapers, and conversation. Like Eisenhart, they complain in particular of the German giving up his language and customs when he travels or emigrates.

"On the contrary, *an intense longing for a foremost place among the powers and for manly action fi'l's our nation*."

¹ This refers to the situation at the end of the first Balkan War when Austria insisted on the formation of an independent Albania out of a part of the territories won by the Balkan allies in order to shut Servia away from the sea and keep her dependent on Germany. Russia, supported by the liberal sentiment of Europe, protested, but Germany and Austria threatened war if their wishes were not carried out.

Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. In a great part of the national press this feeling has again and again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the clamor of parties and the party press, would carry all spirits with him."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans., 1914, p. 257.

"Our claim to a great position in the world may certainly lead to a war similar to the Seven Years' War. Still, we shall be as victorious as was Prussia's hero king. That is my absolute and joyous conviction. A great war will unify and elevate the people and destroy the diseases which threaten the national health. The latent forces within our armies require arousing. They will make it unconquerable in hard times. * * *

"Our future lies in our own hands. Small men will talk finance and whine that we can not afford it. We can find the necessary funds easily, in case of need, by loan. * * * Germany does not lack money. What we want is a firm will to greatness. Then only shall we obtain greatness. Everyone must do his best. All true Germans must gather round the Emperor, ready to give their blood and their treasure for the honor, the greatness, and the future of the German nation. 'Through war to victory.'"

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans., 1914, pp. 233, 234. For German title, see above p. 33.

"Each of us must keep himself fit for arms and also prepared in his mind for the great solemn hour when the Emperor calls us to the standard—the hour when we no longer belong to ourselves, but to the fatherland with all the forces of our mind and our body; for all these faculties must be brought to the highest exertion, to that 'will to victory' which has never been without success in history."

The Crown Prince, in *Deutschland in Waffen*, May, 1913.

"A wholesome alternation of appropriate periods of real war and real peace is what the author [Dr. Schmidt-Gibichenfels, *War as a Factor of Kultur*], looks upon as an indispensable

condition for the creation and preservation of all that is good and beautiful and great and sublime in nature as well as in the domain of true and genuine kultur."

Review in Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, December 24, 1912. [N., p. 20.]

"The old churchmen preached of war as of a just judgment of God; the modern natural philosopher sees in war the favorable means of selection. They speak with different tongues but they mean the same thing."

Klaus Wagner, Krieg, 1906, p. 145.

"As a matter of fact, the struggle between the different social classes of one and the same people is nothing but a fever, a process of decomposition within the national organism, whereas a fight against foreign enemies enhances the sound constitution of that organism and endows it with fresh vigor. It is not possible for any people to forego the fight—or at least the readiness to fight against foreign enemies—and at the same time to preserve peace within. *The so-called world-peace does not mean order, but chaos.* It implies, in the first place, an autocracy of the financial powers and the proletarians, directed against the productive classes, and, in the end, in the shape of the 'war of all against all,' a return to those prehistoric conditions which, in the opinion of our cosmopolites themselves, formed the starting point of the whole development of 'kultur' in every form."

Der Reichsbote, Jan. 7, 1913. [N., p. 26.]

[Speaking of Britain:] "Our just hate is too deep, too universal. Every German, every warrior abroad, the boy in his play, the gray-haired man sitting at home in quiet thought, *all are aflame for the reckoning with England.* That for them is victory, and whether they get it or not—we can not tell yet—*hate will further devour, it will be passed on to our children and children's children.*"

Wilhelm Kahl, professor and one time rector at the University of Berlin, Deutsche Reden in Schwerer Zeit, 1914, I, pp. 182-83.

"We are compelled to carry on this war with a cruelty, a ruthlessness, an employment of every imaginable device unknown in any previous war."

Pastor Baumgarten, in Deutsche Reden in Schwerer Zeit, 1914-15. [Archer, p. 86.]

SECTION V.

WAR AS THE SOLE ARBITER.

"We have already seen that war is both justifiable and moral, and that the ideal of perpetual peace is not only impossible but immoral as well."

Treitschke, *Politics*, 1916, II, 599.

"To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with special satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which is only too willing to boast of its international cosmopolitanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the possibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world. This view of life is un-German and does not become us."

The Crown Prince, in *Deutschland in Waffen*, 1913.

"We must not look for permanent peace as a result of this war. Heaven defend Germany from that."

Oskar A. H. Schmitz, in *Das wirkliche Deutschland*, 1914, p. 19.
Schmitz is a writer on politics and literature.

"Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiring people which has not yet reached its political and national zenith and is bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honorably in the civilized world. Every arbitration court must originate in a certain political status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and must treat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of the contracting parties do not agree as an encroachment. In this way every progressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which may easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs and may check the expansion of the young and vigorous State in favor of one which is sinking in the scale of civilization."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, p. 32.

"Between States regarded as intelligent beings disputes can be settled only by material force. War is therefore associated with the notion of a State. If you suppress war you must therefore remove the State, or what amounts to the same thing, the plurality of States; you must set up universal despotism, universal slavery."

Lasson, *Das Kulturideal und der Krieg*, 1868, pp. 15-16. A popular edition has been published recently. Lasson is professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, and one of the leading philosophers of Germany.

"A State organized only for peace is really no State. A State is really manifest only in its preparation for war."

Idem., p. 17.

"War is the fundamental phenomenon in the life of a State, and preparation for it assumes a preponderant place in the national life."

Idem., p. 18.

"It is not alone that which it already has that a State defends by war; it is even more that which, as yet, it has not, but regards as a necessary gain from the war. It is absurd to inveigh against wars of conquest; the sole point of interest is the object of the conquest."

Idem., p. 32.

"The State (which realizes the highest form of the culture of the race) can realize itself only by the destruction of other States, which, logically, can only be brought about by violence."

Idem., p. 35.

"Only the fear of an outside power can impose limits on the territorial expansion of the State. Any intervention [in the affairs of other States] not encouraged by favorable auspices ought to be abandoned; but if success is assured, it is not merely justified, it becomes actually a duty of the State toward itself."

Idem., p. 43. Lasson, writing after the Austro-Prussian War and two years before the Franco-Prussian, manifests a spirit which as an octogenarian he has not lost (see p. 17); it is the same as that of Bernhardi below.

"We must strenuously combat the peace propaganda. War must regain its moral justification and its political significance in the eyes of the public. It is necessary that its high significance as a powerful promoter of civilization should become generally recognized. * * * In short, we must become convinced that a war fought for an ideal or fought with the intention of maintaining one's position in the world is not a barbaric act but the highest expression of true civilization; that war is a political necessity, and that it is fought in the interest of biological, social, and moral progress."

F. von Bernhardt, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans. London, 1914, p. 105. For German title see above p. 33.

"Our position in the world is happily such that if certain sacrifices must be made in the cause of peace, other nations must first be called upon to make them; they must be demanded from Germany only in the last resort."

Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschtum*, 1904, p. 214. [A., p. 54.]
Lange is the founder and president of the *Deutschbund*, a society formed in 1894 to push German colonization in Poland and Hungary.

"The will to war must go hand in hand with the resolution to act on the offensive without any scruples, just because the offensive is the only way of insuring victory. It is and always will be the most effective method of translating the political will into military deeds. That is the reason why we can only deplore the fact that in Germany, which 'enjoys the safest place in the whole world,' as I recently saw it stated quite properly, it has become official and parliamentary usage to speak exclusively of Germany's 'defense,' for which she ought to be prepared. **No; Germany ought to be armed for attack, exactly as in 1870,** and therefore this military preparedness ought to be of sufficient strength to enable us to give military expression, if need be, to the will to war by the use of vastly preponderant forces, as we did in 1870."

General Keim in *Der Tag*, October 16, 1912. [N., pp. 89-90.]

"But there is another lesson to be drawn from the events in the Balkans, namely this, that all questions of high politics must be reduced, in the end, to questions of military force, and not to formulas of international law or closet politics or court diplomacy."

General Keim in *Der Tag*, Nov. 8, 1912. [N., p. 90.]

"When a State recognizes that the existing treaties no longer express the actual political conditions, and when it cannot persuade the other powers to give way by peaceful negotiations, the moment has come when the nations proceed to the ordeal by battle. A State thus situated is conscious when it declares war that it is performing an inevitable duty. The combatant countries are moved by no incentives of personal greed, but they feel that the real position of power is not expressed by existing treaties and that they must be determined afresh by the judgment of the nations, since no peaceful agreement can be reached. The righteousness of war depends simply and solely upon the consciousness of a moral necessity. War is justified because the great national personalities can suffer no compelling force superior to themselves, and because history must always be in constant flux; war, therefore, must be taken as part of the divinely appointed order."

Treitschke, Politics. Trans., 1916, II, pp. 597-98.

"Our country is obliged more than any other country to place all its confidence in its good weapons. Set in the center of Europe, it is badly protected by its unfavorable geographic frontiers, and is regarded by many nations without affection. Upon the German Empire, therefore, is imposed more emphatically than upon any other peoples of the earth the sacred duty of watching carefully that its army and its navy be always prepared to meet any attack from the outside. It is only by reliance upon our brave sword that we shall be able to maintain that place in the sun which belongs to us, and which the world does not seem very willing to accord us."

Crown Prince, in Deutschland in Waffen, 1913.

GERMANY OPPOSES ARBITRATION AT THE HAGUE.

The peaceful settlement of international disputes is largely a gift of the English-speaking peoples to the modern world. It was introduced in the practice of nations by the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, negotiated by John Jay on special mission in London. Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the treaty, which fitly bears his name, submitted the disputes outstanding between the United States and Great Britain to arbitration, and the success of the Commission organized under article 7 caused nations little by little to try the method and, having tried it, to elevate it to a custom. The

peaceful settlement of international disputes, largely by means of arbitration, may properly be called the traditional policy of the United States, and it has been, with one exception, the policy of the United States and Great Britain in the settlement of disputes sure to arise between nations in their mutual intercourse.

Peaceful settlement has not been the policy of Prussia, and where diplomacy has failed, the sword has been drawn. Some of its most thoughtful subjects have indeed been strongly in favor of peaceful settlement, and no one was more devoted to the cause than the great philosopher, Kant, whose tractate on perpetual peace is a classic on the subject. The views of Kant and of his enlightened countrymen have not, however, prevailed. To mention but a number of instances, the war with Denmark of 1848 and 1864 about the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, the war of 1866 with Austria, the war of 1870 with France. At the second Hague Conference the German delegate admitted the feasibility of arbitration, but blocked the adoption of any general arbitration treaty, as the Imperial German Government favored negotiations and treaties with individual nations or nations in pairs. It has steadily refused the offers of the United States, first made by Mr. Root and renewed by Mr. Bryan, to conclude a general arbitration treaty between this country and Germany. The German's fundamental faith in force, evident throughout this pamphlet, finds expression in the hostility to international law and contempt for treaty obligations revealed in the following section.¹

[May 24, 1899.] "Meeting Count Münster [chairman of the German delegation] who, after M. de Staal, is very generally considered the most important personage here, we discussed the subject of arbitration. To my great regret, I found him entirely opposed to it; or, at least, entirely opposed to any well-developed plan. He did not say that he would oppose a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that *Germany is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten days; and that neither France, Russia nor any other power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany.*"

Autobiography of Andrew D. White, 1905, II, p. 265.

[June 9, 1899.] "At 6 o'clock Dr. Holls [secretary of the American legation at the Peace Conference], who represents us upon the subcommittee on arbitration, came in with most discouraging news. It now appears that the German Emperor is determined to oppose the whole scheme of arbitration, and will have nothing to do with any plan for a regular tribunal,

¹We are indebted to Dr. James Brown Scott for this note and the suggestion of the passages from Mr. White.

whether as given in the British or the American scheme. This news comes from various sources, and is confirmed by the fact that, in the subcommittee one of the German delegates, Professor Zorn of Königsberg, who had become very earnest in behalf of arbitration, now says that he may not be able to vote for it. There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies—the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Roumania—leading them to oppose it.”

Idem., II, p. 293.

[June 15.] “Early this morning Count Münster called, wishing to see me especially, and at once plunged into the question of the immunity of private property from seizure on the high seas. He said that he had just received instructions from his Government to join us heartily in bringing the question before the conference; that his Government, much as it inclines to favor the principle, could not yet see its way to commit itself fully; that its action must, of course, depend upon the conduct of other powers in the matter, as foreshadowed by discussions in the conference, but that he was to aid us in bringing it up.

“I told him I was now preparing a draft of a memorial to the conference giving the reason why the subject ought to be submitted, and that he should have it as soon as completed.

“This matter being for the time disposed of, we took up the state of the arbitration question, and the consequences of opposition by Germany and her two allies to every feasible plan.

“He was very much in earnest, and declared especially against compulsory arbitration. To this I answered that the plan thus far adopted contemplated entirely voluntary arbitration, with the exception that an obligatory system was agreed upon as regards sundry petty matters in which arbitration would assist all the States concerned; and that if he disliked this latter feature, but would agree to the others, we would go with him in striking it out, though we should vastly prefer to retain it.

“He said, ‘Yes; you have already stricken out part of it in the interest of the United States,’ referring to the features concerning the Monroe Doctrine, the regulation of canals, rivers, etc.

" 'Very true,' I answered; 'and if there are any special features which affect unfavorably German policy or interests, move to strike them out, and we will heartily support you.'

"He then dwelt in his usual manner on his special hobby, which is that modern nations are taking an entirely false route in preventing the settlement of their difficulties by trained diplomatists, and intrusting them to arbitration by men inexperienced in international matters, who really can not be unprejudiced or uninfluenced; and he spoke with especial contempt of the plan for creating a bureau, composed, as he said, of university professors and the like, to carry on the machinery of the tribunal.

"Here I happened to have a trump card. I showed him Sir Julian Pauncefote's [English delegate] plan to substitute a council composed of all the ministers of the signatory powers residing at The Hague, with my amendment making the Dutch minister of foreign affairs its president. This he read and said he liked it; in fact, it seemed to remove a mass of prejudice from his mind."

Idem., II, pp. 301-302.

[June 16.] "This morning Count Munster called and seemed much excited by the fact that he had received a dispatch from Berlin in which the German Government—which, of course, means the Emperor—had strongly and finally declared against everything like an arbitration tribunal. He was clearly disconcerted by this too literal acceptance of his own earlier views, and said that he had sent to M. de Staal insisting that the meeting of the subcommittee on arbitration, which had been appointed for this day (Friday), should be adjourned on some pretext until next Monday; 'for,' said he, 'if the session takes place to-day, Zorn *must* make the declaration in behalf of Germany which these new instructions order him to make, and that would be a misfortune.' I was very glad to see this evidence of change of heart in the count, and immediately joined him in securing the adjournment he desired."

Idem., II, p. 308.

It should be added that the exertions of Ambassador White and Mr. Holls of the American delegation *apparently* won von Bülow and Prince Hohenlohe to the American arbitration plan. However, at the conclusion, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, of the German delegation, while approving arbitration

in principle, voted against its compulsory application. Germany would, he said, continue to negotiate individual treaties. The reason is evident from von Bülow's speech below.

"Germany has not found any formula that will meet the great diversity which characterizes the geographical, the economic, the military, and the political positions of the various countries, or which would be calculated to put an end to the diversities and at the same time to furnish a basis for an agreement [hence she could not take part in discussions on disarmament at The Hague]."

Prince von Bülow, Reichstag, Apr. 30, 1907. Reden, 1907-09, III, p. 33.

"Here we have, gentlemen, the results of our naval agitation. For what England is doing now, we have to thank the advocates of this naval policy. * * * It is altogether the fault of the German Government that this has come about. This can not be denied. The Liberal Government in England announced from the very first, when it came into power in the beginning of 1906, that it was going to tackle the question of the limitation of armaments. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman announced this at once in the House of Commons. Afterwards Mr. Vivian, an English Labor member, brought in a motion advocating the limitation of armaments. This motion was accepted by the Government and carried in both Houses of Parliament in May, 1906. Indeed, the Liberal Government went so far at that time as to reduce subsequently the naval budget for 1906. A very considerable amount was struck off the naval budget, and the English ministers gave as a reason for this reduction that England meant to take the lead [in disarmament] by practical measures, because each country had always thought that the other ought to take the lead.

"After that, gentlemen, at the interparliamentary conference in London in 1906, in which, as you know, members of this house took part, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman once more set forth the whole matter, and that conference resolved unanimously to submit the question of the limitation of armaments to the second conference at The Hague. And after all this—these words are meant for those gentlemen who formed that resolution—you ranged yourselves on the side of Bülow's policy,

which amounted to this, that the question of the limitation of armaments was prevented from being discussed, and that the British Government was disavowed. On April 30, 1907—perhaps you are by this time sorry for it yourselves—you backed up Prince Bülow in this house, when he carried this policy against the Liberal English Government. Nevertheless, the Liberal English Government persevered in its efforts to further the matter. I need only remind you that Mr. Lloyd George and others, as we were told last year, tried once more to take the matter up with the German Government—not, it is true, in a formal way, but still with sufficient competence in the matter.

“You will have to bear these facts in mind in order to understand what has happened in England. The Liberal Government had taken a stand on this question during all these years, had pledged its authority, and had taken the lead by practical proposals. It was disavowed by Germany. The outcome is to be seen in the result of the general elections—a gain of the English jingoes and Conservatives which is almost decisive. And now the Liberal Party finds itself compelled, in order not to be swept out of power under the influence of the ‘German terror,’ to make this tremendous increase of the navy a plank of its own platform. This is what we have achieved.”

Dr. David in the Reichstag, Mar. 16, 1910. Eduard David is one of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party in Germany.

“Gentlemen, if the great powers wish to come to an understanding in regard to a general international disarmament, they will first have to come to an agreement in regard to the respective rank to which the different nations may lay claim, as compared with each other. An order of precedence, so to speak, would have to be drawn up, and each single nation would have to be entered according to its allotted number, together with the sphere of influence that is to be accorded to it, in some such way, perhaps, as in the case of the industrial syndicates. I must decline, gentlemen, to draw up such a list or to submit it to an international tribunal. * * * *Gentlemen, whoever considers the question of a general disarmament objectively and seriously and follows it up to its last consequences must come to the conviction that it can not be solved as long as human beings are human beings, and as long as states are states.*”

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, Mar. 30, 1911.

SECTION VI.

ECONOMIC NECESSITY OF EXPANSION.

*"The first prerequisites for world power are extensive territory and population, together with a powerful tendency toward expansion. A world power needs extensive territory, * * * not only for food and the raw materials necessary to manufacture but also as a market for these manufactures. Besides, it needs a population bound together by customs, speech and blood. The size of the possessions will not do it of itself—the possessions must be in safe hands, the possessors must be linked together by a strong and inseparable tie. Only that State can be a world power and remain such which disposes of sufficient forces to rule and hold its wide territory and corresponding share of world trade."*

Arthur Dix, *Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs*, 1901, p. 26.

"Economic superiority, which is the result of a more extensive territory, must in time lead to political superiority and predominance. In other words, great kingdoms keen for conquest are in a position finally to make the little ones subject to them; or, vice versa, an economic mastery which is exerted only by possession of capital and by exports to foreign markets, without equivalent political power and territorial mastery, rests on feet of clay. It is the territory which stands at their disposal for their independent development that determines the future of peoples otherwise gifted quite equally."

Max Sering, in *Handels- und Machtpolitik*, 1900, II. pp. 33-34. Sering is professor of political economy in the University of Berlin.

"Because the German people nowadays increase at the rate of 800,000 inhabitants a year they need both room and nourishment for the surplus. * * * If we had limited ourselves to the territory formerly in our possession we should have lost the larger part of our increase to foreign countries and the rest would have been without work. The increase in population would soon have come to an end, and our effectiveness in labor

and in war, the dissemination of German speech, German thought and productivity over the world would not have been able to continue. The increase of population would have passed into the curse of overpopulation—a superfluity of those without work and in misery. That, however, must never be. * * * The rapid growth of the German people must continue to give it room, light, and air. As a world power in the world market, we must assert our place and make it secure in order that the younger hands may find room and opportunity for employment.”

Arthur Dix, *Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs*, 1901, p. 14.

“In order to live and to lead a healthy and joyous life we need a vast extent of fresh arable land. This is what imperialism must give us. Germany may reap the fruits of Russian policy, if she has sufficient courage. * * * What would be the use of a Germanism flourishing in Brazil or in South Africa? It would further the expansion of the German race very greatly, but it would contribute very little to the might of the German Empire. * * * On the other hand, the continental expansion of German territory, the multiplication on the continent of the German peasantry, whose activities and capacities are so immeasurably superior to the obtuse nonchalance of the moujiks, would form a sure barrier against the advance of our enemies, and a secure basis for our growing power.”

Albrecht Wirth, *Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte*, 1901, p. 235. Albrecht Wirth is privat-docent in the Technische Hochschule at Munich and writer of many books and innumerable articles.

“In the good old times it happened that a strong people thrust a weak one out of its ancestral abode by wars of extermination. To-day such deeds of violence no longer occur. To-day everything goes on peaceably on this wretched earth, and it is those who have profited who are for peace. *The little peoples and the remnants of a people have invented a new word—that is, international law.* In reality, it is nothing else than their reckoning on our good-natured stupidity. * * *

“Room; they must make room. The western and southern Slavs—or we! Since we are the stronger, the choice will not be difficult. We must quit our modest waiting at the door. Only by growth can a people save itself. England has its Greater Britain and America its ‘America for the Ameri-

cans.' If England has succeeded in getting 4,000,000 Irishmen out of Ireland without stirring up any of the great powers against her, it is possible for us to bring about peace and order in middle Europe as a basis for the further development of the German people."

Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts, 1911, pp. 74-75.

On pages 99-107, Tannenberg makes it clear that Switzerland, Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland and their colonies must be incorporated in the Empire, if for no other reason because these little countries have profited by German protection gratis, and in the case of Switzerland in particular have profited by German inventions and then undersold the Germans.

"Conquering and occupying the country [western Russia], however, is not enough of itself. What annoyance we have had with this bit of Alsace-Lorraine, with its trifling 15,000 square kilometers! The honor of entering the German Empire and its customs union must be paid for. *Alsace-Lorraine brought us 4 milliard marks for a dowry. That was a tidy sum, but 25 milliards would have been better.*"

In the following paragraph he dwells with satisfaction on the natural richness of the Baltic provinces of Russia, which the German Empire may be expected to seize.

Idem., p. 143.

He speaks apprehensively of the development of the United States, and declares that there is a party in the country which may expand the Monroe Doctrine "America for the Americans" into "The World for America."

As for Spain, he laments the fact that her lost colonies did not fall into German hands. "Fate meant well by us when she bestowed upon us the favor of the quarrel about the Caroline Islands, but unfortunately it turned out otherwise." And he regrets the opportunity, then let slip, to seize "Cuba, the Pearl of the Antilles," and the Philippines.

Idem., p. 215.

"Since Bismarck retired there has been a complete change of public opinion. It is no longer proper to say 'Germany is satisfied.' *Our historical development and our economic needs show that we are once more hungry for territory, and this situation compels Germany to follow paths unforeseen by Bismarck.*"

Daniel Frymann, Wenn Ich der Kaiser wäre, 1911, 21st ed., 1914, p. 9. Frymann's work has been widely read in Germany, much more widely, indeed, than Bernhardt.

"Our national development calls for recognition. A natural right is growing up in that respect. This is not a policy of prestige or of adventure.

"Moreover, we are not an institute for the artificial preservation of dying nations."

Leipziger Tageblatt, Jan. 24, 1913. [N., p. 51.]

"Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. *Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.*

"The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first the procedure is pacific. Overpopulated countries pour a stream of emigrants into other states and territories. These submit to the legislature of the new country, but try to obtain favorable conditions of existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, pp. 21-22.

"Gentlemen, the craving for expansion makes itself felt most strongly in those countries where a rapid capitalistic development obtains, in those countries where the monopolization of industry by syndicates, trusts, and dominating banking interests has reached the highest degree. To this must be added certain differences which have to be accounted for by historic development; and in regard to Germany, it is of special significance that, notwithstanding her enormous industrial progress, she is not a colonial empire of any account. We can not compare our colonies to those of France or England nor even to those of small countries like Belgium and Holland. In view of the efforts of our imperialists and in view of the efforts of our capitalists to monopolize the economically profitable areas, this craving for expansion is, no doubt, a source of great danger."

Deputy Scheidemann, in the Reichstag, Mar. 30, 1911. Philip Scheidemann is leader of the majority Socialist group in the Reichstag and has lately been a leader in the movement for the Stockholm conference.

"* * * Germany, in the interest of her foreign trade and pushed by iron necessity, will, after this war, be driven into 'world-economic' expansion to an extent such as even the boldest advocates of world trade hardly regarded as necessary before the war. The degree to which the treaties of peace create the preliminary conditions for this will decide the verdict on the success of German arms and on the wisdom of German diplomacy."

Bernhard Harms, *Deutschlands Anteil an Welthandel und Welt-politik*, 1916, p. 215. Harms is professor of political economy at the University of Kiel.

SECTION VII.

GERMANY THE RULER OF MIDDLE EUROPE.

The significance of a Middle Europe as planned by the Germans is not easy to grasp. The scheme appears innocent, but let no one be deceived. If realized, what is there in the world to oppose this new Roman Empire? England, with its widely scattered empire, of whose population over one-half is in India; the nonmilitary Republic of the United States; Russia divided by internal dissensions and relatively weakened abroad? Nor should we be deceived as to the final purposes concealed in this plan. Take its relation to Russia. By the inclusion of Poland, Germany would take from Russia its principal manufacturing area. By its ability to close the Dardanelles, Russia's great outlet, it would hold a club over Russia's export trade. Russia is not to-day and will not probably for some years, be in a position to rectify this situation. And economic dependence is very likely in these days to lead to political dependence as well. The effect of Middle Europe on the other parts of Europe can be judged from two sentences of the most moderate of its advocates, Naumann and Von Liszt: "Middle Europe will be German at the core; it will use the German language in its official communications;" and, conversely, "Serbia and Montenegro will have to obey; they will have to do as they are told." This is no commercial scheme—it is a world empire taking shape before our eyes.

"Greater Germany is the goal of the twentieth century. We shall fill Middle Europe with an empire of racial vigor. We shall then be in a position to meet the further duties and demands that are in store for us."

Tannenbergr, Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts, 1911, p. 87.

"Only a Germany that reaches from the Ems to the Danube, from Memel to Trieste, to about the Bug, can compel peace in Europe without imposing a lasting burden on her inhabitants. For only such a Germany can feed herself, only such a Germany can defeat France and Russia. * * * *Since, then, all the world desires peace, all the world must desire such a Germany,*" etc.

Lagarde, Deutsche Schriften (1878), 1891, pp. 113-14. Paul de Lagarde (1827-91), whose real name was Boetticher, was a theologian and professor at Göttingen.

"The strongest Germanic State on the Continent must take over the hegemony; the smaller ones must sacrifice as much of their

independence and their language as is necessary to the permanent insurance of a new imperial unity.

"The question whether military force would become requisite is secondary, but it is essential that the state which aspires to the hegemony should have at its disposal sufficient intellectual, economic, and military power to reach this end and hold it fast. Which state would it be? It can be only the German Empire, which is now in search of more territory." No one can doubt it after the above dissertation on the other great powers. The moral situation, however, is so far favorable to the little Germanic¹ states that a military, fratricidal attack upon them will not be at all necessary. *All depends upon Germany's obtaining the hegemony in middle and western Europe by the subjection of France and the incorporation, at the same time or afterwards, of the German Provinces of Austria in any form that may suit our racial purposes.* The natural pressure of this new German Empire will be so great that, willy-nilly, the surrounding little Germanic States will have to attach themselves to it under conditions which we set."

Joseph L. Reimer, *Ein pangermanisches Deutschland*, 1905, pp. 119-120. Reimer is one of the young liberal-imperialists. His fame rests on this book.

"Let no man say every people has a right to its existence, its speech, etc. With this saying in one's mouth one can easily appear civilized, but only so long as the respective peoples remain separated from one another, are viewed by themselves, and do not stand in the way of a mightier one. * * * When the little nations clash with the great and mighty, then their worth is tried. Duty within and necessity without require that so we should treat them. In this respect there are two possibilities:

"1. The peoples in question have Germanic blood in their veins, belong therefore by nature in part to us, or they have none, are therefore altogether alien.

"2. They are politically or geographically in our way, or they are not.

"In the first case it is our double duty to draw the Germanic blood to us—a duty to ourselves not to let this kindred blood be lost, but to preserve it from further mixture and treasure it

¹ Germanic is not the same as German—it means people who speak a Teutonic language, as the Dutch, Danish, Swedish, or English, and who, as the Pan-Germans love to think, are of Teutonic blood. Actually there is much less of this in the inhabitants of the smaller Teutonic nations and of the German Empire itself than the latter like to acknowledge.

up for the strengthening of our Germanic stock; and a duty to the Germanic blood in these peoples itself to free it of obstructive mixture and **let it have a part in the loftier destinies of a greater Pan-Germanic Germany.**

"If the peoples in question have nothing Germanic about them, and are essentially alien to our culture, then the second question is in place: Are they in the way of our expansion or not? If not, let them develop even as their nature bids them; if they are, to spare them would be folly. Those whom we spared would be a thorn in our flesh which we did not extract—for the thorn's sake."

Idem, pp. 129-130.

"Do not let us forget the civilizing task which the decrees of Providence have assigned to us. Just as Prussia was destined to be the nucleus of Germany, so the regenerated Germany shall be the nucleus of a future empire of the West. And in order that no one shall be left in doubt we proclaim from henceforth that our continental nation has a right to the sea, not only to the North Sea, but to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. *Hence we intend to absorb one after another all the provinces which neighbor on Prussia. We will successively annex Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Northern Switzerland, then Trieste and Venice, finally northern France, from the Sambre to the Loire.* This program we fearlessly pronounce. It is not the work of a madman. The empire we intend to found will be no Utopia. We have ready to hand the means of founding it and no coalition in the world can stop us."

Bronsart von Schellendorf, quoted by H. A. L. Fisher in *The War, its Causes and Issues*, 1914, p. 16.

"*The future territory of German expansion*, situated between the territories of the eastern and western powers, must absorb all the intermediate regions; it must stretch from the North Sea and the Baltic through the Netherlands, taking in Luxemburg and Switzerland, down to the lands of the Danube and the Balkan peninsula, and will include Asia Minor as far as the Persian Gulf. The influence of other world powers must be eliminated from this great territory."

Ernst Hasse, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik*, 1906, p. 65. Hasse was professor of colonial politics at Leipzig, and a municipal official. He was one of the most active leaders of the Pan-German League and its president.

[Franz von Liszt advocates the inclusion of Austria-Hungary, Holland, and the Scandinavian kingdoms, Switzerland, and Italy.] "Apart from an independent Polish state to be formed, the Balkan peninsula, including European Turkey, would form a portion of Middle Europe. We may further count on the inclusion of Bulgaria and Roumania after their territorial wishes have been satisfied, but it remains to be seen what attitude Greece would adopt. Serbia and Montenegro will have to accept the situation and do as they are told. I think the inclusion of Turkey is particularly important, for Turkey connects the Middle European union of states with Asia and Africa, particularly with Egypt and the Suez Canal. By attaching Turkey, a large and fruitful field will be opened for the promotion of peaceful industry and for carrying out the imperial program sketched out at Damascus in 1898. Middle Europe would be connected with the world of Islam.

"If we add up we find that the territories to be included in the Middle European union would extend to 8,000,000 square kilometers. They are inhabited by about 200,000,000 people. In extent the union would rank after the British Empire, Russia, and the United States. In number of population it would rank only after the British Empire. The economic independence of the union would be secured by the colonial possessions of the allied states."

Franz von Liszt, *Ein mitteleuropäischer Staatenverband*, 1914, pp. 32-33. Von Liszt is professor of criminal law at Berlin. Von Liszt signed in 1915 the Delbrück-Dernburg petition against incorporating in Germany independent peoples. But "strategic needs" and "economic" were recognized. Among the 143 signers were men who prefer south-eastern expansion, or colonial—as Delbrück—to the annexation of neighbors.

"A glance at the map shows us that our bulwark against Russia will have to extend from the North Cape to the Black Sea and from hence to the Caucasus and to the Persian Gulf. The Scandinavian countries, the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey ought to form one community; for every single one of these states would be lost if Russia should gain control over one of them, and thus be able to exert pressure on the others. * * * At any rate, it may be said that, within these frontiers, the Middle European community approximately comes up to the mark of equality with our eastern neighbors in

regard to the number of its population." [Winterstetten reckons up over 161,000,000 in the new Middle Europe.]

Karl von Winterstetten, *Nordkap-Bagdad, das politische Programm des Krieges*, 1914, pp. 8-9.

"The establishment of a sphere of economic influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has been for nearly two decades the silent unspoken aim of German foreign policy. Our diplomacy in recent years, which has seemed to the great mass of all Germans vacillating and little conscious of its aim, only becomes intelligible when regarded as part of a consistent eastern design. It is to the credit of Rohrbach to have shown in his writings how the single incidents fit into the general scheme of our policy. It is indeed in this region, and in this region alone, that Germany can break out of her isolation in the center of Europe, into the fresh air beyond, and win a compact sphere of economic activity which will remain open to her independently of the favor and the jealousy of the great powers. Apart from the defense of hearth and home, no other success could compensate Germany for the enormous sacrifices of the war if she did not secure a really free hand, politically speaking, to pursue this economic goal. * * * A secure future for Germany is to be reached along this road and no other, and Germany would be missing the greatest opportunity ever offered her in the history of her foreign relations if she were not now to go forward with vigor and decision to its realization.

From an essay by Dr. Spiethoff in *Die wirtschaftliche Annäherung zwischen dem Deutschen Reiche und seinen Verbündeten*, 1916. I, p. 24 [Round Table, March, 1917.] Arthur Spiethoff is professor of political economy at the University of Prague, Austria.

"Somebody coined the phrase 'Berlin-Bagdad.' Why shall we not say 'Antwerp-Bagdad'? I consider it utterly impossible that we should ever hand back Antwerp to the mad ministers of King Albert. Why should not Antwerp be connected with the Rhine? What we still have to do is to prolong the great waterway into Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Mackensen has seen to it that the guns of Belgrade and Semendria can never again menace our Danube shipping. As for Roumania, that criminal State will never recover the position which she had before."

Dr. Sigmund Günther, Radical, in the Bavarian Diet, quoted in the *London Times*, Mar. 6, 1917.

"And over all these, over the Germans, French, Danes, and Poles in the German Empire, over the Magyars, Germans, Roumanians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs in Hungary, over the Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Southern Slavs in Austria, let us imagine once again the controlling concept of Mid-Europe. *Mid-Europe will have a German nucleus; will voluntarily use the German language*, which is known all over the world and is already the language of intercourse within central Europe, but must from the outset display toleration and flexibility in regard to all the neighboring languages that are associated with it. * * * In this respect much has been lacking before the war. * * *

"In this respect the new generation growing up after the war will do better than the old people, so that a type of Mid-European may be worked out including all elements of culture and strength, the bearer of a civilization of rich and varied content, growing up around the German nationality."

F. Naumann, *Central Europe*, 1916, pp. 108-109. Naumann was a German clergyman and is editor of *Die Hilfe*. He has written many books on social-economic questions, and is a radical in the Reichstag.

"Of the territory Germany now holds in the west she should retain what is necessary to strengthen the security of the Empire by land and sea. This territory, * * * should be annexed 'politically, militarily, and economically.' In the east * * * such territory should be held as would not only improve Germany's position strategically but would afford new territory for colonization."

Resolution adopted unanimously by a committee of members of the National Liberal party of Germany at a meeting held in Berlin, as reported by the *Kölnische Zeitung* and summarized in *Amsterdam* for the *New York Times*, June 4, 1915.

"The course of the history of the world serves as a warning to the states of Middle Europe to join together by close economic ties and to put aside separate political interests for the great purpose of upholding completely the independence and spiritual culture of that kingdom which has won the leading position in Europe among the world powers."

J. Partsch, *Mitteuropa*, 1914, p. 6. Josef Partsch is a professor of geography at Leipzig. This work set forth the geographic basis for a Middle Europe and prepared the way for those who advocated a Middle Europe on economic and political grounds.

"Such a league [between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Holland] is a matter purely for the contracting States, and does not concern France or England or anyone else in the world.

"Should France, with or without England, make such a league the occasion for a declaration of war, it would render the Pan-German movement the same service it did the solution of the German question in 1870. A second Waterloo would suit us. We must keep our powder dry. [If war comes] *no peace should be concluded without the acquisition by the German Empire of the French part of Flanders in Belgium and all of Luxemburg.*"

* * * * *

"Holland needs our settlers and our might for its overseas possessions, which of itself it can not protect and develop. *We need these new Dutch territories, already fertilized by German blood, for the indispensable expansion of our economic dominions.* We need free traffic on a German Rhine to its mouth, a traffic which the silent resistance of Holland now keeps from us.

"* * * If Holland were merely a continental power, this alliance would only come about when Germany was ready to impose her just claims by force. But as the vast transoceanic possessions of Holland are daily crumbling away under a growing menace, the merchant princes of the Amstel and the Meuse are impelled by considerations of personal interest to make common cause with us."

Fritz Bley, *Die alldutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande*, 1897,
pp. 6-7.

"If Middle Europe wishes to become a world power it will have to find its way to the shores of the Indian Ocean, and that way is through Bagdad. Once it has gained a footing on that sea *it will also be able to defend those precious possessions which Holland, in order not to lose them, will have to intrust to the protection of Middle Europe—the Dutch Indies.* Holland has no longer any choice in this new era, when the map of the world is being remade, and when states are being gathered together into vast empires. Either she will have to save her colonies and her independence by joining the Middle European federation (which does not mean the German Empire), or she will lose both. This war will do away with the small neutral states, and at the end of this whole development, for the accomplishment of which more wars than one may prove necessary, there will be only large

federated states left, which is in accordance with the character and tendencies of our times, and is also demanded by the fact that the small countries can only maintain themselves alongside of those gigantic states by joining forces."

Karl von Winterstetten, Nordkap-Bagdad: das politische Programm des Kriegs, 1914, p. 23.

In telegrams which have recently been brought to light from the Russian archives the Czar and the German Emperor are shown to have been arranging in 1905 for a secret alliance endangering Denmark. In case of war with England, Denmark was to be treated as Belgium has been in the present war, except that a preliminary effort was to be made to make the Danes see and accept the inevitable. The German Emperor telegraphed on August 2, 1905, from Copenhagen, where he had gone to break ground for several nefarious schemes.

"Considering great number of channels leading from Copenhagen to London and proverbial want of discretion of the Danish court, I was afraid to let anything be known about our alliance, as it would immediately have been communicated to London, a most impossible thing so long as treaty is to remain secret for the present.

"By long conversation with Isvolsky, however, I was able to gather that actual Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Raben, and a number of persons of influence have already come to the conviction that in case of war and impending attack on Baltic from foreign power Danes expect—their inability and helplessness to uphold even shadow of neutrality against invasion being evident—that Russia and Germany will immediately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on Denmark and occupying it during the war.

"As this would at the same time guarantee territory and future existence of dynasty and country, the Danes are slowly resigning themselves to this alternative and making up their minds accordingly. This being exactly what you wished and hoped for, I thought it better not to touch on the subject with Danes and refrained from making any allusions.

"It is better to let the idea develop and ripen in their heads and let them draw final conclusions themselves, so that they will of their own accord be moved to lean upon us and fall into line with our two countries. Tout vient à qui sait attendre. ['All things come to him who waits.']

* * * * *

"WILLY."

"There is no other solution for Austria than that of becoming a colonial State of Germany."

Paul de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften* (1878), 1891, p. 111. See note, 52.

"Austria lacks a ruling race. Only the Germans can rule in Austria."

Idem, p. 397.

"With regard to the east, the following consideration must guide us: For the great increase in industrial power which we expect in the west we must secure a counterpoise by the annexation of an agricultural territory of equal value in the east.

* * * It is necessary to strengthen the agricultural basis of our national economy; to secure room for the expansion of a great German agricultural settlement; to restore to our empire the German peasants living in a foreign land, particularly in Russia, who are now actually without the protection of the law; *finally, we must increase considerably the number of our fellow countrymen able to bear arms*; all these matters require an important extension of the frontier of the empire and of Prussia toward the east through the annexation of at least some parts of the Baltic provinces and of territories to the south of them, while keeping in view the necessity of a military defense of the eastern German frontier.

* * *

"As to what political rights to give to the inhabitants of the new territories and as to what guaranties are necessary to further German influence and industrial life, we will merely refer to what we have said about France. *The war indemnity to be exacted from Russia should, to a large extent, consist in the surrender of territory.*"

Petition of the Six Industrial Associations to the Imperial Chancellor, May 20, 1915. [G. 126-27.] These associations were the League of Agriculturists, the German Peasant League, The Committee of the Christian German Peasant Union, The Central Association of German Industrialists, the League of the Industrialist and the Conservative Middle Class Association. The influence of these great business and farming organizations can hardly be overestimated.

"The lands we shall demand from Russia must be extensive enough to maintain permanently all Roumanians, even those of Austria and Turkey, in Bessarabia and to the northeast of Bessarabia, * * * as subjects of King Charles. *This policy*

is somewhat Assyrian, but there is no other way. The Germans are a peaceful people, but they are convinced that they have a right to live as Germans and that they have a mission for all nations of the earth."

Paul de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften* (1878), 1891, p. 391.

*"So long, then, as the sun still shines on us it must be our purpose to enter the first class of the economic world group powers. This involves the adhesion of the other Central European States and nations. Except to our comrades of German race living in Austria and Hungary, it is indeed of no special direct interest to these peoples that we Germans should sit in the upper council of universal history. It is not to be expected of them that they should share our historical sentiments, since there beats within them a heart of another race and of different stuff. They will put the question to themselves from their own point of view, whether in the choice of German, Russian, or English leadership they wish to belong to the German world union or not. * * * Hence sooner or later they must decide with which union they will or can range themselves, according to geographical position, production, or mental leanings. This is a harsh necessity, a heavy fate, but it is the overpowering tendency of the age, the categorical imperative of human evolution."*

F. Naumann, *Central Europe*, 1916, p. 194.

"A vital Mid-Europe needs agrarian territories on its boundaries and must make the accession easy and desirable to them. It needs, if possible, an extension of its northern and southern seacoasts; it needs its share in over-sea colonial possessions. But how can all this be talked of now without getting involved in inconclusive discussions of neutrality or in the coming negotiations at the peace congress? * * *

"And who is prepared to say where the future Central European trench-made boundaries will run? Whether they will pass on the inner or the outer side of Roumania, or on this or that side of Bessarabia? Whether they will follow the Vistula or not? Whether Bulgaria is to be included in the Central European sphere of interest or not? Whether or not we shall secure a line of railways to Constantinople in the trusty hands of allies? What Mediterranean seaports will come into consideration as the starting point of Central European railway lines? What will

become of Antwerp? How the Baltic Sea will appear after the war? Thus there are a hundred questions which will still remain to be answered. * * * Their answer will be essentially affected according to whether the German-Austrian union is at bottom something that is desired and determined upon or not. Here and here only is the birthplace of Mid-Europe."

Naumann, Central Europe, 1916, pp. 198-199.

SECTION VIII.

EXPANSION TO THE SOUTHEAST.

"In this nineteenth century, when Germany has become the first power in the world, are we incapable of doing what our ancestors did? *Germany must lay her mighty grasp upon Asia Minor.* * * *

"The Turk has lost his rights, not only from the moral but also from the strictly legal point of view. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 he gave undertakings, not one of which he has kept. His claims are nullified.

[All Europe may be set ablaze.] "But if the health and life of Germany require this mortal and terrible remedy, let us not hesitate to apply it; so be it. God is the judge. I accept the awful responsibility. * * * God never forsakes a good German."

"Amicus Patriae," *Armenien und Kreta, eine Lebensfrage für Deutschland*, 1896, pp. 13, 15, 16. [A., p. 39.] These words regarding the present ally of Germany make strange reading now.

"The right and left banks of the Danube from Presburg to its mouth, the northern Provinces of Turkey, and the west coast of the Black Sea, do they not offer large tracts of land, naturally fertile and as yet unexploited, to German emigrants?"

F. List, *Sämmtliche Schriften* 1850, II, 209. List was a German economist (1789-1846). He advocated in his writings nationalism, protectionism, and a commercial union with Austria. His writings are much quoted to-day by Pan-Germans and by the advocates of Middle Europe, many of whom look upon him as the founder of the movement.

"All weakening of German national energy by pacifist associations or analogous activities reinforces the formidably increasing power of those who rule to-day from the Cape to Cairo, from Ceylon to the Polar Sea. * * * **No truce with England.** Let our policy be a national policy.

"This must be the mainspring of our action in the eastern question. **This is the fundamental reason which necessitates our political indifference to the sufferings of Christians in the Turkish Empire, painful as these must be to our private feelings.** If

Turkey were disintegrated to-day, the fragments of her empire would become the sport of the great powers, and we should be left with nothing, as has happened so often in the past. We must retard the catastrophe. **Let Turkey have any constitution she likes, so long as she can keep herself afloat a while longer.**

"Bismarck taught us to make a distinction between our foreign policy and our domestic policy. The same thing applies to the Christian missions. As Christians we desire the propagation of the faith by which we are saved. But it is not the task of our policy to concern itself with Christian missions.

"The truth here, as elsewhere, is that we must find out which is the greatest and morally the most important task. When the choice has been made, there must be no tergiversation. **William II has made his choice; he is the friend of the Padisha, because he believes in a greater Germany.** * * *

"Imagine a few firm, rigid, incorruptible officials at the head of a territory like Palestine scouring the country on horseback with European promptitude. They would be as much abused as satan, but as useful as angels. * * *

"**A sort of amicable dictatorship would be set up, which would often address Turkey as the bird of the proverb was addressed, 'Eat or die.'** * * * Meanwhile Germans would be settling upon all the shores of the Mediterranean. Good luck to you, my brethern. Work hard. Bestir yourselves. The old sea will yet behold many things. You hold in your hands a morsel of Germany's future life."

Friedrich Naumann, *Asia*, 1899, pp. 145, 148, 162, 163. [A., pp. 41-42.] The force of this doctrine of political indifference to Turkish atrocities is more evident when we recall that Naumann was a pastor of the German church.

"If, notwithstanding Damascus and Tangier, we abandon Morocco we lose at one blow our position in Turkey, and with it the advantages and prospects for the future which we have acquired painfully by years of toil."

Marschall von Bieberstein, German Ambassador to Turkey, to von Bülow, quoted in von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1913), 1914, pp. 84-85. Von Bülow declared that it was upon his advice that the Emperor went to Tangier in 1906.

"New lands for our peasants, the preservation of Germanism within the Danubian monarchy itself, the unification of the whole German race, an open door in the southeast and an open road

for Germanism to pursue its paths as of old, protection of the non-Slav peoples of the southeast against pan-Slavism—in short, ‘Berlin-Bagdad’; this phrase in which all those things are included must be our watchword.”

Karl von Winterstetten, *Berlin-Bagdad, Neue Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik*, 1913, p. 52. See note, p. 25.

“Every day makes it clearer how ineradicably established is one of the prizes of victory won by the Central Powers: it consists in the linking up with the nearer East. The vast territory from Belgrade to Constantinople, Bagdad, and beyond can never again be torn from its political, military, and economic connections with central Europe. Whatever the fate of Poland and Belgium, Constantinople and Sofia are safe from subjection; *Serbia and Roumania can do us no further harm*. And this even Wilson, to whom so much of the course of things in Europe is incomprehensible, will come to understand in time.”

Dr. Heinrich Friedjung in *Vossische Zeitung*, Feb. 14, 1917. H. Friedjung is the leading Austrian historian and a strong advocate of close political and economic alliance between Austria and Germany.

THE MENACE OF THE BAGDAD PLAN.

The Bagdad Railway was part of the splendid scheme to erect a German Empire in the southeast. In that project German statesmen found themselves crossed by the British Government, when it took possession of Ko-wei at the head of the Persian Gulf. To Germans, Britain, with her possessions in every sea, seemed acting the part of the dog in the manger. Whatever opinion may be held about this, it is certain that their scheme was more than a plan for expansion; it was a plot against the British Empire. The following quotations could be paralleled by scores of the same kind. If that were not enough, they could be supported by the revelations of German intrigue in Egypt and India to stir up sedition in those countries. When the Kaiser, in 1898, declared himself the friend of three hundred million Moslems he gave the lead for the policy which his many agents in the East were paid to follow.

“The new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would hasten the break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter.”

Leipziger Volkszeitung, March, 1911, quoted by S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, 1917, p. 13.

“To some extent, indeed, **Turkey’s construction of a railway system is a threat to England**, for it means that an attack on the

most vulnerable part of the body of England's world empire, namely, Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility."

R. Mangelsdorf in the *Akademische Blätter*, June 1, 1911.
Quoted by S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, 1917, p. 14.

"The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success of which, attained with so much effort, is the Bagdad Railway; the victory of the Revolutionary party in Turkey; the prospect of a modern revolutionary movement in India * * * all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political significance of the Bagdad Railway question."

Karl Radek, in *Die Neue Zeit*, June, 1911.

"The prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. * * * *It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot*—and here we come to the point where *the relationship of Germany to Turkey*, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of *decisive importance for German foreign policy*, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England. England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would probably entail also the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan power like Turkey would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia."

Paul Rohrbach, *Die Bagdadbahn* (1901) 1911. Quoted by S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, 1917, p. 19. Rohrbach is a traveler and a very popular writer on colonial and foreign politics. His best known works, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* (1903) and *German World Policies* (1912, trans. 1915), develop the theory of the mission of German kultur. Rohrbach signed the "Delbrück-Dernburg petition." See note, p. 55. See his suggestion, p. 44.

"As early as the beginning of the new century people talked openly, with a triumph which far anticipated events of the railway which would threaten India and render possible a Turkish invasion of Egypt. * * * In this direction we have made great mistakes which were in no way necessary. *The more quietly the Bagdad Railway was built the better.*"

Count von Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik* (1914), ed., 1916, p. 340.

SECTION IX.

SUBORDINATION OF FRANCE.

"In the first place, our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favorable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. **In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy.** This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all can not be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. **France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.**"

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, pp. 105-106. For similar demands see pp. 54, 153.

"Whatever Providence may hold in reserve for Germany it is on France that will fall the task of paying the costs, but in another measure than 44 years ago. It will be no paltry five billions they will have to pay to ransom themselves, but perhaps thirty. *The Holy Mother of God at Lourdes will have much to do if she undertakes, even through miracles, the task of healing all the bones that our soldiers will break in the bodies of the unfortunate inhabitants on the other side of the Vosges.* Poor France! There is yet time for her to change her plans, but in a few hours it will be too late. Then France will receive blows that will be remembered for many generations."

National-Zeitung, July 31, 1914. Quoted by Dampierre, *L'Allemagne et le droit des gens*, 1915, p. 105.

[Speaking of France in the event of a war:] "The victorious German people will be in a position to demand that the menace of the French forever cease. **France then must be crushed.** We must demand further that so much of French soil be ceded to us as we shall need for final security. Then will be the time to

consider the evacuation of which we have spoken. We would finally take such of her colonial possessions as we need," etc.

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre* (1911), 21st ed., 1914, p. 152.

"For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her [France] both politically and economically, and must improve our military and strategical position with regard to her. For this purpose in our opinion it is necessary radically to improve our whole western front from Belfort to the coast. Part of the North French Channel coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards England and to secure better access to the ocean.

"Special measures must be taken to keep the German Empire from suffering internally in any way owing to this enlargement of its frontier and addition to its territory. In order not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine, the most important business undertakings and estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

"Furthermore, it is necessary to impose a mercilessly high war indemnity (of which more hereafter) upon France, and probably on her rather than on any other of our enemies, however terrible the financial losses she may have already suffered owing to her own folly and British self-seeking. We must also not forget that she has comparatively large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could hold on to these with impunity if we do not help ourselves to them."

Confidential petition of the German Professors and other Intellectuals (June 20, 1915) [G., p. 134]. Among the signatories are Friedrich Meinecke, professor of history, Berlin; Hermann Oncken, professor of history, Heidelberg; Herr von Reichenau, retired diplomat; Herr von Schwerin, Regierungs-präsident, of Frankfurt-on-Main; and Dietrich Schäfer, professor of history, Berlin. This document, the other parts of which are equally harsh, was signed by 352 professors, 158 educators and clergymen, 145 administrative officials, 182 business men, 252 artists, writers, etc.; in all by 1,352 men of position. It breathes the same predatory spirit as the Manifesto of the Industrialists.

"We can secure Germany's position on the continent of Europe only if we succeed in smashing the Triple Entente, in humiliating

France, and giving her that position to which she is entitled, as we can not arrive at an agreement for mutual coöperation with her."

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans. 1914, p. 207.

"If the fortress of Longwy with the numerous blast furnaces of the region were returned to the French, then when a new war broke out, the German and Luxemburg furnaces [list of which is given] would be paralyzed in short order by a few long-range guns. Thus about 20 per cent of the production of crude iron and of German steel would be lost. * * *

"Let us say, by the by, that the high production of steel derived from the iron ore gives to German agriculture the only chance of obtaining the phosphoric acid needed when the importation of the phosphates is blockaded.

"The security of the German Empire, in a future war, requires therefore imperatively the ownership of all mines of iron ore, including the fortresses of Longwy and of Verdun, which are necessary to defend the region."

Petition of the Six Industrial Associations to the Imperial Chancellor. [G. pp. 129-30.] See note, p. 60.

"We need a new international law. For a name we need not seek. We may call it English sea law. Treaties of peace must be framed so as to be more effective. *If we had driven out the resisting Alsatians * * * and apportioned the land to our gallant soldiers as settlers we should not be vexed to-day with their Frenchiness.* If in 1871 we had taken the whole district of the Meuse and Moselle, chased out the inhabitants, settled the land anew and taken from France not 5 billions but 25, we should not have been face to face with another war with her in 1878. Such a loss would have robbed France for all time of the power to reënforce the number of our enemies."

Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts* 1911, p. 84.

"We are in a position to offer the French more than any other power could offer them; guaranties for a great African empire; the possibility of reducing expenditure on the army, and devoting the surplus to shipbuilding, a safer and better investment for their capital than the stock of the eastern States of Europe; organizers

of industry and commercial agents. On the other hand, we could take a great deal from them; not only 20 milliards but ancient Carlovingian and Burgundian lands, fertile colonies, and freedom of movement in that Mediterranean which a German Gibraltar near Toulon would transform into a prison."

Maximilian Harden, *Zukunft*, Aug. 19, 1911, p. 249.

"In the same way, in the case of a new victory over France, strategical reasons alone would make it certain that some territories would be annexed; and in the same way it is safe to predict that France would be compelled to compensate and to receive within her own frontiers all those inhabitants of these territories who, for historical and ancestral reasons, do not wish to become German citizens. The future of the nations is not bound up with the domination and exploitation of neighboring countries, but with the occupation and settlement of as large and self-contained areas as possible, just as that has been their life principle in the past."

Der Reichsbote, Jan. 7, 1913 [N., p. 26].

"It [the prospect of war] is entertained without emotion. *The profits are calculated—the annihilation of France, an indemnity of war amounting to twenty-five milliards because it is remembered that last time you paid up too easily—and then we shall rub our hands.* You smile! That is because you don't know what Germany is to-day. It is a nation of shopkeepers; love of gain is its ruling passion; to earn money, to get rich quickly, is its one ideal."

Alfred Kerr, in an interview with Georges Bourdon. *The German Enigma*, 1914, p. 166. Kerr is a German, editor of the review, *Pan*. Bourdon, a Frenchman, visited Germany in 1912 to learn from prominent Germans their view of Franco-German relations.

"Assuredly nothing is eternal here below. No one can tell if such and such a State will be able eternally to hold its trans-Atlantic possessions. France lost its immense colonial empire in the eighteenth century; it has reconstituted in the last decades a second one. One may indeed say that the Gallic cock has taken quite too much of the African sands. * * * France holds more territories than she can administer. Her work in Algeria and in equatorial Africa is wretched. One can say the same of France as of Belgium, to wit, that some day they must renounce a part of their possessions."

Kölnische Zeitung, May 9, 1914. The *Kölnische Zeitung* is reputed to be in close connection with the German Government.

SECTION X.

SEA POWER AND COLONIAL EXPANSION.

"In order to assure to our people the horizon which girdles the earth, colonies and sea power are indispensable."

From a telegram sent to von Reichenau, chairman of the Verein für Deutschum im Ausland, May 2, 1916, by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. [G. p. 25.]

"It is quite conceivable that a country without colonies may cease to rank as a great European power, however strong it may be. Therefore, we must never become rigid as a purely continental policy must make us, but see to it that *the outcome of our next successful war must be the acquisition of colonies by any possible means.*"

Treitschke, Politics, 1916, I, p. 119.

"The first and most important of all the national demands which we shall have to make when the time comes for the signing of peace must be a demand for a very large colonial empire, a German India. The empire must be so big that it is capable of conducting its own defense in case of war."

Hans Delbrück, Bismarcks Erbe, 1915, p. 202 *et seq.* Delbrück (see note, p. 30) is leader of those in Germany who wish to see colonies acquired rather than lands in Europe. He is a sharp critic of the Pan-Germans whose plans, he holds, alarmed the United States and brought her into the war. See p. 93, also note, p. 55, and pp. 72-73.

"All that was before the Serajevo murder. People also concerned themselves, of course, with the Austrian problems, but confined themselves mostly to critical remarks against the pro-Slavic policy of the Austrian Government. The 'premature death' of Francis Ferdinand was called, to be sure, the 'most important event since Bismarck's dismissal, perhaps even since the days of Versailles.' But this crime was by no means important in the Pan-German agitation, especially as there seemed to be uncertainty as to the course that Austria would pursue. *The necessity*

for a world war was looked upon from the start as a western European question, having to do with the acquisition of colonies by Germany."

Kurt Eisner, The Pan-German Society, New York Times Current History, VI, p. 678. Eisner is a writer and socialist. This article first appeared in Die Neue Zeit, April 23, 1915.

"Where does the great aim lie which we must fix for ourselves; or, to put it better, what is the exalted wish at the fulfillment of which we must aim when the final victory has been granted to us? It can only lie overseas. **The greater our victory, the greater must our colonial empire become.** Assuming that, whether by our land victories or by the submarine war, we had reduced England to such an extent that, in spite of the help of America, she renounced the continuation of the war and was ready to recognize our direct or indirect domination over Belgium, we should still have to say—not Belgium, but Africa; not the coal area of Charleroi, but Nigeria; not Zeebrügge, but the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde Islands; not Antwerp, but Lagos, Zanzibar, and Uganda, and Gibraltar for Spain. Not economic advantages and the forced imposition of treaties of commerce, **but a war indemnity in cash or raw materials.**

"None of our allies has any interest in Germany winning Belgium. The interest of Austria-Hungary is, indeed, the opposite, because Austria-Hungary can not desire the German Empire, although it is an ally, to achieve the hegemony of Europe. On the other hand, Turkey has a very strong and direct interest, and Austria-Hungary at least an indirect interest, in Germany winning a great colonial empire in Africa; Austria-Hungary an indirect interest, because the economic advantages, the supply of raw materials, which a colonial empire guaranties, will benefit Austria also. **If our victory is great enough, we can hope to unite under our hand the whole of Central Africa** with our old colony of Southwest Africa; Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Dahomey, well-populated Nigeria with the port of Lagos, Cameroon, the rich islands of San Thome and Principe with their splendid ports, the Kantanga ore district, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mozambique and Delagoa Bay, Madagascar, German East Africa, Zanzibar, and Uganda; and in addition the great port of Ponta Delgada in the Azores, one of the most important and most-frequented coaling stations, and Horta, one of the most important centers of the trans-Atlantic cable system. At present the Azores belong to Portugal, which is at war with Germany;

Portugal also owns the Cape Verde Islands, with the port of Porto Grande, one of the most frequented coaling stations in the Eastern Atlantic.

"All these territories together have over 100,000,000 inhabitants. United in a single ownership, and with their various characteristics supplementing one another, they offer simply immeasurable prospects. They are rich in natural treasures, rich in possibilities of settlement and trade, and rich in men who can work and also be used in war. To demand them is not unjust and does not offend against the principle of equilibrium, since Germany would thus only be obtaining a colonial empire such as England and Russia, France and America have long possessed."

Delbrück in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, quoted in the *London Times*, July 25, 1917. See note above, p. 71.

"Our existence as a State of the first rank is vitally affected by the question whether we can become a power beyond the seas. If not, there remains the appalling prospect of England and Russia dividing the world between them, and in such a case it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English moneybags would be the worse alternative."

Treitschke, *Politics*, 1916, I, pp. 33-34.

"Away from the Continent, on the great theater of the world, where our interests have grown a thousandfold and are necessarily striking root ever more widely as a result of our rapid increase in population, only a strong fleet is able to give us permanently such a secure and respected position [as we have on the Continent because of our army]. May we not neglect the opportunity to develop our naval power to such a pitch that not only we may assert our will as against countries like China with vigor such as is used by peoples with whom we think ourselves otherwise equal, but that we may also hinder by fear of our home fleet every one of our competitors, even the mightiest, from arbitrary meddling with German commercial development—from every insult to our German flag."

Hermann Schumacher, in *Handels- und Machtpolitik*, 1900, II, 245. Hermann Schumacher is professor of political economy at the University of Bonn. About China, see p. 144.

"The German people is of one mind with its princes and its Emperor in the feeling that in its powerful development *it must set up a new boundary post* and create a great fleet which will correspond to its needs.

"Just as Emperor William the Great created the weapon by whose help we became again black, white, and red, so the German people is now lending its efforts to forging the weapon through which, God willing, and in all eternity, it will remain black, white, and red."

Kaiser's speech, Berlin, Feb. 13, 1900. Christian Gauss, p. 158. The Kaiser often refers to his grandfather, William I, as "the Great." The weapon alluded to here is the increase in the size of the army which Bismarck, in defiance of the constitution and in spite of an adverse majority in the Diet, succeeded in maintaining in 1862-1866.

SECTION XI.

THE LOST TEUTONIC TRIBES.

"The German Empire has become a world empire. Everywhere in distant quarters of the earth thousands of our countrymen are living. German guardians, German science, German industry, are going across the sea. The value of what Germany has upon the seas amounts to thousands of millions. *It is your earnest duty, gentlemen, to help bind this greater German Empire firmly to our ancestral home.* The vow which I made you to-day can become truth only if you are animated by a united, patriotic spirit and grant me your fullest support. *It is my wish that, standing in closest union, you help me do my duty not only to my countrymen in a narrower sense, but also to the many thousands of countrymen in foreign lands. This means that I may be able to protect them if I must.* It is with this wish, and deeply conscious of the injunction which is issued to us all—'What you have inherited from your fathers, conquer it in order that you may possess it'—that I raise my glass to our beloved German Fatherland and call out: 'Long live the German Empire!'"

Kaiser's speech, Berlin, June 16, 1896. Gauss, pp. 102-103

"The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominion of the emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of German fellow countrymen have been incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against the Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, p. 76.

"Like broken-off fragments from the wall of an old fort lie on the west side of Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland. In their present position, they are all products of the nineteenth century."

J. Partsch, *Mitteleuropa*, 1904, p. 181. See note above, p. 57.

"When our brothers of the Low-German race shall have gotten over their almost childish fright at 'annexation by the Prussians' they will acknowledge that the admission of Holland into Greater Germany is advantageous to both parties. [Moreover, in the bosom of Greater Germany, the Dutch would be able to preserve, to a reasonable extent, their own peculiar characteristics.] * * *

"If the Rhine from its source to its mouth becomes a truly German river, it will then be the Low-German or Dutch commercial towns and seaports near its mouth which will chiefly benefit thereby."

Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 (1893), 1895, p. 13. Anonymous, by a "Pan-German;" but a semi-official statement of the Pan-German League. Grell, *Der Alldeutsche Verband*, 1898, pp. 13-14.

[Speaking of the present sentiments of the Belgians and the Dutch, and their probable preferences:] "One may count on it that both countries, given a choice between Germany on the one hand and England and France on the other, would take England and France; would repeat the error, then, of Hanover, Hesse, and Nassau in the time of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. They should not be surprised if the consequences are the same."

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre* (1913), 21st ed., 1914, p. 154.

"As for Belgium and Holland, it must be clear to both that this [coming] war will determine their future. As matters in Europe have come to a head, one may freely avow that *such little States have lost their right to exist*. For only that State can make a claim to independence which can make it good, sword in hand."

Idem, p. 153.

[Holland is to-day in the position of the beggar contenting himself with the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table. The tendency of Great Britain, France, and Russia to become self-supporting powers must gradually impoverish Holland and in time drive her into the arms of Germany or expose her to the

rapaciousness of imperialistic empires. Holland is no longer desirable as a military ally, having nothing to offer in return. The more Germany develops her canal system the more the Dutch ports will lose their trade. **But Germany "is in the position" to dictate terms and to force Holland, economically, to seek union and absorption.** Holland can form an alliance with Germany of a precisely opposite nature to the ill-fated alliance she formerly contracted with Spain. Of course, Germany would have the casting vote in things political, but otherwise Holland would retain a large amount of independence. Germany must aim at an economic *rapprochement*, but she can afford to wait, and need be in no hurry to precipitate matters. In case of war Germany could not be expected to regard the Dutch ports as "neutral" and refrain from making use of them. Holland must be aware of that, as also of the martial spirit that has distinguished the Hohenzollerns from the days when their gun called "Lazy Peg" (faule Grete) battered down the old fastness of Friesach. Germany, to make a long story short, if put to it, "Fara da se": Holland must eventually be amalgamated with Germany, as both countries stand and fall together; the same language, ideals, and ideas distinguish both peoples, who must be one.]

Grenzboten, July 25, Aug. 1, Aug. 8, 1901. [Summarized in P. G. D., pp. 110-111.]

"If Belgium, as we hope and as the Belgians hope, is to be divided after the war between Germany and France, vast portions of the Belgian and French Congo will have to be included in Germany's colonial empire, which we would then complete by the acquisition of British East Africa and Uganda, in exchange for Kiau Chau, New Guinea, and the Australasian Islands. Such an empire could easily be defended from the sea, and it would have to be considered whether we could not exchange Togoland, which is isolated, for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Germany would then have a colonial empire worthy of her enterprising spirit, and it would yield us all the raw material we need."

Baron Albrecht von Rechenberg in Nord und Süd. [Round Table, March, 1917.] Rechenberg has been in the foreign office and has held various colonial appointments.

"Because it is needful to insure our credit on sea and our military and economic situation for the future in face of England, because the Belgian territory, which is of the greatest economic

importance, is closely linked to our principal industrial territory, Belgium must be subjected to the legislation of the Empire in monetary, financial, and postal matters. Her railways and her water courses must be closely connected with our communications. By constituting a Walloon territory and a Flemish territory with a preponderance of the Flemish, and by putting into German hands the properties and the economic undertakings which are of vital importance for dominating the country, we shall organize the Government and the administration in such a manner that the inhabitants will not be able to acquire any influence over the political destiny of the German Empire."

Petition sent to the Imperial Chancellor, May 20, 1915, by six industrial associations—the League of Agriculturists, the German Peasants' League, the Committee of the Christian German Peasant Union, the Central Association of German Industrialists, the League of Industrialists, and the Conservative Middle Class Association. [G. p. 125.] See note, p. 60.

[Professor Ernst von Halle speaks definitely of the necessity of incorporating Holland on the one hand and Austria and the Balkans on the other, because it is an unnatural thing that Germany should not possess the mouths of the great rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, which take their rise within her borders. Belgium should be partitioned between Germany and France. Later he complains of the Dutch profiting at the expense of the Germans in their customs arrangements, and of the dangers to Germany involved in the possession of the mouth of the Rhine by a people so easily a prey to her enemies.]

Volks und Seewirtschaft, 1902, II, pp. 1-8. Ernst von Halle was professor of political economy at the University of Berlin.

"You can not talk and sing about an invincible Watch on the Rhine as long as the Dutch and the Swiss do not sing the same tune."

Bley, Die alldutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande, 1897, p. 4.

"We may then leave it to Switzerland to choose whether she shall enter the German customs union and the Pan-German confederation, bringing all her cantons or only the German

ones with her, or whether she shall form part of the German Empire on equal terms as a Federal State."

Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa (1893), 1895, p. 17. See p. 76.

"To speak quite frankly: Austria will assent finally to that shifting of the weight of gravity which took place in 1866. She will renounce all future claim to be the chief ruling power in Central Europe, as she was in her ancient days of splendor. There is no formal dependence involved, no curtailing of sovereignty, no giving up of inherited power, but all the same there will be an actual acknowledgment of the existing position of forces."

Naumann, Central Europe, 1916, p. 61.

"'Land, more land,' is the old battle cry which has reverberated without ceasing throughout the ages of German history from prehistoric times to the present. * * * A nation which tries to acquire land exclusively by peaceful means cannot hope for success or for permanent possession in the general struggle for 'a place in the sun,' but is usually rewarded by ingratitude and doomed to perish. The desperate situation of the Germans in the Slav and Magyar countries and, we should like to add, the disappearance, which is going on slowly but surely, of the German strain in the Anglo-Saxon States, in North America, in South Africa, and Australia, impress the fact upon our minds that it is not sufficient to further 'kultur' exclusively by peaceful means. Such efforts are misjudged and resisted, if those who are trying to introduce or to further 'kultur' are simple and indifferent enough to let the proper time go by for achieving racial union and for asserting themselves in the political world, if need be, by the use of armed force. * * * Therefore it is also a national duty to fight against our worst enemies; that is to say, against the racial indifference and the political immaturity of the Germans in the minds of old and young alike, by spreading information by tongue and pen in schools and associations."

From a review of Karl Tolle, *Das Deutschtum im Ausland*, in the *Deutsche Welt*, weekly supplement of the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, Mar. 29, 1913. [N., p. 21.]

"In the interest of the world's civilization it is our duty to enlarge Germany's colonial empire. Thus alone can we politically,

or at least nationally, unite the Germans throughout the world, for only then will they recognize that German civilization is the most necessary factor in human progress. We must endeavor to acquire new territories throughout the world by all means in our power, because *we must preserve to Germany the millions of Germans who will be born in the future, and we must provide for them food and employment. They ought to be enabled to live under a German sky, and to lead a German life.*"

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans. 1914, p. 83. For German title, see above, p. 33.

SECTION XII.

DISPOSSESSING THE CONQUERED.

"Germans alone will govern * * * they alone will exercise political rights; they alone will serve in the army and in the navy; they alone will have the right to become landowners; thus they will acquire the conviction that, as in the Middle Ages, *the Germans are a people of rulers. However, they will condescend so far as to delegate inferior tasks to foreign subjects who live among them.*"

Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 (1893), 1895, p. 48. See note, p. 76.

"If we take, we must also keep. A foreign territory is not incorporated until the day when the rights of property of Germans are rooted in its soil. With all necessary prudence, but also with inflexible determination, *a process of expropriation should be inaugurated, by which the Poles and the Alsatians and Lorrainers would be gradually transported to the interior of the Empire, while Germans would replace them on the frontiers.*"

Friedrich Lange, Reines Deutschtum, 1904, p. 207. [A., pp. 24-25.] See note, p. 40.

"We wish to commence in a new empire a new life of which the supreme aim shall be: **Greater Germany whose task shall be the well-being of Germans.** All other laws are dependent on this great one.

"The Reichstag of Greater Germany is to be elected by universal suffrage. All voters must be married and 30 years of age. Voting rights will be conferred only on those admitted to the rights of complete citizenship. Those only may become complete citizens whose mother tongue is German, whose education corresponds to that of the common school (Volksschule), who are of pure German blood, and who take the oath of allegiance. Rights of citizenship may be canceled by the courts for any word or act contrary to German interests. * * *

"The new addition, the Greater Germany, * * * will only be represented in the Reichstag when their Germanization is com-

plete. All officials of Greater Germany will use the German language; interpreters may be permitted in cases of necessity, but at the cost of the person requiring them, and this cost will be proportionate to the importance of the case as well as to the litigant employing the interpreter. Part of the sum thus gained shall be turned over to the public treasury to be applied in German colonization.

"Books, newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets of any kind must be printed in German. * * * Foreign books may be imported only after authorization by the State and on payment of a tax of 100 per cent ad valorem. Foreign newspapers must obtain the same authorization and pay the same tax. The state shall have the right to take the first page of the principal edition of every newspaper without recompense, in order that it may present to the people governmental views in nonpartisan fashion. * * *

"No foreigner shall acquire house or land in Greater Germany." * * *

Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts 1911, pp. 82-83.

"When we have won, and obtained territorial concessions, we shall receive lands inhabited by French or Russians, consequently by enemies. One wonders if such an increase of territory will improve our situation. In our national egoism and hardness of heart we have not got so far as to demand from a vanquished enemy the cession of uninhabited territory. * * *

"To speak openly on the question of 'evacuation' has its utility, so that our enemies should know that this extreme measure has its supporters in Germany. * * *

"Those who have learned to think according to the historical school will be horrified when we demand the 'evacuation' of land inhabited by Europeans; for that signifies the violent interruption of an historical development centuries old. Besides, the idea wounds the sensibilities of civilized man and is contrary to the modern law of nations which protects individual property. But if we consider seriously the peculiar position of the German people, squeezed into the middle of Europe and running the risk of being suffocated for want of air, *it must be agreed that we might be compelled to demand from a vanquished enemy, either in the East or in the West, that he should hand over the unpopulated territory.* * * *

"We must not contemplate an offensive war undertaken with the object of getting territory evacuated; but we ought to get used to the idea that such a step would be admissible as a reply to an enemy's attack."

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre*, (1911), 21st ed. 1914, pp. 140-141.

"We may depend upon the re-Germanizing of Alsace, but not of Livonia and Kurland. **There no other course is open to us but to keep the subject race in as uncivilized a condition as possible**, and thus prevent them from becoming a danger to the handful of their conquerors."

Treitschke, *Politics*, I, p. 122.

[In case of war with Russia:] "We shall demand the cession of such territory as we need for the straightening of our frontiers and for colonization. *Evacuation of it will be required.*"

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wäre*, (1911) 21st ed. 1914, p. 170.

"War will unify the strong nation that is capable of a future and make it free, and will establish the people on a healthy substantial basis. Those are the two chief purposes of war. A third can, however, be suggested, *that a nation even when her national and fundamental interests do not coincide with those of another nation, still must rudely destroy this people's highest interests, must indeed remorselessly cut off from this foreign people the means of living for the future.* It is a great, powerful nation which overturns a less courageous and frequently degenerate people and takes its territory from it. For a great, strong people finds its house too narrow, it cannot stir and move about, cannot work and build up, cannot thrive and grow. The great nation needs new territory. *Therefore it must spread out over foreign soil, and must displace strangers with the power of the sword.*"

Klaus Wagner, *Krieg*, 1906, p. 80.

"Slowly, not too hastily, we people of Germanic blood must

proceed in the settlement of the lands which are to be ours in the future. * * *

"The lands which we need to-day and in the future for colonizing, we must thoroughly cleanse of foreign elements."

Idem, p. 171.

"By right of war the right of strange races to migrate into Germanic settlements will be taken away. *By right of war the non-Germanic [population] in America and Great Australia must be settled in Africa.* * * * *By right of war we can send back the useless South American Romance peoples and the half-breeds to North Africa.*"

Idem, p. 173.

"The historical view as to the biological evolution of races tells us that there are dominant races and subordinate races. Political history is nothing more than the history of the struggles between the dominant races. Conquest in particular is always a function of the dominant races. * * *

"Where now in all the world does it stand written that conquering races are under obligations to grant after an interval political rights to the conquered? Is not the practice of political rights an advantage which biologically belongs to the dominant races? * * * What are the rights of the masses? * * * In my opinion, the rights of men are, first, personal freedom; secondly, the right of free expression of opinion—as well as freedom of the press; * * * and, finally, the right to work, in case one is without means. * * *

"In like manner there is the school question. The man with political rights sets up schools, and the speech used in the instruction is his speech. * * * **The purpose must be to crush the [individuality of the] conquered people and its political and lingual existence.** * * *

"The conquerors are acting only according to biological principles if they suppress alien languages and undertake to destroy strange popular customs. * * * Only the conquering race must be populous, so that it can overrun the territory it has won. Nations that are populous are, moreover, the only nations which have a moral claim to conquest, for it is wrong that in one country there should be overpopulation while close at hand—and at the

same time on better soil—a less numerous population stretches its limbs at ease.

[As to the inferior races:] “From political life they are to be excluded. They are eligible only to positions of a non-political character, to commercial commissions, chambers of commerce, etc. * * * **The principal thing for the conqueror is the outspoken will to rule and the will to destroy the political and national life of the conquered.**” * * *

K. F. Wolff, *Alldeutsche Blätter*, Aug. 30, 1913. Wolff is one of the regular staff of the Pan-German organ. The extremists among German political writers are continually bearing in memory the condition of affairs which prevailed in ancient Sparta and India, and in Medieval Europe, where serfdom or a distinction of races prevailed. Such a distinction, they say, is warranted by history and by science. The fittest, the strongest should rule; the weak should serve and obey. A new warrior aristocracy should be created of German blood.

SECTION XIII.

THE PAN-GERMAN PARTY.

The Pan-German League was established in 1890 as a result of the dissatisfaction over the Zanzibar negotiations with England by which Germany gained Heligoland in return for certain concessions in East Africa, and in response to an editorial in the *Kölnische Zeitung* entitled "Germany, wake up." The organization was soon united with a group which Dr. Carl Peters had established in 1886 for the furtherance of German oversea interests. The first congress was held in 1891, and in 1894 the *Alldeutsche Blätter* was established as the organ of the League.

"In place of the great enthusiasm of the year 1870, which inspired the German people to heroic deeds, a certain apathy has become manifest. Economic interests and social questions push into the background individual utterances of a marked national feeling. Although the interests of *Deutschtum* are every year injured in the most shameless fashion, now here, now there, the great mass of the German people remains indifferent and disinterested. While other peoples defend energetically the holy possessions of their race, and everywhere with success, we consume our energies in internal party struggles and grow apathetic in deceptive self-content. National tasks should not be placed behind social and economic ones. We must strengthen our national feeling and bring home to the mass of our people the fact that Germany's development did not end in the year 1871. We ought not to forget that beyond the boundary lines compassed by the black, white, and red flag thousands of Germans reside; that the German nation is justified, and in duty bound, no less than other nations, to take its share as a dominant power in the history of the whole world; and that in our progress toward the position of a world power we only took the first step when the German Empire was founded. That our demands are not unrealizable was demonstrated by the speech of our Emperor, January 18, 1896, at the banquet in celebration of the foundation of the German Empire, when the Emperor pointed out that Germany had become a world power, whose subjects dwelt in far-off lands, whose interests in the world were estimated at milliards of marks, whose duty it had therefore become to protect the

many thousands of Germans in foreign parts, and to link this greater German Empire closer to the home country."

Official circular of the Pan-German League, soliciting membership. Grell, *Der Alldeutsche Verband*, 1898, pp. 7-8.

1. "To quicken the patriotic self-consciousness of Germans. and to offer opposition to all movements antagonistic to national development.

2. "To treat and solve all questions bearing upon the bringing up of children and higher education in the Germanic sense.

3. "*To watch over and support all German national movements in all countries where Germans have to sustain a struggle in support of Deutschtum, with the object of embracing and uniting all Germans on the globe.*

4. "To promote an active German policy of interests in Europe, and across the seas, and especially to further the colonial movement for practical purposes."

Statutes of the Pan-German League, first adopted May 10, 1903. Grell, p. 8. See also *Handbuch des alldeutschen Verbandes*, 1906, pp. 21-22.

"*Who wields the decisive influence on the trend of foreign politics in Germany? Who gives the life impulse to economic driving forces? Absolutely none other, for a quarter of a century, but the Pan-Germans. They have acquired a greater influence on the shaping of national policy than even the mightiest combination of interests among the great landowners and capitalists. In the course of years they have put through more measures than all the political parties and all the parliamentary subdivisions of Germany taken together.*"

Kurt Eisner, in *Die Neue Zeit*, trans. New York Times Current History, VI, p. 676. See note, p. 72.

"*Since the second Morocco crisis [1911] the 'world war' had been the ever-recurring catchword in the Pan-German Society's organ, and the German world 'concerns'—the popular word for 'interests'—had been the dominant subject. From the early part of 1914 the leader of the Pan-German propaganda, Dr. Ritter, who was dismissed shortly before the war, traveled about making speeches dealing with the world war, in which, following a well-known pattern, the splendors of war and the immorality of peace were*

presented and the absolute necessity of war for the realization of German world ambitions was set forth."

Idem, p. 676. See note, p. 72.

"Lending their coöperation to this program of the Pan-German Society and its manifold ramifications and *affiliated organizations are the Land Owners' League, the Central Industrial Society, and others, a portion of the capitalistic interests, especially shipowners, and finally*—and herein lies the special nature of this society—*its executive heads are former generals and admirals.* Besides this, it has the coöperation of a staff of 'intellectuals' whose activities extend everywhere. The latter, having acquired, mostly by foreign travel, certain kinds of knowledge and experience, are welcome to the press as experts whenever there is a controversy regarding any question of world politics; on such occasions the Pan-German propagandists bob up, as collaborators and information suppliers of the press, in huge numbers, like snails after a rainstorm, and public opinion is delivered over almost defenseless to them. The secret and the danger of their influence, however, lie in the fact that, whereas public opinion is invariably swept forward irresistibly by the force of events, *the Pan-Germans, by unflagging energy, have been preparing these very events for years.*"

Idem. pp. 674, 675.

"The fuel for all this agitation has been furnished by the Imperial Admiralty. The predecessor of Herr Tirpitz, Herr Hollmann, more than once declared in the budget committee that if we thought that the admiralty fostered a naval agitation he was far from being the one to do it; he thought himself too good for that and the undertaking unworthy his office. *With Herr Tirpitz all was changed.* He furnishes the official articles, he commands the corvette captains who by their writings are to soften the hearts of the Reichstag and pen all the articles in the Berlin Correspondence and in the North-German Gazette. *From his office the provincial papers are directed, and the pamphlets provided with material* which are sent into the world under the anonymous signature of 'A Friend of the Fatherland.' And if it is not possible to arouse enthusiasm in this fashion, then *they attempt at least to give people a scare.* A pamphlet * * * says, 'What shipping carries our flag is too much to perish and too little to survive. * * * If we do not support the new naval program * * * it will be visited on our children and our

children's children.' Then appears a pamphlet from the official publishing house of Mittler & Son, in which is said: 'A State must approve of this program if it will not merely lead the life of a drudge;' or what are great sacrifices in comparison to an unsuccessful war? * * * If this program is rejected a war at sea threatens our coasts, harbors, and maritime cities with pillage and fire; and the whole German Empire may be stricken at a blow from the list of the rich and commanding world powers. Gentlemen, here is nothing new; we have had it all before."

Eugen Richter in the Reichstag, December 11, 1899. Tombo, *Deutsche Reden*, pp. 192-194. Deputy Richter proceeds to show that the same methods were employed to induce the Reichstag and its electorate to vote large increases to the army in 1887. The Reichstag of 1886 had refused to vote the increases and had been dissolved. The new Reichstag passed the bill in 1888.

Pan-Germans describe themselves as "warm-hearted Germans who never forget to think of the future development of the German people, just as a father provides for the future of his children, and is not engrossed merely with the present."

Heinrich Calmbach, *Alldeutsche Katechismus*. Quoted by Vergnet, p. 8.

Calmbach is one of the writers attached to the Pan-German League.

"Furthermore, England is afraid of nothing so much as of a war. * * * *Unfortunately, all the efforts for better relations with England will come to nothing so long as the German Philistine who has taken the beautiful title of Pan-German, is saturated with hate of England and presses for war with her.* It is very easy through a so-called national or patriotic phraseology to win over the masses and to stir up feeling against another kingdom. What a lot of trouble they make the leaders of the Pan-Germans do not consider; they take no responsibility for the consequences of their jingoistic efforts."

Deutsche Revue, January, 1913, p. 95. This is an unsigned leading article in the well-known German periodical.

"From the first projected naval program to the most recent law for defense, every single plan for preparedness has originated in Pan-German circles. They were the advance guards. **Twice they pushed the 'Morocco' question almost over the precipice to a world war.** And eventually Sultan Abdul Aziz, whom I made in 1906 the hero of an article which unfortunately passed un-

perceived, became, after all, the 'Sultan of the world war,' in so far as western European problems are responsible for the catastrophe.

"When the *Panther* suddenly appeared off Agadir, in the summer of 1911, German public opinion was caught entirely unprepared.¹ But anybody who had taken the trouble to follow the propaganda and publications of the Pan-German Society might have predicted months before that some day a world crisis would come as punctually as any of the issues of the weekly organ of the society, the *Pan-German Gazette* (*Alldeutsche Blätter*). To readers of this paper the act of the *Panther* was as comprehensible as the arrival of their favorite sheet—they had been, so to speak, subscribers for six months to one as well as to the other. And it may be remembered what a joyful outcry there was in the press, especially in provincial papers, over the 'act of deliverance' of the *Panther*. What had previously been urged only by Pan-German sheets, from their hiding places, was now taken up by the great papers. They sought to make the incident lead to the uttermost extremes. In vain the semi-official ones tried to reassure themselves; for months the press agents of the Pan-German Society proved themselves the stronger. The publisher of the *Grenzboten*, Cleinow, a trusted ally of the foreign office, spoke in those days of the activity of a Krupp press agency. And when the responsible heads of the Government succeeded once again in calming the storm a renewed passionate agitation of the Pan-Germans began. Under the immediate pressure of the unwelcome² Franco-German agreement, General von Bernhardi wrote his fateful book, *Germany and the Next War*.

"The program of the Pan-German Society is simple and clear. The 'nationalistic' Pan-German illusions are merely an idealistic by-product for the delectation of teachers and professors affiliated with the society. The real goal is the acquisition of colonies where Germans may settle, where German peasants may cultivate the soil, of colonies that may supply us with raw material for our manufactures and use German products in exchange. That is the 'sure market,' the dream of the German export trade."

Kurt Eisner, in *Die Neue Zeit*, trans., *New York Times History*, VI, 674-675. See note, p. 72.

"The Defense Association (*Wehrverein*) has opened the eyes of

¹ For the Morocco dispute, see note pp. 112-13.

² Of 1911.

the German people to the fact that we can not hope for victory unless we have a strong military force. The navy by itself alone is of no avail, and the Germans have no guarantees that victory must always be theirs. The famous Prince Leopold of Dessau once said that God was always on the side of the strongest battalions. But these strong battalions are no longer at our disposal. We must all realize this. Our people ought to be permeated with a sense of responsibility. *That the Defense Association was necessary, that it has been moving in the right direction and has demanded only what was absolutely indispensable, is proved by the third army bill, in which all those demands which the Defense Association considered necessary have been embodied.* We must insist on the fact that it was we who took the lead, and who recognized the needs of our people in time. * * * Our schools ought to reform their curricula. The classical stuff ought to be done away with, and our younger generation ought to be imbued with the German point of view. Patriotism is the highest form of idealism. That is what we ought to inculcate in the minds of our young people.

"The history of the German nation and of its 'kultur,' which is unequaled, entitles it to a voice in the affairs of the world. Modesty will not get us far. It is sometimes necessary to answer by means of the sword."

From a speech by General Keim (retired) in a meeting of the local branch of the Wehrverein in Darmstadt, as reported in the Darmstädter Tageblatt, Apr. 23, 1913. [N., p. 87.]

"The chairman, Attorney Class, of Mayence, opened the proceedings with a discussion of the political situation.

"If we are unanimous to-day in backing up our Government and in thanking them for bringing in an army bill conceived on so great a scale, we may be permitted at the same time to give expression to the hope that the armed forces of Germany will be really made use of, in case jealous rivals or neighbors should oppose our national needs. *Our rapidly increasing nation must assert its right to exist. It must look out for fresh land.* * * * The German Empire must look far ahead in safeguarding its future, and the only way to do this is the *resolute adoption of an active policy.*' [Loud and long-continued applause.]"

From a report of a meeting of the general committee of the Pan-German League in Munich, contained in the Tägliche Rundschau, Apr. 21, 1913. [N., p. 77.] Heinrich Class is a lawyer and was one time president of the Pan-German League.

"The Pan-German League is convinced that the future of Germany's economic position in the world can not be permanently assured unless we pursue a comprehensive and progressive policy of colonization. Our future is to be safeguarded only by the acquisition of colonies of our own."

Meeting of the local branch of the Pan-German League in Halle, as reported in the *Saalezeitung*, Nov. 8, 1912. [N., p. 74.]

"General Keim: Every good German ought to be a member of the Defense Association (*Wehrverein*). The Defense Association is fighting for the military preparedness of our nation, for those ideals which the German people ought to pursue. **There is a smell as of gunpowder pervading the world, even where we do not hear the roll of the muskets.** The Defense Association took this state of things into account as long as a year ago. It is guided by the conviction that Germany cannot enjoy peace unless she has an army strong enough to preserve it. * * * One can often hear it said: Why should there be war or for what end? The kings do not want it nor do the Governments and least of all the people. Then why have war? But war does not depend on the will or wishes of human beings; it is as inevitable as the forces of nature; **it is an irresistible demoniacal power, which makes all written agreements, all humanitarian efforts, and all peace conferences miserable failures.**"

From a report on a meeting of the local branch of the *Wehrverein* in Cassel, in the *Casseler Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb. 6, 1913. [N., pp. 81-82.]

"We are celebrating, on this New Year's Day, the centenary of a great historic event. It is the day of Tauroggen, on which Yorek's courageous deed¹ in the mill of Poscherun ushered in a new era for Prussia and for Germany. At that time, too, the thirteenth year of the new century was the year of liberation from gloom and oppression, and we could wish for nothing better from the coming year. Should a war be necessary to accomplish this, as it was necessary a hundred years ago, **should the 'year of fire and flood' really be followed [as our prophets will have it] by the 'year of blood'—well, in that case the German people will reveal**

¹ Gen. Yorek was in command of a Prussian corps in the service of France in Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812-13. After the retreat of the latter from Moscow Yorek entered into relations with the Russians and made a collusive surrender of his corps to them which then passed into the Russian service. Patriotism inspired his act, although the military ethics of his action were doubtful.

to the world that they are ready to-day, as they were in 1813, to defy a world in arms."

Die Post, Jan. 1, 1913, [N., p. 7.]

"The fear of German despotism is one of the most solid with which we have to reckon, and one of the strongest enemy powers against which we have to fight. In Germany this fight is the fight against the Pan-Germans. * * *

[Delbrück proceeds to point out the danger:]

"When their demands [those of the Pan-Germans] are so exaggerated that they put serious difficulties in the way of any entrance into negotiations, and when the forces which put forward these demands are so excessively strong that even a strong and independent government can not detach itself from them. That is the case with us at present, since *the circles which put forward the Pan-German demands, and in which this propaganda is carried on, are essentially circles on which the government is obliged in part to rely in the whole of its domestic policy.*"

Delbrück in the Preussische Jahrbücher, quoted by Manchester Guardian, May 24, 1917. See note, p. 71; also note, p. 55.

"Listen to the Colonial League: 'We need colonies, and more colonies than we have already, to give vent to our surplus energies without losing them and to make our motherland economically independent.' The Navy League adheres to this view and says: 'We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we have now, but to bring about the acquisition of others.' * * *

"With the voice of these leagues the military writers chime in. All honor to the many-sided knowledge that appears in this abundant literature. *But it is ground into the soldier that the best defensive is the offensive; he laments therefore in a form more or less veiled that we do not make use of our superior military strength in order to extend our power. And so readiness for war imperceptibly becomes a need for war.*

"The most important link, finally, in the chain of irresponsible politicians is the Pan-Germans. The aims of this association are not clear.

"According to the name, they seek the political union of all those who are bound by German tongue and lineage; in practices however, they employ their influence to bring German interest, (or rather the parties interested), wherever they are in the world,

to the top. A thoroughly praiseworthy undertaking; only *in the choice of means they do not depend merely on dexterity but recommend smartness and dash, in other words threatening and violence—dangerous weapons. For in the case of failure, they bring shame; in case of success, disfavor and revenge.*”

Leading article in *Deutsche Revue*, July-September, 1912, pp. 257-258. The methods of “smartness and dash” (i. e., as if in fencing), here described as those advocated by the Pan-Germans, were those adopted when the Austrian and German foreign offices, with their 48-hour ultimatum, dealt with Serbia. They proved as dangerous as the writer feared. Professor Delbrück, of Berlin, says (*Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1915, p. 234): “Was this abruptness intended * * * to render the keeping of peace impossible? Many say so, particularly those in foreign countries. It seems to me that the exact opposite could be said with more justice. * * * Expressed in markedly mild terms the Serbian demands would have accomplished nothing materially * * * and would have given an impression of weakness and irresolution.” The article in the *Deutsche Revue* aroused great resentment among the Pan-Germans. It was attributed by some of them to Kiderlen-Wächter, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose foreign policy they regarded as pusillanimous.

“**The People** can no longer rightly believe that the present battles are inevitable battles of defense. They **have a rather gloomy suspicion that a policy is being pursued**, and here a positively disastrous effect is produced by certain documents **in which great leagues and private persons express lust of conquest**. Only general ideas of their contents reach the great mass of people, but to the best of my belief their existence is well known in every barrack, in every workshop, and in every village inn. The consequence of this literature of conquest is the disappearance of simple faith in the defensive war.”

Friedrich Naumann, *Die Hilfe*, as quoted in *The New York Times*, Aug. 24, 1916. Herr Naumann then advises that the people be taught that the present German occupation of enemy country is a great blessing for the Germans, and also that it is absolutely necessary because the enemy occupies German colonies in Asiatic Turkey, Eastern Galicia, and also a bit of the Vosges. They should also be told that the war has to go on because the enemy still desires to crush Germany.

SECTION XIV.

PAN-GERMANISM AND AMERICA.

"The most dangerous foe of Germany in this generation will prove to be the United States."

Dr. Otto Hötsch in *Alldeutsche Blätter*, Aug. 23, 1902. Hötsch is really speaking here of commercial war, but to him political war was a natural sequence of commercial. Hötsch is professor of history at the royal academy in Posen and at the war academy in Berlin.

"Operations against the United States of North America must be entirely different. With that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has until now been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force in order to combat the encroachments of the United States upon our interests. **Our main factor is our fleet.** * * * It is evident, then, that a naval war against the United States can not be carried on with success without at the same time inaugurating action on land. * * * It is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the Government would be willing to treat for peace.

"If the German invading force were equipped and ready for transporting the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions, these corps can begin operations on American soil within at least four weeks. * * * **The United States at this time [1901] is not in a position to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank.** * * *

"The fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by the invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for peace. To accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the Nation meet.

It should be so managed that a line of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize in a short time many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to impose heavy indemnities. * * *

"As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the United States."

Freiherr von Edelsheim, *Operations upon the Sea*, trans. 1914, pp. 86-92. Edelsheim was a second lieutenant in the service of the German General Staff in 1901, when he wrote these words. They are not official, but the opinions of a military man and a nobleman.

"The German Empire has become a world empire. Everywhere in distant quarters of the earth thousands of our countrymen are living. German guardians of the sea, German science, German industry, are going across the sea. The value of what Germany has upon the sea amounts to thousands of millions. It is your earnest duty, gentlemen, to help bind this greater German Empire firmly to our ancestral home. * * * *It is my wish that, standing in closest union, you help me to do my duty not only to my countrymen in a narrower sense, but also to the many thousands of countrymen in foreign lands. This means that I may be able to protect them if I must.*"

Kaiser's speech, June 16, 1896. Gauss, 102. This is one of the Kaiser's most pointed and significant utterances. The protection of German citizens in South America could only mean interference in the affairs of South American nations, and if they refused such interference it was likely to mean such ultimatums as Austria sent Serbia. Such a statement was a threat against the Monroe Doctrine and was likely to involve the United States.

"The Germanization of America has gone ahead too far to be interrupted. Whoever talks of the danger of the Americanization of the Germans now here is not well informed or cherishes a false conception of our relations. * * * In a hundred years the American people will be conquered by the victorious German spirit, so that it will present an enormous German Empire. Whoever does not believe this lacks confidence in the strength of the German spirit.

Letter of a New York German, Robert Thiem, to the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, Sept. 20, 1902. The *Alldeutsche Blätter* thinks the author

rather optimistic. Germans differ as to the outcome in America, says this Pan-German organ. Some are very pessimistic. The *All-deutsche Blätter* thinks that the great hope is for Germans in America to retain their language.

"Immigration [to the United States] is mainly German and Irish. Since immigrating Germans quickly pick up the English-American language, they make a good cement for the great American structure. Whether it will always be so, whether at last the American Germans will harken to the voice of the blood, and whether the arrogant Irish will ever melt into the American nationality like the Germans is not yet demonstrated. The Monroe Doctrine lacks as yet a justification in the unified character of the people."

Fritz Bley, *Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums*, 1897, p. 8.

It is therefore the duty of everyone who loves languages to see that the future language spoken in America shall be German. It is of the highest importance to keep up the German language in America, to establish German universities, improve the schools, introduce German newspapers, and to see that at American universities there are German professors of the very highest ability who will make their influence felt unmistakably on thought, science, art, and literature. If Germans bear this in mind, and help accordingly, the goal will eventually be reached. At the present moment the center of German intellectual activity is in Germany; in the remote future it will be in America. The Germans there are the pioneers of a greater German culture, which we may regard as ours in the future. He advises the Germans to compose themselves into an aristocracy of talent, which is the most effective way nowadays to obtain political power. Germans only need to grasp the situation and the future is theirs. Let them show that they mean to maintain *Deutschtum*, and then emigration may be directed to America with impunity.

Hübbe-Schleiden, in the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, Feb. 21, 1903. [Summarized in P. G. D., pp. 319-321.] Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden is a traveler, student, and writer on German colonization.

"The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a

political alliance with the Irish, and thus united constitute a power in the State with which the Government must reckon."

Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans., 1914, p. 78.

"From all this it appears that the **Monroe Doctrine** cannot be justified. * * * So it remains only what we Europeans have described as an aspiration. And so it remains **only what we Europeans almost universally consider it, an impertinence.** With a noisy cry they try to make an impression on the world and succeed, especially with the stupid. The inviolability of the American soil is invoked without there being at hand the slightest means of warding off the attack of a respectable European power."

Johannes Vollert, *Aldeutsche Blätter*, Jan. 17, 1903.

"We must desire that at any cost a German country containing some twenty to thirty million Germans may grow up in the coming century in south Brazil—and that, too, no matter whether it remains a portion of Brazil, or becomes an independent State, or enters into close relationship with our Empire. Unless our connection with Brazil is always secured by ships of war, and unless Germany is able to exercise pressure there, our development is threatened."

Gustav von Schmoller, *Handels- und Machtpolitik*, I, p. 36. Schmoller at the time of his death (1917) was the most distinguished economic historian in Germany.

"The more Germany is condemned to an attitude of passive resistance toward the United States the more emphatically must she defend her interests in Central and South America, where she to-day occupies an authoritative position. Now, in matters of equity and respect for the law the Romanic peoples in America can not be judged according to European standards, and in certain circumstances Germany will be constrained all the more to employ coercive political measures in proportion as the amount of German capital invested (in State loans, railways, plantations) in those parts increases. *For this purpose we need a fleet capable not only of coping with the miserable forces of South American States, but powerful enough, if the need should arise, to cause Americans to think twice before making any attempt to apply an economic Monroe doctrine in South America.*"

Von Schulze-Gaevernitz in *Die Nation*, Mar. 5, 1898. Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz is professor of political economy in the University of Freiburg.

"While Englishmen and Yankees are everywhere disliked on account of their sharp and reserved manner, the French were, until the seventies, the unrivaled leaders and patterns of these peoples [the South Americans] in their progress toward a higher culture; but now through their want of numbers and through their swift decline into universal corruption, they have forfeited much of their leadership. Would that the Germans might be called through their talents and activities to be the intellectual, economic, and political leaders of these peoples. * * *

"The Germans seem marked by their talents and by their achievements to be the teachers and the intellectual, economic, and political leaders of these peoples [the Spanish and Portuguese Americans].

"If the Germans do not accomplish this mission, then, sooner or later, in consequence of political or financial bankruptcy, the nations of Spanish and Portuguese America will come under the domination and exploitation of the United States." * * *

J. Unold, *Das Deutschtum in Chile*, 1899, pp. 62-65. Johannes Unold is professor in the *Handelshochschule* at Munich and is a zealous Pan-German.

"The moral sanction of the Monroe Doctrine disappeared on the day when the treaty for the annexation of the Philippines was signed by McKinley. Thereby America broke the tacit agreement, 'Do not mix in American affairs and I will not mix in affairs outside America,' and gave us the right to set up a doctrine of a Greater Germany against that of a Greater America. *European interests, and with them the German, lie in America in case we have the power to support them effectively. We shall not forbear to accustom America to this point of view.*"

* * * * *

"It depends on the political situation when German diplomacy shall hold the time fit to put a value on the Germans of Venezuela and their interests by taking possession of a harbor * * * and thus do the cause of peace and the development of the country the best service. * * * But nothing can be done and German emigration should not be directed to South America unless the question whether Germany means simply to obey the Ameri-

can order of hands off in South America is first answered in the negative."

W. Wintzer, *Die Deutschen im tropischen Amerika*, 1900, pp. 78, 81, 82. Wintzer is a journalist and author. It will be noted that this was written just three years before President Roosevelt had occasion to rebuff the German Government for its evident designs on a Venezuelan harbor.

"Trade with the United States forms the biggest but in many respects the unhappiest chapter in the over-sea relations of Germany. Not only is the balance of trade heavily against us, but, above all, the balance of emigration. Many hundred thousands Germany has lost to America to be fertilizers of kultur [*Kulturdünger*]. It is there that the German emigrants have given up their allegiance most quickly, and they have helped forge the mighty weapons of competition which are now directed against us by the third world empire in the international market, nay, in our own!"

Arthur Dix, *Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs*, 1901, p. 149. Dix hopes that the Panama Canal may not fall solely into American hands. In case it does Germans should try to get bases in the West Indies (p. 141). He complains that the American ship subsidy bill then up is directed against German shipping and that the tariff is directed especially against German imports.

"And even the causes of political friction between the two countries have increased since they became neighbors in the South Sea, and since the United States proclaimed her determination to make herself mistress of the passage for world trade between the old and the new middle sea, the Atlantic and the Pacific."

Idem., p. 150.

"The North Americans can not forget that the German settlements may be the entering wedge in South America which is to overturn the Pan-American air castles; and the American consuls, especially the American envoy in Rio Janeiro, Colonel Page Bryan, follow jealously the progress of German colonization and investment. Their fears are our hopes and these are the stronger because we have the population to dispose of and the United States has not. * * * The question whether the German element there will turn to Germany or to the United

States will be determined in a few years and it will depend upon the position which Germany takes in fostering church and school." * * *

Otto Hötsch in *Aldeutsche Blätter*, Aug. 16, 1902. The writer insists, as do many Germans, that the South Americans, as a mixed race, are incapable of taking care of themselves and developing their natural resources, and that another power must step in. They believe that it will be Germany or America. See note, p. 95.

"A far-seeing policy is required, ruthlessly applying all the resources of its power in concluding treaties with foreign States, which are eager to receive our emigrants, and so would in the end accept the conditions accounted necessary by our Government. The Argentine and Brazilian Republics, and in a greater or less degree all these needy Republics of South America, would accept advice and listen to reason, voluntarily or under coercion."

Friederich Lange, *Reines Deutschtum*, 1904, p. 208. [A., p. 35.]

"Not only North America, but the whole of America must become a bulwark of Germanic Kultur, perhaps the strongest fortress of the Germanic races. That is everyone's hope who has freed himself from his own local European pride and who places the race feeling above his love for home. Also South America must and can easily become a habitation for German or Germanoid races!

"The lands will be settled upon by people of Germanic blood, the non-Germanic inhabitants being driven into reservations or at best to Africa [Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Egypt]. * * *

"A free South America for those of Germanic blood, that too, is a sublime end, which will be attained by war, not perhaps by the conquest of the land by North American or by European troops, but through the colonizing efforts and self-assertion of the South American Germans."

Klaus Wagner, *Krieg*, 1906, pp. 165-166.

"Germany takes under her protection the Republics of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the southern third of Bolivia, as much as belongs to the basin of the Rio de La Plata and the southern part of Brazil, where Germans predominate. * * *

[German South America] "will procure for us in the temperate zone a territory for colonization where our emigrants

will be able to settle as agriculturists. Chile and Argentina will keep their language and autonomy, but we should insist upon the teaching of German in the schools as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are the countries for German culture. German should there be the national language."

Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 250, 265-266.

"The German settlements in South Brazil and Uruguay are the only ray of light in this dismal picture of South American civilization. Here dwell 500,000 Germans, and it is to be hoped that in a reorganization of South American conditions after the peoples of Latin and Indian mixture are quite ruined by bad management, the immense plains of the Platte, with the coast in the west, the east, and the south, will fall into the hands of the German people. * * * *It is truly a miracle that the German people did not long ago resolve on seizing the country.* Think of half a million Germans in a temperate climate in a country of 10,500,000 square miles; that is to say, nine times the size of Germany. All that is enough of itself. *False modesty has no place in a struggle for world empire.*" [And he proceeds to argue that England would not have been so falsely modest.]

Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts*, 1911, pp. 228-229.

"These occurrences in South Africa [speaking of the success of the British in the Boer War] I have touched upon only to draw a lesson for our future * * * *to show that to the inhabitants of the South American republics it would only be a blessing if they came under German control.* They would soon reconcile themselves to German rule and take delight in the fame of the German name in the world."

Idem, p. 230.

"After this war we shall have to reckon on a loss of influence in the states of Central and South America; first, because of the lessened purchasing power of those countries and, secondly, because of the increased Pan-American ambitions of the United States; and we shall have a claim by right of victory

and by considerations of justice for damages at the expense of England and the United States."

Professor Hermann Schumacher, *Meisbegünstigung und Zollunterscheidung*, 1915, pp. 43-45. [G., p. 346.] See note, p. 73.

"In the case of America our public opinion is to some extent lacking in courage. Just because the United States has set up the Monroe Doctrine to exclude Europeans from America, it does not follow that we should acquiesce in that doctrine. The general acquiescence arises from a lack of unity in Europe; it is this which allows the United States to fish in troubled waters. But the States of Central and South America have only recognized the doctrine when it insured them a convenient protection against European countries—when the United States was interfering with Mexico, the three chief States of South America deliberately set themselves against it. There is, of course, no question of our making political conquests in America; it is a matter of our commercial and cultural activities."

Alfred Hettner, *Die Ziele unserer Weltpolitik*, 1915, p. 25. This is No. 64 of the collection of political essays entitled *Der deutsche Krieg*. Hettner wrote in 1915 when Germans were cautious in their expressions about America. Hettner is professor of geography at the University of Heidelberg.

"At the close of the Spanish-American War, I was returning on the *Santee*—I think it was—from Santiago, Cuba, to Montauk Point. * * * On board there was a military attaché from Germany, Count von Goetzen, a personal friend of the Kaiser. There was also an attaché from some South American country, possibly Argentina.

"Apropos of a discussion between Count von Goetzen and myself on the friction between Admiral Dewey and the German Admiral at Manila, von Goetzen said to me: 'I will tell you something which you better make note of. I am not afraid to tell you this because, if you do speak of it, no one would believe you and everybody will laugh at you.

" 'About fifteen years from now, my country will start her great war. She will be in Paris in about two months after the commencement of hostilities. Her move on Paris will be but a step to her real object—the crushing of England. Everything will move like clockwork. We will be prepared and others will not be prepared. I speak of this because of the connection which it will have with your own country.

“ ‘Some months after we finish our work in Europe we will take New York and probably Washington and hold them for some time. We will put your country in its place with reference to Germany. We do not purpose to take any of your territory, but we do intend to take a billion or more dollars from New York and other places. The Monroe Doctrine will be taken charge of by us, as we will then have put you in your place, and we will take charge of South America as far as we want to. I have no hostility toward your country. I like it, but we have to go our own way. Don’t forget this, and about 15 years from now remember it and it will interest you.’ ”

Statement of Maj. N. A. Bailey to Dr. W. T. Hornaday, given in a letter from Dr. Hornaday in New York Tribune, August 11, 1915.

“The Emperor was standing; so naturally I stood also; and according to his habit, which is quite Rooseveltian, he stood very close to me, and talked very earnestly. * * * He showed, however, great bitterness against the United States and repeatedly said, ‘America had better look out after this war;’ and, ‘I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war.’ * * * I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous part of this interview, on account of the many spies not only in my own embassy, but also in the State Department, that I sent but a very few words in a roundabout way by courier direct to the President.”

James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, 1917, pp. 251-253. Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador to Berlin, is here summarizing an interview with the Kaiser on Oct. 22, 1915.

“The Germans became imbued with the idea that America must be made to suffer, that America must indemnify the German people, and behind these ideas were the German army and navy, the Pan-Germans, the agrarians, conservatives of all hues, and the National Liberals, the national German committees * * * and the German Government. * * *

“In April, 1915, I was with a party of German officers at Bad Elster in southeastern Saxony. Major Liebster, an acquaintance of mine * * * joined our party. * * * Major Liebster sought the occasion for a conversation with me and among other things said: ‘We are keeping books on you Americans. It’s a long account and we haven’t missed any details.’

Rest assured that that account will be presented to you some day for settlement. * * * We are keeping the account in black and white * * * with customary German thoroughness.' "

A. Curtis Roth, former American vice consul at Plauen, in daily papers, Oct. 26, 1917.

SECTION XV.

PRETEXTS FOR WAR.

“For the sake of Germany’s internal conditions a campaign on a large scale would serve a good purpose, even if it brought grief and pain to individual families.”

Das deutsche Armeebblatt, Aug. 26, 1911, quoted by Deputy Bebel in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911.

“The conviction prevails in wide circles of the population that a war would be wholly profitable, inasmuch as it would produce a clarification of our precarious political position and improve many political and social conditions.”

Die Post, Aug. 26, 1911, quoted by Deputy Bebel in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911.

“We shall never improve matters at home until we have got into severe foreign complications—perhaps even into war—and have been compelled by such convulsions to bring ourselves together.”

Hamburger Nachrichten, June, 1910. Quoted by W. H. Dawson, What is Wrong With Germany, 1915, p. 146.

“That a state, even when on the very point of making war, should solemnly assert its love of peace and its aversion to conquest, is nothing; for in the first place it must needs make this asseveration and so hide its real intention if it would succeed in its design; and the well-known principle, ‘Threaten war that thou mayst have peace,’ may also be inverted in this way: ‘Promise peace that thou mayst begin war with advantage’; and in the second place, the State may be wholly in earnest in its peaceful assurances, so far as its self-knowledge has gone; but let the favorable opportunity for aggrandizement present itself, and the previous good resolution is forgotten.”

Fichte. Quoted by G. Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy (n. d.), p. 79.

"The Great Elector¹ laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the steps of his glorious ancestor. 'He noticed how his state occupied an untenable middle position between the petty states and the great powers, and showed his determination to give a definite character (*décider cet être*) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the State and corriger la figure de la Prusse, if Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honor the great name of kingdom.' [Treitschke.] The King made allowance for this political necessity, and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. *None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible.* He had always determined to be the aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself favorable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The whole history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of decision which he showed."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans. 1914, pp. 41-42.

"It is a wretched old-womanish policy to consider everything that happens beyond our borders as not our business. Every injury to a German student in Prague, every riot in Laibach is an insult to the German people and is warrant for occupying the territory in question. Consider a moment what England or France does when in Egypt or Morocco English or French travelers are attacked with clubs and revolvers. What haven't we put up with in Prague? It is a shame. **To what end have we the best army in the world? * * * We must get to work with the Pan-German idea.**"

Tannenberg, Gross-Deutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts, 1911, p. 78.

"The intention of the general staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said Gen. von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war.'

¹ Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, 1640-1688, who laid the foundations of the greatness of Brandenburg-Prussia.

Germany can not and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the general, **'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.'** "

Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, minister of foreign affairs, Berlin, May 6, 1913. The French Yellow Book, Letter No. 3.

"We shall arrive at an understanding with England, which is desirable from every point of view, only after we have crossed swords with her. As long as Germany does not consider this necessity as a leading factor in her foreign policy we shall be condemned to failure in all important matters of foreign policy.

"Of course we need not proclaim these views to all the world for the benefit of our opponents. We may even earnestly endeavor to work for our purposes by peaceful means. However, we must never allow ourselves to enter upon a course which hampers our ultimate aim, and we must unceasingly keep before our eyes our true purpose. We must, therefore, politically and militarily, prepare ourselves for the struggle which is probably unavoidable. Then only can we hope for success."

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans., 1914, pp. 209-210. For German title, see above page 33.

"Not only army and navy, but our foreign policy also must be ready for immediate action. Our statesmen must unceasingly labor to improve the conditions for the approaching struggle. They may coöperate meanwhile with other great powers for particular purposes, but they must constantly bear in mind that an understanding with the powers of the Triple Entente can only be a strictly limited one. *Therefore Germany's statesmen must be determined to take to arms as soon as our interests are seriously threatened.* The responsibility of bringing about a necessary war under favorable circumstances is much smaller than the responsibility of making an unfortunate war inevitable by following a policy of present advantage, or by lacking the necessary resolution."

F. von Bernhardi, *Britain as Germany's Vassal* (1912), trans., 1914, pp. 218-219.

"It is natural and, within certain limits, politically a matter of course that the German Emperor should have thought that, *until Germany had a strong fleet, we must try to keep on good terms with England, and even on occasion to make concessions.*"

Count von Reventlow, *Deutsche Auswärtige Politik*, 1916, p. 60.

"Let it be the task then of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. * * * We must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Moroccan¹ negotiation shows.

"If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents *we must initiate an active policy, which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England that both those States would feel themselves compelled to attack us.* Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe."

Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), trans., 1914, pp. 278-279.

"*Never did people play so much with the notion of a preventive war as in the last few years, never so criminally.* As a theme for smoking-room gossip and as the topic of conversation of unimportant street politicians, it presents great opportunities; it amuses the mob as games of chance do children. But when able German generals, such as Bernhardi, men of real serious-mindedness and of thoughtfulness, play variations on the theme, it becomes a public danger."

Neue Rundschau, April, 1913. p. 579. See what Nippold says about this notion of "preventive war," below, p. 128.

"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*,² we are in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large."

* * * * *

"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing

¹ See pp. 112-113.

² See note on this paper, p. 70.

everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France."

Report of Lieut. Col. Serret, military attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Étienne, minister of war, Berlin, Mar. 15, 1913. The French Yellow Book. See note 1, p. 116.

"Must we not, even now, be thankful that Russian thirst for power, and French ambition, fostered and encouraged by English egoism, did not let the shots fired at Serajevo lead to a stern chastisement of Serbia, as moral earnestness demanded, but allowed them to swell into the thunder rolling through this, the greatest war which has ever shaken the world? **Two years too early for our enemies, but an act of grace from God for ourselves and our allies.** For now we have the lead in the iron game of war; and though England may lurk in the background, waiting for her turn in the game—so be it, England—we know exactly what trumps you hold, but whether you know ours, coming days will show."

K. König, Sechs Kriegspredigten, 1915. Sermon, Sept. 6. [B. 99–100.] Karl König is a writer on philology and pedagogics.

SECTION XVI.

THE COMING WAR.

[Of Napoleon's reestablishment of oligarchy:] "Was that greatest of all antitheses of ideals thereby relegated ad acta for all time? Or only postponed, postponed for a long time? May there not take place at some time or other a much more awful, much more carefully prepared flaring up of the old conflagration? Further: Should not one wish that consummation with all one's strength—will it one's self—demand it one's self?"

Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals* (1887), 1911, section 17.

"Our aim must be the development of German power with all that it involves. The grouping of all its members into one political whole has always been the object of the efforts of a virile nation.

"It must be well done; we must confine our efforts within just limits; *we must go forward gradually till the moment arrives when we can unmask our batteries without danger; then Europe will find herself faced by a situation whose smallest details have been prepared and against which she will be powerless.*"

A Universal German Empire [about 1872]. Quoted by Vergnet, p. 13.

"It is therefore necessary to convince ourselves, and to convince the generation we have to educate that the time for rest has not arrived; *that the prediction of a supreme struggle, in which the existence and power of Germany will be at stake, is by no means a vain chimera emanating from the imaginations of a few ambitious madmen; that this supreme struggle will burst forth one day terrible and momentous as all struggles between nations that serve as a prelude to great political revolutions.*"

From a speech by General von der Goltz, quoted by Emil Reich, *Germany's Swelled Head* (1907), 1914, pp. 52-53.

"Count Schlieffen also points out that the other powers can not afford to remain passive spectators of this contest, but are compelled to perfect their own armaments in exactly the same

way. This, gentlemen, is nothing more or less than the admission that *Germany has been the motive power in arming Europe to her teeth.* * * * True enough, we have always been told that other states are arming, too. Quite so! Other states have always pointed to Germany and then armed in their turn, and this has led to an effort on our part to become the strongest power—not only on land but also on sea.”

Deputy Stücklein in the Reichstag, Mar. 17, 1909.

THE MOROCCAN QUESTION.

Owing to its great natural resources Morocco has long been recognized as a profitable field for the investment of European capital. On that account, no doubt, and because of the weakness of its government, intervention by foreign powers has been frequent. Because of the heavy investment of French capital and because the prevailing anarchy in Morocco threatened French interest in Algeria, France came to be regarded as having special interests in Morocco. In 1904, when France gained the assent of Britain and the co-operation of Spain in her Moroccan policy, Germany said nothing, and Chancellor von Bülow declared that Germany's interests in Morocco were purely economic. In 1905 Germany demanded a reconsideration of Moroccan affairs and forced France, against the will of her minister of foreign affairs, Delcassé, who resigned in consequence, to come to the conference at Algeciras. That conference discussed placing Morocco under international tutelage, but because France was the only power in a position to undertake the necessary task of repressing Moroccan anarchy, France was left in charge, subject to certain Spanish rights, and continued her work. Germany seemed satisfied, and von Bülow said that Germany had no political interests in Morocco. In 1909 Germany and France came to an agreement by which France granted equality of treatment to German merchants and Germany recognized the political interests of France. But, in 1911, when France made disorders in Morocco an occasion for penetrating farther into the interior, and when German merchants complained that they were not getting equality of treatment, Germany for a second time opened a closed book. She sent a gunboat to Agadir, on the west coast of Africa, as if to establish a port there and tap the hinterland, although she had no economic interests in that part of the country. France protested vigorously and Britain supported France, an act which the Germans regarded as one of pure interference. Matters came very close to war. Germany, however, surprised at the extent to which England and France were ready to make common cause, and not yet ready to force war upon so formidable a combination, recalled her gunboat, accepting compensation in the French Congo. Her withdrawal, although by no means empty-handed, was looked upon by many Germans as a humiliation, and German periodicals showed great bitterness. The Pan-Germans refused to regard the Moroccan question as closed. Britain, they said, has taken Egypt, now France has Morocco; what do we get? From this time it was a growing belief among Germans that Germany would have to fight. No concessions could banish this belief. Indeed concessions only made her rattle the sabre more vigorously. Britain, they said, was standing in the way of the “place in the

sun" to which Germany aspired, and France was becoming too self-confident. In some mysterious and underhand way, they felt, Germany's premier position in Europe, won by Bismarck, was being taken from her. For the feeling that Germany was being "hemmed in" by diplomacy there was perhaps some excuse, yet if Germany had been checkmated at certain points, she was much to blame. She had a way of forgetting that a bargain is a bargain, and of demanding, with pointed pistol, sudden reconsideration. She was too prone to disturb the delicate equilibrium of Europe. When she did so other nations were likely to yield her something, but they were also likely to become more and more afraid of her and her methods, and less willing to satisfy her aspirations, lest by doing so they should be merely strengthening the hands of a relentless enemy.

Count Brudzewo-Mielzynski quotes a Pan-German pamphlet on the floor of the Reichstag as follows: "If our appetite for land is not satisfied by this [the proposed partition of Morocco], *we must appeal to the sword. Necessity knows no law.*"

He adds: "In these articles there is no thought of a protectorate or of any peaceful occupation of territory. No, it is brutally demanded again and again that new territory be annexed and made German." * * *

Count Brudzewo-Mielzynski in Reichstag, Nov. 11, 1911.

"It is very characteristic that when the German Emperor returned at the end of July from his northern trip and it was announced that he and the Chancellor and the Secretary of State had determined at a conference in Swinemünde not to begin a war on account of Morocco, a burst of anger and rage should come from a great part of the German press; some of them even went so far as to attack the Emperor personally. * * * [In an article in the Post of August 4] the Emperor is hauled over the coals and accused of having brought Germany under the shadow of a new Olmütz. You hear men ask: Have things changed? Have we become a race of women? What has happened to the Hohenzollerns, who have produced a Great Elector, a Frederick William I, a Frederick the Great, an Emperor William I? The Emperor is accused of being the chief support of the Anglo-French policy, a stronger support than 50 French divisions. He is called the hope of France. Can this be true? Is this possible? * * * After this article the Post published a series of communications approving it. At the head of the list was a retired octogenarian lieutenant-general, who declared that all his comrades felt as he did, and greeted the article with enthusiasm; they feared that, as far as Germany

was concerned, the Agadir affair would end in shame and disgrace. The same sentiments were expressed by a retired court preacher, and within a few months we have seen the spectacle of a part of the Protestant clergy in full cry at the heels of the war pack. The Evangelical Church Journal published an article which concluded with these words: *'From one end of Germany to the other people voice but one question: When do we get our marching orders?'* And these are the preachers of Christian brotherly love."

Deputy Bebel (Social-Democrat) in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911. Bebel was the leader of the German Socialists up to his death in 1913. He was always the antagonist of the German jingoos.

"The treaty of the 4th November, 1911 [settling the Moroccan question], has proved a complete disillusion.

"The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

"It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufacturers, German trade, German expansion.

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our 40,000,000 inhabitants, as a second-rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second-rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again."

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Étienne, Minister of War, Berlin, March 15, 1913. The French Yellow Book.

"During the year following the last Moroccan crisis, the feeling has taken hold of practically the whole of the German nation that a great European war is the only means by which we could hope to obtain free scope for the pursuit of our world-policy. General Friedrich von Bernhardi's book, Germany

and the Next War, has played a prominent part in voicing and, at the same time, in furthering that feeling. The literary qualities of this book as well as the high authority of its author have attracted the attention of wide circles far beyond the German frontiers."

Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg, 1913, p. 1. In various issues of the *Aldeutsche Blätter* this anonymous work is attributed to some one standing close to Bethmann-Hollweg. Its pacific spirit makes its testimony all the more significant.

"The Imperial Chancellor has laid special stress on the great political significance which he attributes to the fact that we have, as he says, succeeded for the first time in establishing, by means of an agreement, friendly relations of mutual advantage between France and ourselves and in arriving at a settlement which, in his words, may be expected to satisfy both parties. He looks upon this as a step toward a permanent reconciliation between these two great nations.

"Well, gentlemen, I for one can not altogether share that opinion. I can well understand that France feels quite satisfied under the circumstances. But I do not indulge in any illusions, as if this could induce them to bury the hopes which are still alive in France to-day. Our peace is safeguarded not by such accommodations nor by agreements and understandings, but only by our trusty German sword and at the same time by the feeling, which is probably in the minds of the French, and quite rightly too, that *we also hope to see to it that there shall be a Government which is determined not to let that sword rust when the proper time comes.*"

Von Heydebrand, Conservative Agrarian leader, in Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911. See note on p. 120.

"Gentlemen, Herr von Heydebrand has suggested that the Imperial Chancellor ought to have said: 'Since we did not succeed in obtaining what we wanted in the Morocco convention, we mean to stand back and await events.' But Herr von Heydebrand has admitted himself that he can not tell us what he could have proposed over and above what has been arranged in that convention, as far as Germany is concerned; he said it was difficult to make any such proposals if one was not in control of affairs. *But the course of action which you propose*, Herr von Heydebrand, *would have involved nothing less than war.* ["Hear,

hear!" from the Social-Democrats.] For what would have been the consequence if no agreement had been reached between France and Germany—if what you wish had come about, and the conference had been dissolved without achieving any results? There would have been mad outbursts of the war spirit in both countries alike. ["Hear, hear!" from the Social-Democrats.] War would have been urged by all possible means and would have become inevitable."

Deputy Bebel in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911.

"Gentlemen, yesterday the discussion touched upon the meetings of protest and the attacks directed against the Government. It is certain that last summer there was only one pervading sentiment which, so far as I am concerned, I sincerely deplore. In the press, in public assemblies, attacks were made upon the Government, upon the wearer of the crown—violent and, as I believe, unjustifiable attacks. The Pan-German League arranged a meeting of protest in Berlin. Our colleague, Deputy Lattmann, spoke there, as well as the Conservative member of the Prussian Diet, von Böhlendorff. The tone was relatively mild, but in the secret conference preceding this meeting violent reproaches were uttered and passionate speeches were made. This was well known to me. In the assembly itself a battle song was given out, a war hymn that is characteristic of the feeling of these days. It contained this remarkable stanza:

'We swing the good old sword
It shines in morning light.
Hurrah! It flashes forth
And won't be sheathed again.
Though you sweat blood and water,
It cleaves unto the bone.'

Dr. Wiemer (Social Democrat) in the Reichstag, Nov. 10, 1911.

"It is not merely on account of vain prophecies based on the random guesses of superstition that, for a long time past, the year 1913 has been looked upon as a time of crisis,¹ but—notwithstanding the longing which makes itself felt at the present moment for a relaxation of the political tension—the events and

¹ That 1913 was the hundredth anniversary of the great rising of Prussia against Napoleon seemed to many Germans significant. Perhaps 1913 was to be the year when the inevitable war would break out. See pp. 128-29; p. 93; p. 110.

prospects in the domain of international politics have actually taken a turn which makes it inevitable that, in a fast-approaching future, one of two alternatives must take place. Either a settlement of accounts, direct or indirect, between the two Anglo-Germanic nations of Europe, or an honest understanding which assures Germany the rights which are her due and enables her to satisfy her own pressing need for an expansion of her world policy."

Arthur Dix in *Leipziger Tageblatt*, Dec. 31, 1912. [N. p. 50.]

*"Morocco is easily worth a big war, or even several. At the best—and even prudent Germany is becoming convinced of this—war is only postponed and not abandoned. Is such postponement to our advantage? * * * They say we must wait for a better moment. Wait for the deepening of the Kiel Canal, for our naval program to have taken full effect. It is not exactly diplomatic to announce publicly to one's adversaries: 'To go to war now does not tempt us, but three years hence we shall unchain the world war.' * * * No; if a war is really planned, not a word of it must be spoken. One's designs must be enveloped in profound mystery. Then brusquely, all of a sudden, one jumps upon the enemy in the darkness."*

Albrecht Wirth, *Unsere Äussere Politik*, 1912, pp. 35–36.

THE CHALLENGE TO ENGLAND ON THE SEAS.

It has been the consistent policy of the British Government to maintain a navy as large as that of any two continental powers combined. To Germany this policy seemed a threat. If Germany's world trade grew too rapidly, the envious English might suddenly destroy it, they said. The British said that their island position made a navy as large as any other two an absolute necessity. To so great a degree, they said, is Britain dependent upon the outside world for food and supplies, that if her navy lost the control of the seas around the island for six weeks she would have to surrender on her enemies' terms. Hence the English have been unwilling to risk a one-sided reduction in dreadnaughts. Nevertheless, from 1906 on the Liberal Government in Britain sought better relations with Germany. They proposed that Britain and Germany should make an agreement to limit the building of dreadnaughts. To show its good will, the British Government reduced its naval program of 1906. Germany's answer was to accelerate her program. By 1909 it was becoming evident that the German Navy was gaining on the British, and there was great alarm in Britain, so great that popular sentiment forced the Government to increase its naval program. Yet, in 1911 Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed a "naval holiday." Germany would not listen to such a plan. In 1912 Secretary Haldane, a member of the British Government

and a man favorably known in Germany, was sent to Berlin to get some arrangement. The Liberal Government in England wished to reduce its building program so that more money could be spent on social reforms. The German Government would do nothing unless Britain would agree, in case of war between Germany and France, to hold aloof. Haldane was willing to pledge Britain to stay out unless France were attacked. This the German Government regarded as unsatisfactory. It did, however, make some concession for the year in its naval program, to which Britain at once responded. But there was no permanent change in the German policy of forcing the pace. Perhaps Germany hoped, as an influential member of the Reichstag suggested, that England would be unable to keep up. It will be observed in the extracts which follow that the German Social-Democrats fully realized that it was their country that was to blame for pressing naval armament. Nowhere has the case against Germany been put more cogently—or truly—than in the Reichstag by such men as David and Haase.

“Our Emperor knows that an insult to him [English indignation at the Kaiser’s telegram to Kruger at the time of the Jameson raid] is an insult to the Nation, and that the day of atonement will come; for God’s mills grind slow but sure. And he may have thought to himself amid the rush of things: ‘Be quiet, my sword, thy day will come!’ * * * She [England] knows that she has no friend. That we are not her friends both the past and the present testify. The future will bring the settlement. For there are no invincible enemies of the Kultur nations; there shall not be.”

Richard, Count du Moulin-Eckart, *England und die Mächte*, 1901, p. 79. Moulin-Eckart is professor of history in the Technische Hochschule at Munich and a writer on history and politics.

[After discussing the tension between Germany and England as the chief problem of foreign policy, Deputy David alludes to the efforts of some parties to hush discussion.] “This is not at all my opinion. No; the Reichstag has not only the right but the duty to look this question squarely in the face and to make clear the dangers of this tendency, and to arouse the conscience of the German people, lest if things go on in this way the most serious complications will ultimately ensue. * * * *Gentlemen, we are facing the results of our German naval agitation.* England has now presented the bill which has been incurred by these advocates of our naval policy. * * * *Gentlemen, it is wholly the fault of the German Government that it has come to this.* * * * The Liberal Government in England has from the first moment, from the very beginning of the year 1906, declared that they

were ready to take up the question of the limitation of armaments."

Deputy David (Social-Democrat) in Reichstag, Mar. 16, 1910. For the amplification of this, see pp. 45-46.

"Gentlemen, that the English now choose to forget these things [the reference is to alleged English interference in the Morocco affair] and profess to know nothing about them, after they have not succeeded in embroiling France and Germany in a war which might not have been to England's disadvantage—that they choose to forget just at the present moment, is natural enough from the English point of view. But we Germans have not forgotten. And we can not but ask ourselves if all that we have had to go through was only a dream and did not really happen at all. Is it not a fact that an ambassador to a certain European court made remarks in regard to us and our German policy which must bring a blush to our cheeks? That this could have happened, gentlemen, is the grave fact of the situation, and no one can get away from this by professing that he knows nothing about it. We know about it, and—like a flash in the night—this has shown the German people where the enemy is to be found. [Vigorous applause from the Right and the National Liberals.] The German people know now when they wish to expand on this earth and to find a place in the sun, the place to which they are entitled by their rights and their destiny; they know now who it is who arrogates to himself the right to decide whether that is to be permitted or not. [Vigorous applause from Right, the Center, and the National Liberals.] Gentlemen, we Germans are not accustomed to put up with that, and the German people will know how to reply. If the Imperial Government has made a reply, if they have given a German answer to that English question—I hope they have given it; I should have been glad to have heard it; but the German people will know what that answer ought to be like when the time comes. For their very existence as a nation is at stake, and no people, least of all, the Germans, will let that be taken away from them. *And therefore I say it is for the Government to choose the hour.* It is not only the right but also the duty of the Government to face that decision, and we trust that, in doing so, they will pay due regard to the honor of the German nation. *And we Germans shall be ready—I would have this understood—to make any sacrifices that are necessary, whenever they are required.* [Uproarious interrup-

tions on the Left.] I cannot shout louder than you. Have some patience. I am just going to give you my answer. [A voice from the Left: "It is all very well for you to talk."]"

Deputy von Heydebrand (the "uncrowned king of Prussia") in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911. This speech was warmly applauded by the Crown Prince, who was present. No other speech in the Reichstag in recent years has made such a sensation. In this speech, approved by the Crown Prince, the leader of the feudal Prussian nobility, practically served notice that he and his kind would not tolerate the failure to seize another occasion to make war. Throughout this outburst of the most typical Junker leader there is the same spirit, even the same phrases about a place in the sun and Germany's existence at stake, that have been heard over and over since the murder of the Austrian archduke gave the war party the opportunity von Heydebrand thought they had missed in 1911.

"Permit me to say that *the sentiments expressed yesterday by Deputy von Heydebrand find an echo in thousands, yes, millions of German hearts.* We members of the Reichstag are charged with the duty of giving expression to these views and sentiments of our nation."

Deputy Lattmann in Reichstag, Nov. 10, 1911. Lattmann is an active Pan-German.

"What does Morocco or the Congo signify compared with the knowledge that over there, on the other side of the Channel, is our most envious foe, and that we are doing nothing to defend ourselves against him; that we are not pursuing the path we had chosen, regardless of what England may say? *You members of the Reichstag, tell us how many ships does it take, how much do they cost? We are ready to put up the money.*"

Magdeburger Zeitung, end of October, 1911. Quoted by Deputy Bebel in the Reichstag, Nov. 9, 1911.

"Deputy Bebel said yesterday that when we build 10 dreadnaughts, England will build 20. My reply is: The time will come when England will not have the sailors to man these 20 dreadnaughts. It is no business of ours what England does. *Our sole concern is with what we must do so that England will fear a war with us. That is our duty.*"

Deputy Bruhn in Reichstag, Nov. 10, 1911. Bruhn is a newspaper publisher.

"I would remind you of the days when England proffered her hand to us, trying to bring about better relations, and we refused to take it. * * *

"I have further to confess that I can not see a commendable innovation in what happened here yesterday, when the heir to the throne made a public demonstration from the gallery of this chamber against the policy which the responsible head of the Government has followed."

Deputy Dr. Wiemer (Social-Democrat) in the Reichstag, Nov. 10, 1911.

"The desire to live in peace and friendship with the Germans exists not only among the English ruling classes but also among all ranks of English society. * * *

"In England there exist no deeply grounded prejudices against Germany. The number of those who do not wish well to Germany is very small and their ill will springs from the feeling of mistrust, which the rapid growth of the German navy has brought about. The rapid growth of the German navy has, of course, made necessary a corresponding increase of the English navy, which for the protection of the English island Empire is simply indispensable.

"The assertion often heard that the growth of German trade had roused envy and hate in England against Germany, is absolutely mistaken. The English have a proverb that competition is the life of trade. That competition has powerfully stimulated English business and advanced it. Furthermore, the English merchants are not so shortsighted as to be jealous of Germany's welfare, for they know well enough that they can do a much bigger business with a rich Germany than with a defeated and impoverished Germany. The assertion often heard in Germany that from commercial envy England would like to destroy the German navy is ridiculous.

"It ought to become positively easy to destroy the existing prejudices in England against Germany by frank discussion. In Germany the situation is quite different. There one will find important elements in the population and especially of the rank and file of the common people who are bitterly prejudiced against England, and the ill will against England is so great that the body of the people at the time of the Morocco crisis would have hailed an Anglo-German war with enthusiasm, without taking account of the consequences of such a war. That may

seem exaggerated, but the author was at the time in Germany and observed with much pain the prevailing excitement. Fortunately the rulers did not allow themselves to be turned aside by the passions of the masses. The danger is that at another opportunity the German Government will perhaps not be in a position to resist the wishes of the people, and will begin a war with England to save [not Germany but] itself."

Sir Max Waechter, *Deutsche Revue*, May, 1913. Sir Max Waechter is a naturalized Englishman, who was born and grew up in Germany, and has been back there many times. He is here writing in a well-known German periodical to urge better relations between the two nations

"The land hunger of our people must once for all be satisfied. But how and where that may happen—its satisfaction never would be possible unless we were to match the English navy. No matter what decisions took place on land, if we have not reached the point where we are a match for England, we have no right to think of over-sea politics."

Admiral Breusing, at a Pan-German celebration in Breslau, reported in the *Alldeutsche Blätter*, September 13, 1913.

"Gentlemen, it is quite true that a considerable number even of our artisans, our small tradesmen, our officials—of our middle classes in short—have been infected with this imperialistic mania. They have either been intoxicated by the nationalistic claptrap, or they are suffering from the delusion that they will share the benefits accruing from a policy of conquest. There is no doubt that there is a terrible awakening in store for them; some of them will soon come to see matters in their true light, and then they will sigh and groan on account of the increasing burdens."

Deputy Haase (Social-Democrat), in the Reichstag, Apr. 22, 1912.

"When Frederick the Great saw that powerful enemies were about to crush him, he struck first without waiting for their mortal blow. *In Germany to-day no responsible person doubts that the Triple Entente is about to crush us. We all know blood will certainly flow, and the more the longer we wait.* There are only a few who dare to advise us to imitate Frederick's example. And there is none who dares to do the deed.

"Why?

"Certainly it is not fear. For that can not influence those who know that the peril is inevitable, and that it will be all the more terrifying if we wait for it rather than choose our own time.

"Again; what men are most honored in the history of the nation? What names fire the German heart with the deepest passion? Not Goethe, Schiller, Wagner, Marx. No. It is Barbarossa, Frederick the Great, Blücher, Moltke, Bismarck, **the men of blood and iron**—it is they, who have sacrificed thousands of lives, for whom the German people cherish their tenderest feelings and a gratitude which almost amounts to worship. **Because they have done what we ought to do to-day.** Because they were brave above all others and cheerfully faced the responsibility. Middle-class morality, however, only condemns all these great men; for the Philistine is more jealous of his middle-class morality than of anything else, and yet he renders tribute with thrills of devotion to the bloody deeds of those Titans.

"All this proves incontestably that **the German people possess sufficient penetration** to recognize the inexorable demands of the present, and that they have sufficient honor and sufficient national imagination and instinct to venerate the personification of power and to **see that the situation calls for the sword.**"

Dr. W. Fuchs, a distinguished physician, in *Die Post*, January 28, 1912. [N. p. 2.]

"* * * The chairman of the local branch, Baron von Vietinghoff-Scheel, in welcoming the guests, reminded them of the glorious time of 42 years ago. Since then, our nation has grown by leaps and bounds in numbers, wealth, knowledge, and abilities. Quite recently, however, its standing among other nations has been declining, and *discontent makes itself felt at home*. The latter must be accounted for by the fact that *our frontiers are becoming too narrow. We must develop an appetite for land*; we must acquire new territories for settlement, if we do not want to become a declining nation, a stunted race. We have to think of the future of our people and of our children in a spirit of genuine love, no matter if we are called war-mongers and brawlers.

* * * * *

"The last speaker of the evening, His Excellency von Wrochem, entreated his hearers to keep their powder dry and to see to it that the sharp edge of the German sword remained intact. With

their increasing prosperity, the Germans came to be fonder of gold than of iron; sentimentalism and the maunderings of our humanitarians and pacifists have exposed Germanism to the danger of being overcome by cosmopolitanism, and this went so far that our Emperor actually was to have been offered the Nobel prize. It is quite true that we are meant to serve, but that does not mean that we are meant to cringe and to fawn, and our convictions must be more precious to us than holding office. *May our younger generation grow up in this spirit and be ready for the coming day, the fateful day of the final issue of arms by which it shall be decided whether Germany is to be or not to be."*

From the report of the General Meeting of the Pan-German League in the Erfurter Allgemeiner Anzeiger, Sept. 9, 1912. [N. pp. 72-73.]

After a short interval Lieutenant General Liebert continued the discussion.

"* * * Germany is pursuing a miserable policy of philistinism. [Applause.] What do we see, as we look around? Enemies on all sides. The three greatest military powers which the world has ever seen are arrayed against us. And the German Empire has to rely on itself alone, for its ally is engaged in the southeast. Three millions of men we have to send to the west and one million to the east. People talk of a year of fire, a year of flood, and a year of blood; when spring comes once more the time may have arrived for the great powers to clash. Therefore it is necessary for the German people to stand together and be strong.

"* * * There is a smell in the air as of blood, and no one can know when and where the torch of war is going to flare up. But when that day comes, we will think of the times of our youth."

From the report of a meeting of the Pan-German League in the Braunschweiger Neueste Nachrichten, Dec. 3, 1912. [N. p. 76.]

"Gentlemen, the thing that is now inducing these continually increasing armaments, which now amount almost to a mania, is the policy of world power which the German Empire is following. None of my colleagues have any idea of rendering the Empire defenseless, but we certainly are determined to oppose with all the power at our command this lust of conquest so noticeable among our people."

Deputy Haase (Social-Democrat), in the Reichstag, Apr. 22, 1912.

GERMAN MILITARY LAW OF 1913.

The German military law of 1913 increased the German Army by 136,000 officers and men, raising it to a total of 866,000 men of all grades and services. It was originally offered as an excuse for the measure that Germany's ally, Turkey, had been weakened by the Balkan wars. Since the war it has been alleged that this increase was merely a reply to the preparations of France and Russia. A comparison of dates disposes of this story. The German military increase was first formulated in November, 1912, openly discussed in January, 1913, and finally passed June 30. The French law for three years' service was formulated in February, 1913, by a cabinet alarmed at Germany's new plan and was passed July 19 of the same year. It met with much opposition and was passed only because of the fear evoked by the new German law. The Russian project was formulated in March, 1913, as a necessary reply to the German proposals. Both Russia and France were forced to increase their armament by Germany's move. Many Germans, indeed, refused to see the necessity of the new law. One of the Reichstag deputies, Dr. Potthef, wrote in the Berliner Tageblatt (April 3, 1913): "What they ask of us is not a peace measure; it is simply a mobilization." But the official newspapers acclaimed it, and showed as well that it was indeed no peace measure. "This security," stated the semi-official Kölnische Zeitung on June 28, 1913, "gives us a free road towards a profitable world policy. We are yet but at the starting point. Long roads, full of promise, open before us in Asia and in Africa." Such were the aims of a "defensive measure."

"Gentlemen, it has been said that we are compelled to increase our army, because France is going to introduce compulsory service for the term of three years. Whoever says that falsifies the real facts of the case, *for without our army bill France would not have dreamt of introducing the three-years' service bill.* ("Hear, hear!" from the Social-Democrats.) Even now, after the first excitement has calmed down, it is already quite plain that there is just as little desire in France on the part of the masses of the population to shoulder these new personal and economic burdens ("Hear, hear!" from the Social-Democrats.) The propaganda in French military circles for the three years' service had made no impression at all and was an absolute failure, until the announcement of the German Army bill in the Post brought grist to the mill of those agitators."

Deputy Haase in the Reichstag, Apr. 7, 1913.

"That Germany's armaments could not but lead to similar measures in other countries was as natural as anything could be. Surely, the German Government can not have been so naïve as to imagine that the increase of the German army would remain without any military effects in France and Russia. What has

come to pass is exactly what anyone must have foreseen who has watched the development of armaments during the last few decades. In Russia, an increase in the expenditure for the army has been announced by the Minister of Finances, which forms his reply to the German army bill, and in France, the increase of the German army, as planned by the ruling classes, has given rise to a feverish competition in armaments. * * * Again and again it has been pointed out in France during the last few months—and in my opinion quite fairly—that the recent alterations in regard to the organization of the French army must be looked upon solely as a measure of defense. Only in the shape of a measure of defense could the French Government have dared to propose the reintroduction of compulsory military service for the term of three years. * * * *I venture to say that no French minister could have dared to expect the French people to submit to this reintroduction of the term of three years, which is now under consideration, if it had not been for the German army bill.*”

Deputy Noske (Social-Democrat), in the Reichstag, June 10, 1913.

“We are all familiar with the speech that General von der Goltz made recently at the meeting of Young Germany, in which he said, among other things, ‘**Oh, if we could only have another war soon.**’ Such are the ideas put forth by the professional soldiers.”

Deputy Scheidemann, in the Reichstag, April 8, 1913.

“What our people are longing for is a great national purpose. Our present policy seems to be one of mere self-preservation. *But a progressive nation, advancing by such strides as we do, needs more territory for the employment of its energies, and if that is not to be had by peaceful means there is nothing left but war. It is the task of the Defense Association (‘Wehrverein’) to arouse the people to a recognition of this fact.*”

From a speech by General von Wrochem, in the local branch of the Defense Association (*Wehrverein*), as reported in the *Danzinger Neueste Nachrichten*, March 6, 1913. [N. p. 84.]

“*This state of things can not continue forever. It calls for a decision. The longing for permanent peace is impossible of realization, and it has effeminating tendencies. A just war is better by far. Nay, better even to fight and be beaten than never to have fought at all. Nor do we lack a great national purpose. When*

the earth was divided among the other great powers, Germany's hands remained practically empty. But Germany, with her ever increasing, inexhaustible increase of human beings, wants more land for them to settle in. * * *

From an address by General von Wrochem, in the *Wehrverein*, as reported in the *Hannoverscher Courier*, February 20, 1913. [N. p. 83.]

"The reality is the permanent threatening of war. Whether it comes from here, from England, or France, it is potentially behind every incident that attests antagonisms. That is the truth which all manly hearts have to face. In France you are blinded by illusions. You dream, you revel, in the luxury of humanitarian ideas. You believe in justice, goodness, peace, fraternity; and that is a very dangerous state of things. You say, 'War, violence, and conquest are things of the past, out of fashion, and altogether played out.' But I answer you, 'War is not out of fashion, it's a thing of to-morrow.' "

Quoted from Alfred Kerr, in an interview with Georges Bourdon, *The German Enigma*, 1914, p. 173. See note, p. 70.

A GERMAN'S SOBER ESTIMATE OF THE WAR SPIRIT.

The following is the testimony of Otfried Nippold, for several years with the German Foreign Office and in foreign service. He has written on Japan and lately on international law and politics. He is now in the University of Berne. He gathered in most careful fashion a collection of statements advocating war and conquest made in the years 1912-1913 by prominent men, by well-known associations, and by leading newspapers. At the end of his book of more than a hundred pages this German scholar made the following judicious statement of the situation:

"The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a **systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on**, based on the one hand on the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association (*Wehrverein*). One can not but feel deep regret in observing the fact that in Germany, as well as in other countries, ill-feeling against other states and nations is being stirred up so unjustifiably and that people are being so unscrupulously incited to war. * * *

"But apart from these chauvinists of a more harmless kind, who indulge only occasionally in chauvinistic utterances, we have come upon other speakers and writers—and they are decidedly in the majority, so far as the passages quoted in these

pages are concerned—who deal with the matter in a different, that is to say in a much more thoroughgoing, way. **These men do not only occasionally incite people to war, but systematically they inculcate a desire for war in the minds of the German people.** Not only in the sense that they ought to be prepared for war and ready for all eventualities, but in the much more far-reaching sense that they want war. **War is represented** not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as **a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better.** In the opinion of these instigators, the German Nation needs a war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. * * *

“From this dogma [that war must come] it is only a step to the next chauvinistic principle, so dear to the heart of our soldier politicians who are languishing for war—the **fundamental principle of the aggressive or preventive war.** If it be true that war is to come, then let it come at the moment which is most favorable to ourselves. In other words **do not wait until there is a reason for war, but strike when it is most convenient.** * * * **And above all as soon as possible.** * * *

“We have already described the motive forces, the nationalist press, organizations like the Pan-German League and the Defense Association, soldier politicians like Generals Keim, Liebert, Bernhardt, Eichhorn, Wrochem, etc., politicians such as Maximilian Harden, Bassermann, and their like. * * *

“The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. **War as such is what really matters to them.** For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German Nation would again be in danger of moral degeneration. The truth is that, **to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse** and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts—not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity.

* * * * *

“One of the principal arguments which are at present used in order to hypnotize the masses is the analogy of the year 1813. Attempts are made to manufacture a similarity between 1813 and 1913 which is not in any way warranted by facts.

Whereas, a hundred years ago, the German people were compelled to fight for their most sacred possessions, to-day there is no reason whatever for a war, unless it be the wish of the army to give once more practical proof of its efficiency. But it is, of course, not possible to take that reason seriously. **There is no real issue to-day anywhere between Germany and the powers of the Triple Entente which could be said to make war unavoidable.** But that is exactly where the tragedy comes in for those who are inciting the people to war, and here we also find an explanation for the increased agitation in which they are at present engaged—I mean in the fact that they can not show any real point of conflict based on the actual state of international politics. **As a matter of fact, if Germany is in any danger to-day, it comes from within rather than from without.** The Balkan War, it is true, seemed at last to provide those who are in favor of war with the longed-for opportunity to strike. But now they are all the more disappointed that even this opportunity, which seemed to promise the last great issue in European politics, has apparently passed by in peace. **And in the absence of any real causes of war, of any natural sources of political antagonism against the other States of Europe, they now find themselves compelled to create artificial causes.** But this can only be done by manufacturing excitement among the population, by stirring up nationalistic feeling, and by the systematic cultivation of a warlike spirit—tasks which are being sedulously attended to by our war-loving generals in the Pan-German League, the Defense Association (*Wehrverein*) and similar organizations.”

Otfried Nippold, *Der deutsche Chauvinismus*, 1913, p. 113, *et seq.*

THE KAISER WON FOR WAR.

“In the end a continual dropping will wear out a stone. It is interesting to observe the gradual change in the Emperor’s views during the last three years, from 1911 to 1914. In 1910 the Emperor William could still discuss with the French Minister Pichon, the idea of a union of all civilized States and express his approval of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking at Cuxhaven, he emphasized that peace was needed in equal measure by all civilized nations ‘to enable them to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture involved in their economic and commercial development.’ In 1911, he emphasized, in a speech delivered in Hamburg, that economic competition between

nations could not be fought out by one party striking at the other, but only by each nation straining its capacity to the highest point. On New Year's Day, 1911, in an address to the diplomatists, he still eulogized the peaceful understanding existing between the nations, which was more in accordance with their interest than the conduct of dangerous wars. **But in his speech at Hamburg on June 18, 1912, a different note is already sounded; 'Not inconsiderately must we raise the standard where we are not sure that we shall be able to defend it.'** This speech was delivered six months after the Morocco convention, and anyone who can read between the lines may already detect the influence which the criticism of the Emperor's peaceful policy had begun to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; **he no longer rejects war under all circumstances, but if war must come, it is to be, according to the saying of Clausewitz, a continuation of policy by other means**—that is, of course, on the assumption that the standard can be defended; in other words, that we are stronger than the other side. In the next year, at the boisterous banquets in commemoration of the War of Liberation of 1813, this military note more and more suppressed the notes of peace. **An intoxication appeared to have seized the whole of Germany, a new intoxication of freedom, from what bondage no one knew.** This drunkenness was artificially produced by the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic press had for many a year and day poured out to the German Nation. **Even those occupying the highest positions were unable to escape this condition of intoxication.** A true epidemic of patriotism broke out, setting high and low, young and old, in a fever of ecstasy."

I Accuse! by a German, 1915, pp. 136-37. See note, p. 131.

"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that *the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him*, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'We must keep our powder dry.'"

Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, Nov. 22, 1913. The French Yellow Book, Letter No. 6.

"The person addressed by the Emperor [The King of the Belgians] had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many

critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. **William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later.** Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German Army and in its certain success.

*"General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'For,' he said to the King [Albert of Belgium], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.'"*¹

Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, Nov. 22, 1913. The French Yellow Book, Letter No. 6.

"No one any longer inquired as to the grounds or the object of this popular movement, prepared long in advance and skillfully staged by the Nationalist wire-pullers, a movement in which the Emperor and the Chancellor were at first victims carried away by the stream, a movement in which later they were voluntary participators, and of which in the end they became the conscious directing leaders."

I Accuse! by a German, p. 137. The writer of that cogent indictment of Germany, I Accuse! is so hostile to the German Government in this war that his unsupported assertions should not have undue weight. Yet this statement as to what was happening in Germany hits the nail so exactly on the head that it deserves quotation. The more one learns of the back-grounds of the war the more highly one estimates J'Accuse! as a contribution to the explanation of the immediate causes of the war. Few war books have such careful reasoning, fewer still so much insight.

"THE DAY" DAWNS.

"The fateful day draws near. * * * And even, if the twilight of the gods be upon us, let it come in furious battle rather than in lingering sickness."

Count du Moulin-Eckart, speech at Stuttgart meeting of the Pan-German League *Alldeutsche Blätter*, April 25, 1914.

¹ This information was probably given to Cambon by Baron Beyens. See Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, 1915, p. 26.

"We maintain, to-day more than ever, that Germany and Austria-Hungary, even with the most honorable desire for peace, can not avoid war with their eastern and western neighbors; that a frightful, decisive struggle will be forced upon them. * * * Whoever wilfully seeks to hide the fateful gravity of a future not far away because he fears the effect on the situation of the moment commits an unspeakable crime against the German nation and becomes guilty of high treason."

Alldeutsche Blätter, March 14, 1914. These words in large letters were part of the leading editorial.

"That matters are approaching a decision here we know, and we do not allow ourselves to be deceived as to the necessity of this decision by negotiations with us, which other nations are forced to make, concerning territory outside Europe."

Speech by Admiral Breusing, April, 1914, at the Stuttgart meeting of the Pan-German League. Alldeutsche Blätter, April 25, 1914.

"A struggle is close at hand for the German people, a struggle which will determine their fate for a long future, perhaps forever."

Resolution of the Pan-German League at Stuttgart meeting, April, 1914. Handbuch des alldeutschen Verbandes, 1916, p. 50.

"If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us. Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power, our honor are in question, and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned."

Militärische Rundschau, July, 1914. Quoted in the Annual Register, 1914, p. 305.

"Even though we condemn the activity of the Pan-Serbian Nationalists, nevertheless wanton provocation of war upon the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for the sharpest protest. The demands of that Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of

the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war."

From a front page appeal against the war in Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.

"Repeated conversations, which I had yesterday with the French Ambassador, the Dutch and Greek ministers, and the British chargé d'affaires, raise in my mind the presumption that the ultimatum to Serbia is a blow prepared by Vienna and Berlin, or rather designed here and executed at Vienna. It is this fact which creates the great danger. The vengeance to be taken for the murder of the hereditary Archduke and the pan-Serbian propaganda would only serve as a pretext. The object sought, in addition to the annihilation of Serbia and of the aspirations of the Jugoslavs, would be to strike a mortal blow at Russia and France in the hope that England would remain aloof from the struggle.

"To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which prevails in the German general staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near—an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share. Such a war, warmly desired by the military and Pan-German party, might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are extremely favorable to Germany, and which probably will not again present themselves for some time. 'Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that she can not carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The *Wehrbeitrag*¹ has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several years; at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency in guns of large caliber; but apparently it is this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralyzed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels.'

"In the eyes of my colleagues as well as in my own, the existence of a plan concerted between Berlin and Vienna proved by

¹This was the extraordinary levy for war purposes.

the obstinacy with which Wilhelmstrasse¹ denies having had knowledge of the tenor of the Austrian note prior to Thursday last. It was also only on Thursday last that it was known at Rome, from which circumstances arise the vexation and dissatisfaction displayed here by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this note, which, owing to the excessive severity of its terms and the shortness of the period allowed to the cabinet of Belgrade for their execution, is destined to render war immediate and unavoidable, was drafted without consultation with and without the active collaboration of the German Government, seeing that it will involve the most serious consequences for that Government? An additional fact, which proves the intimate coöperation of the two Governments, is their simultaneous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia. After the request for an extension formulated by the Russian chargé d'affaires at Vienna had been refused yesterday at the Ballplatz,¹ here, at the Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Jagow evaded similar requests presented by the Russian and English chargé d'affaires, who, in the name of their respective Governments, claimed the support of the Berlin cabinet for the purpose of inducing Austria to grant Serbia a longer interval in which to reply. *Berlin and Vienna were at one in their desire for immediate and inevitable hostilities.* The paternity of the scheme, as well as of the procedure employed, which are, on account of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, is attributed here, in the diplomatic world, to a German rather than an Austrian brain. *The secret had been well guarded, and the execution of the scheme followed with marvelous rapidity."*

Baron Beyens, the Belgian minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 26, 1914. The Belgian Grey Book No. 2.

"On August 18, 1914, as American Ambassador at Constantinople, I called on the Marquis of Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to congratulate him on the Emperor's eighty-fourth birthday. * * * The conversation then turned to the war, which was in its third week, and His Excellency told me that when he visited the Emperor in May His Imperial Majesty had said that war was inevitable because of conditions in the Balkans. * * *

"A still more remarkable confirmation came to me from Baron

¹ The names given to the German and Austrian Foreign Offices respectively from their location in the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin and the Ballplatz in Vienna

Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople. In an outburst of enthusiasm after the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in the Dardanelles * * * the German Ambassador informed me that a conference had been held in Berlin in the early part of July [1914], at which the date of the war was fixed. This conference was presided over by the Kaiser; the Baron Wangenheim was present to report on conditions in Turkey. Moltke, the Chief of Staff, was there, and so was Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. With them were the leaders of German finance, the directors of the railroads, and the captains of industry. * * * Each was asked if he were ready for the war. All replied in the affirmative, except the financiers, who insisted that they must have two weeks in which to sell foreign securities and arrange their loans. * * *

"It was not to me alone that Baron Wangenheim told the story of this Berlin conference. Only recently the Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, announced that Baron Wangenheim said the same thing to him, Italy at that time being a member of the Triple Alliance. My diary shows that the conversation with the German Ambassador took place on August 26. This was about six weeks after the fateful council in Berlin * * * and all the details of the meeting were still fresh in Baron Wangenheim's mind."

Henry Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey, in *New York World*, Oct. 14, 1917.

SECTION XVII.

THE PROGRAM OF ANNEXATIONS.

Many of the following passages are from Grumbach's *Das annexionistische-Deutschland*, a compilation, by a Swiss Social-Democrat, of German utterances in favor of annexation, covering 370 large closely packed pages. Grumbach has made no effort to be complete, but has gathered representative passages from various parties, groups, and individuals. In his introduction he says: "No one familiar with the situation can deny that in no other of the warring nations is there such an army of people eager for annexations as in Germany. No one will dare assert that there is any other country in which all the middle-class parties are so committed not merely to annexations but to a whole system of annexations, including not alone colonies, but, above all else—and this to my mind is much more important and decisive—European territories in the east and west. No one will deny that in Germany the whole middle-class press, the great and the small [he points out four exceptions], has come out unequivocally for annexations, and not in any covert way, but most openly. In the Reichstag as in public meetings there has been a cry for annexations. * * * The central committees and the bureaus of all the middle-class parties have urged the policy of annexations and have set forth the reasons in resolutions which have received the widest publicity. Newspapers in the south of Germany, in the east, the west, and in central Germany men from every province and town and class have demanded annexations; not only politicians, but men of science, writers, and physicians have made public declarations in favor of annexations. * * * The Government has done nothing to prevent the wide circulation of annexationist books and brochures, the like of which can not be found in any other country. To judge correctly the prevailing intellectual attitude, it is necessary to observe not only what is going on to-day when the military and political situation * * * puts a damper on a whole series of wild aspirations, but to recall what people hoped for when the military situation was such that they thought they need set no limit to their wishes. I can enumerate dozens and many dozens of annexationists and super-annexationist books and brochures that have appeared in Germany since the beginning of the war, which bear the names of the most eminent men; and they have been sold not by the hundred but by the thousand and tens of thousands; '300,000 copies sold' is the exultant inscription on a war brochure of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in which the idea of German supremacy is celebrated in hysterical fashion. 'In three weeks 20,000 copies' is printed on the cover of a book of 200 pages bearing the title *The Destruction of English World-Power and of Russian Czarism*, in which Herr von der Bleek has had the collaboration of a whole series of the best known political writers in Germany who find territories to annex in all corners of the world."

"A United States of Europe with Germany as leading State and the German Emperor at the head—this is my vision. But such

a union can not be brought about by a military victory, by force; for force is not constructive. And such is their hatred of Germany—a hatred sure to be increased by our victory—that the other nations will not voluntarily enter such a union at once. We must, then, I think, confine ourselves to making preparations for this ideal. *If we win (as is our hope and trust), we must utterly destroy the power of England, our most formidable foe; we must take from her her colonies and her fleet. We might take the French fleet, too, and also make France bear the cost of the war. The Belgian king could be removed, and Belgium could be joined to Germany as an integral part of the Empire.*”

Dr. Oppenheimer of Düsseldorf in *Monistisches Jahrhundert*, December, 1914. [G. p. 256.]

“Mere force or calculation gives mastery; for leadership more is required—superior culture, superior morality, respect for distinctive national characteristics, an intelligence capable of comprehending and assimilating foreign elements. These qualities insure to the people which possesses them all the world power of the future, and we Germans are that people.”

Dr. Albert Gottlieb, *Der deutsche Staatsgedanke*, p. 389; in the *Grenzboten*, No. 52, Dec., 1914. [G., p. 194.]

“We know it! The German eagle will spread his wings in victory and soar to prouder heights than ever. And we will hold for all time the lands which have been fertilized by German blood. Our fiery love for our fatherland makes us strong enough to bring it the greatest sacrifices. *But may we also hold fast what we have seized and win besides whatever we require.*”

Deputy Bassermann at the farewell celebration of the National Liberal representation in the Reichstag, December, 1914. [G. p. 71.]

[Our whole history] “can be understood as one continuous thrust toward the ocean. The small inland state of Brandenburg, with its two great rivers flowing into the Baltic and the North Sea, is the starting point of that natural impulse. Century after century it had pushed its way (though often driven backward), till in 1864 a series of decisive blows were struck. In 1864-1866 Prussia was firmly united, from its coast on the North Sea to its coast on the Baltic, under a single rule; in 1870-71 the whole German seaboard was fused into political unity with the whole German hinterland, so that at last full commercial use

might be made of our geographical position. The Triple Alliance established further outlets [to the Mediterranean] through allied States. It remains to crown the work (1) by drawing closer the lines which bind us to Austria and (2) by extending the German seaboard to the channel, with its free outlet to the Atlantic.

"This is what England dreads. We dare not, then, let Belgium go, and must, if possible, insure that the coast from Ostend to the mouth of the Somme never again falls into the hand of a country which may become a political vassal of England. This must be secured, in some form, to German influence.

"The debated question as to how to dispose of the objections against annexing territory occupied by a foreign and hostile population leads us to certain general considerations as to securing valuable land which is necessary for us. I mean land useful chiefly for agriculture and colonization. One suggestion is that such land should be 'evacuated' by its present inhabitants. In this connection I should like to repeat certain proposals put forward by leaders of our colonial policy and our commercial life. The following items were suggested to the present writer by one of these personages, with especial reference to Belgium:

"1. Lands where the population has committed offenses against our army (by guerilla or armed resistance) to be confiscated, in accordance with the existing law of confiscation. Displaced families to be compensated—if at all—out of the war contribution, and to reside beyond the borders of the German Empire.

"2. Land thus at our disposal to be divided up among (a) members of German regiments suffering in those localities, (b) relatives of the killed and wounded, so far as such individuals present themselves as settlers. Measures to be taken against waste and speculation in real estate.

"3. Factories, etc., the managers of which have taken part in opposing our army, to be confiscated and handed over (in corporate ownership) to the proper workmen from our army, so far as these are ready to take up work there.

"4. Mines, unless already in possession of German subjects, to become State property of the new German Duchy of Belgium.

"5. All Belgians not declaring allegiance to Germany within four weeks after the official incorporation of Belgium to leave the German Empire, along with their families.

"6. Any Belgians within the next 10 years committing offenses against the Empire and its laws to be expelled beyond the frontiers of the Empire.

"7. Agreeably to these principles, along the old frontier of Germany and Belgium, a broad strip of land to be settled by men of pure German stock. * * * We can never again tolerate in the West a border population of doubtful loyalty. We are fighting for our existence, and are justified (after we win) in taking against the western disturbers of peace measures which will insure quiet in that quarter for centuries.

"8. In the new German districts are to be compensated also Germans who have been driven out, in consequence of the war, and have lost homes and positions."

Arthur Dix, *Der Weltwirtschaftskrieg*, 1914, pp. 32-35. This is No. 3 of the collection entitled *Zwischen Krieg und Frieden*.

"Every people in history with sound instincts and a state organization capable of life and growth has pushed its way (if denied by nature) to the seacoast. Peoples unable to win to, or driven from, the sea have silently dropped out of that competition which constitutes world history. *Possession of a sea-coast means possibility of over-sea expansion, and ultimately the transformation of a continental policy into a world policy.*

"Since our peace-loving nature has not protected us from this fearful visitation, *it is from this point of view that the war must be directed.* We must not scruple to look squarely at the consequences of a victorious advance on the part of our army. Advantageous positions on the coast of Belgium and the northern coast of France (which we are hoping to conquer) must not be relinquished. Nothing less will insure our development as a world power and as a sea power. It is from this point of view that we must decide the further question of Belgian annexation. Not on grounds of territorial expansion, no; we must ask ourselves solely: Does maintenance of the conquered strip of coast necessitate annexation, or not? *If strategic necessity requires it, we must annex Belgium whether we so desire or not.*"

Max Apt, *Der Krieg und die Weltmachtstellung des deutschen Reiches*, 1914, pp. 30-31. This forms No. 12 of the collection entitled *Zwischen Krieg und Frieden*. Apt is syndic of the Berlin Board of Commerce.

"The peace which is made must be not only a peace for the diplomats, but one which the whole German people understands and approves—a guaranty of our conditions of life, worthy of our sacrifices. Nothing could be more terrible than that this tremen-

dous war should come to an end which was a disappointment to our people. Many a time the pen has lost for us what the sword has won. *Now that we stand alone in the world, we alone have to say what that end shall be.*"

Speech in Magdeburg, January, 1915, by von Heydebrand, leader of the Conservative party; reported in the *Magdeburger Blätter*, January 17, 1915. [G., p. 46.] For utterances of von Heydebrand before the war, see p. 115, pp. 119-120.

"If our aim is a peace that promises duration, then **everything in respect to extension of territory that the General Staff considers necessary for the avoidance of further wars, lies within the scope of the conditions of peace**; and no regard for the territory or population of our enemies must be permitted to restrain us from exacting those conditions. **Above all no consideration for the supposed rights of the inhabitants to determine their own lot.** Those who have drawn the sword against us in this most wicked of wars have forfeited these rights."

Article in *Der Tag*, Jan. 31, 1915. [G., p. 52.]

"When peace is concluded we must, without unmanly scruples, thinking only of our own interests, take care that our Germany, after the fearful sacrifices of this war, towers in such overwhelming might above all Europe that no imaginable coalition may presume to attack her or, if it should presume, may bleed to death. This we can attain only through an advantageous shaping of our frontiers in order that in the future we may be better protected than hitherto against hostile attack." [And the writer proceeds to show that though strange peoples are thus to be incorporated within the Empire, they need not be a thorn in the flesh. They will not receive the vote until fully assimilated, fully Germanized.]

Article by General Wrochem, in *Der Tag*, Feb. 13, 1915. [G., p. 26.]

"Concerning the conditions we may not speak, but this much must be given utterance: That in the heart of every German there lives the hope that the land conquered with so much German blood shall not be surrendered. *We must on to the British Channel,*" etc.

Speech Apr. 18, 1915, by Vice President of the Reichstag Paasche. [G., p. 72.] After this speech some of the Social-Democratic organs expressed a doubt whether Paasche's views were those of his party, the National Liberal. The official organ, the *Nationalliberale Correspondenz*, replied that they were.

"And if anyone believes that we will restore the territories occupied by us in the West, on which the blood of our people has been shed, without full security for our future—[all that we can say to that is] that we will secure for ourselves tangible guaranties¹ (*reale Garantien*) against making Belgium an Anglo-French vassal, or a military and economic bulwark against Germany."

"Here, too, there is no status quo ante; here, too, Germany cannot again expose the long-oppressed Flemish people to foreign influence.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, April 5, 1916.
[G., p. 8.]

"The greater the danger which we, girt about as we are with enemies, have to face, the more love for home grips our hearts, the more we must take upon ourselves the care of children and grandchildren—so much the more must we hold out until we shall have seized and secured all possible tangible guaranties and pledges that none of our enemies, whether singly or united, shall ever again try conclusions with us. The wilder the storm rages around us, gentlemen, the more firmly must we build our house."

From a speech in the Reichstag, May 28, 1915, by the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg [G., p. 7]. In June Vorwärts, the Social-Democrat organ, observed: "We have already remarked that the expression 'tangible guaranties' [*reale Garantien*, equivalent to the *Sicherheiten* used by the Kaiser below] is the customary phrase whereby the Annexationists express their aspirations without offending against the official injunction against the discussion of German aims in the war. [See below p. 143, and Grumbach, p. 23.] This party, then, has taken possession of the Chancellor." The Leipziger Volkszeitung of May 29, understands the phrase in the same way and comes to the same conclusion. It remarks on the significant enthusiasm with which the pronouncement was received. For the Chancellor's statement to our American Ambassador, see pp. 151-152.

"Hard upon the declaration of war by Russia followed that by France, and when thereafter the English also fell upon us, I then declared: 'I rejoice at it, and I rejoice because we can now come to a reckoning with our enemies, and because at last—and

¹ For "tangible guaranties," see note to following extract.

that concerns the Canal Association particularly—we can procure a direct route from the Rhine to the sea.’

“Ten months have passed. Much precious blood has been shed. * * * The strengthening of the German Empire and the extension of her borders as far as is needful to assure us against future attacks—that is to be the profit of this war.”

From a speech delivered by the King of Bavaria at the banquet of the Bavarian Canal Association in Fürth, June 7, 1915 [G., p. 5]. On June 8 Dr. Stresemann, member of the Reichstag, said that “a sigh of relief must have escaped from the German people on learning that the route to the sea was not to be surrendered” (Grumbach, p. 73). Compare another speech (*ibid.*, p. 6) by the King of Bavaria at the time of the capture of Warsaw, in which he demands the “extension of the German frontiers to such a point as shall make it difficult for her enemies to attack Germany again.”

“In heroic deeds and sufferings we endure without flinching until peace comes, a peace which offers the necessary military, political, and economic guaranties for the future and fulfills the conditions for the unrestricted development of our energies at home and on the open sea.”

From the proclamation to the German people, issued by the Kaiser July 31, 1915, at Grand Headquarters [G., p. 5]. The annexationist press received the words “military, political, and economic guaranties” with enthusiasm. The words seem vague to us, but so it is that the Emperor and his ministers express themselves on such matters. They convey a definite meaning to one who reads carefully the preceding and following paragraphs. See the Chancellor’s speech above.

“The German people will proceed to the order of the day without attending to those who, ostensibly in order to shorten the war a few months, frivolously hazard its highest interests. It will sweep all those aside who are pitiful and anxious enough to desire no more for the enormous stake they have set than that everything should be again as it was. From the saying that ‘we wage no war of conquest’ to infer, after the bloody lessons of this year, that everything is to be again as it was, is a sign of mental impoverishment.”

Kreuzzeitung of Aug. 1, 1915. [G., p. 30.] “Highest interests” (*grösste or höchste Interessen*) is, like “tangible guaranties” (see above, p. 141), pretty words with an ugly meaning, constantly in use among the militarists and annexationists.

“The Central Committee of the National Liberal Party repeats emphatically its conviction, already expressed and now confirmed,

that only an extension of frontiers and coast line can provide the German people with the necessary tangible guaranties for its future military, political, and economic security."

Resolution passed May 21, 1916. [G., p. 37.] For the phrase "tangible guaranties" see above note, p. 141.

"Germany can not do better for her future than to secure naval bases which shall do away with the difficulties which we now deplore. We need bases at both entrances of the Channel; we need strong bases across the sea," etc.

From a speech by Albert Ballin, General Director of the Hamburg-American Line, Hamburg, Oct. 21, 1915. [G., p. 18.]

"[Our sacrifices] demand as the result of peace that Germany shall be strengthened by the retention of the conquered territory and indemnified for loss of treasure."

Resolution of the Free Conservative Party, Dec. 5 and 6, 1915. [G., p. 39.]

"Let our enemies pledge themselves anew to persist in the war; we wait in complete unanimity, in quiet determination, and, let me add, trusting in God, for the hour which shall make possible negotiations for peace. These must assure permanently the military, economic, financial, and political interests of Germany in their widest range, and with every means possible, including the necessary extensions of territory."

Speech in the Reichstag, Dec. 9, 1915, by Dr. Spahn, leader of the Centre, in the name of all the middle-class parties (*bürgerliche Parteien*), representing 254 of the 397 members of the Reichstag. [G., p. 33.] Recently, under Erzberger, the Centre itself has declared against annexations, but not unanimously.

"To-day the military map shows that we are no longer the plaything of foreign powers. A broad road, which binds East and West together, opens up through the lands of faithful allies, and is a token of great days to come. The spirit of the Hanseatic League, which bears our banners over the seas, must never leave us; but the world war teaches us that as in the past our future lies not on the water but on land. Our trade and technical arts can prosper only on a broader basis of earth and within secure frontiers. We must not yet speak of our aims in the war [see above, note p. 141], but they hover before our eyes in ever

clearer outlines. In the East and the West the German flag must wave over the graves of our heroes."

Article by Geheimer Regierungsrat Professor Hillebrandt, member of the Prussian Diet, in the *Kreuzzeitung*, Dec. 31, 1915. [G., pp. 18, 19.] The reader will observe that the writers agree on a large program of annexation. They differ only as to the areas, continental or colonial, which should be made the prize of *this* war.

"We must establish ourselves firmly at Antwerp on the North Sea and at Riga on the Baltic. * * * At all events, we must, at the conclusion of peace, demand substantial extensions of the German Empire."

Ernst Haeckel, *Ewigkeit, Weltkriegsgedanken*, 1915, p. 122 [Archer, p. 57].

"China is the greatest of the three worlds which are being rebuilt, inside and out, in our generation. China contains 400,000,000 men—a fourth part of the human race. * * *

"We ask, which of the great European nations is to furnish the architect for this rebuilding of China? The Japanese? Asiatics? Surely, no. * * * The English? We expect—after this war—that it will not be the English. We Germans? That will depend on how we stand after the war. If victorious, we shall presumably stand high in the Far East, and even if we succeed only as Frederick the Great succeeded in the Seven Years' War, that, too, would increase our prestige. The whole world believes we must be beaten; so powerful are our foes that no one really trusts in the success of Germany. If, then, in spite of odds, we win out, the question for the Chinese will be, 'Shall we take our teachers from the victors, or from the vanquished?' The task of rebuilding China is no light one. We must not dream that we are, one and all, at present in a position to bring European culture and education to the Chinese. We must put ourselves to school—but we shall rise to the occasion."

Paul Rohrbach, *Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeit*, 1915, pp. 68-69. [G., pp. 303-304.] See note, p. 66.

"*I am glad to cast my vote with those who counsel territorial expansion outside Europe. We should relieve certain States with African colonies of the burden of governing those colonies. Portugal, too, if really bound by treaty to assist England by land and sea, we could relieve of Angola at very slight expense. We had been purposing to purchase this colony, but it is better*

to get it for nothing, and to add to it the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and Madeira. Within Europe, on the other hand, we must be exceedingly careful, and must acquire new territory only after the most mature deliberation, especially where it will take years of unremitting labor to convert our antagonists to the view that life under the German scepter—'War state' though we proclaim ourselves—is well worth living. True, our foreign policy must not be too tender-hearted—hard times need stout fists. * * * *In the coming diplomatic convention, if the glib foreign hucksters present cooked-up objections to our taking our rights, our fist, like Bismarck's, must pound the green table till the ink bottles dance, if they refuse to give us our due—what we think necessary for permanent peace. This is self-evident, and must remain so.*"

Alfred Ruhemann, *Die Zukunft Belgiens*, 1915, pp. 145–146. This is a chapter in *Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht*, a book edited by Kurt L. Walter van der Bleek. [G., p. 305.] See below, p. 136.

"As the German Eagle soars high above the beasts of the earth, so must the German feel exalted above all surrounding peoples, and must look down upon them in their bottomless depths.

"But noblesse oblige. The thought that we are the chosen people lays heavy obligations upon us. It is our first duty to keep ourselves a strong people. We are not marching to world conquest. Don't be afraid, dear neighbors; we won't swallow you up. What good would such indigestible morsels be? And as for conquering half-civilized or savage peoples in order to fill them with the German spirit—we have no desire in that direction—and, in fact, such 'Germanizing' is not possible. * * *

"We must be a strong people, a strong German state. This means that our growth must be organic; and if it proves necessary to widen our borders so as to find room for development for our increasing population, we shall take so much as seems necessary. We shall set our foot just so far as strategic reasons render advisable for the maintenance of our invincible strength; but not one inch farther."

Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 1915, pp. 143–144. [G., pp. 348–349.] See note, p. 34.

"We seek to fulfill deliberately the century-old destiny of our race, to extend ourselves without limit. No German wishes to

enslave the other nations—our aim is rather to make the whole world free, free for the exercise of our German powers and our German activities.”

Abridged from Dr. Friedrich Stieve, *Deutschland vor den Toren der Welt*, 1915, pp. 15–19. [G., p. 273.]

“Compared to these questions [annexations], that of a war indemnity appears at first sight to be very much simpler. It is in fact extraordinarily difficult.

“An indemnity which would be adequate simply to reimburse us our war costs would perhaps amount to approximately thirty billions¹—twelve billions for the war itself; five to ten billions as an adequate pension fund for invalid survivors and dependents; the rest for the restoration of military equipment for East Prussia, Tsingtau. * * * So far the reckoning is relatively simple, for what is approximate in our estimates can be figured exactly by the financial administration.

* * * “All these dangers must be avoided, and they can be avoided if the greater part of the indemnity is required to be paid not in cash or exchange but in securities.

“The reckoning of the thirty billions coming to us would go something like this:

“Perhaps two billions in gold, to be deposited in the Reichsbank, to bring its gold reserves to a sufficient amount to meet all emergencies. Should we desire to return from the use of paper money to the expensive circulation of gold, the amount would be about four billions; but it would be more irritating to our opponents to raise, and its economic consequences might also react inconveniently upon us.

“A further four or six or eight billions in exchange, payable in, say, three years. An international balance of this amount in our favor would be very desirable. We shall have great need to import raw material while our industries are active, partly for the home market and partly for the export, whose relations must be gradually reestablished. Accordingly, a certain improvement in our balance of trade during the transition period after the peace is, after all, desirable.

“The rest, twenty billions, in securities.

“This sounds surprising, for what use have we for English, French, or Russian bonds? We have little use for them, to be

¹ This estimate was made in January, 1915. The figures are in marks.

sure. On the contrary, a permanent indebtedness of our opponents to Germany could only have very uncomfortable political consequences.

"What we need, however, is stocks and bonds of railways and docks, mines and factories, dams, etc., in Turkey and in China, in the Congo, and, under certain conditions, in South America, etc. In addition, Government bonds of our allies. We need, above all, a strengthening of our economic position in the world, and we need to free our political friends from the excessive financial influence of England and France.

* * * * *

"Just as the war indemnity of 1870 was useful in completing our simple industrial organization at that time through the adoption of the gold standard and the stimulation of our industrial development, though with certain unpleasant accompanying phenomena during the promotion period, so also it is at present just as necessary to strengthen our economic position in the world by war indemnities. The program of a close economic alliance of the central powers will be made materially easier thereby.

"Industrial productive powers, the acquisition of colonies and of securities are therefore the industrial purposes of the war, demanded by our business interests to equalize all the effects of a war which was forced upon us.

"Then there is the separate question of Belgium. It is impossible to leave Belgium in the devastated condition which we were forced to bring upon it. It is equally impossible to have a malevolent Belgium as a neighbor on the borders of our Rhenish Westphalian industrial region. Our victory will not be complete until hatred has been vanquished by love and every measure taken to revive industrial Belgium, but as a part of the Empire. It is required by considerations of humanity and a world peace, which demand a complete healing without a scar of these deep national wounds. * * *

"The twentieth century is ours. * * *

"We need victory for the continuance of our economic life. Not only does our industry maintain the war, but a complete victory is necessary for our industry. If we achieve a complete triumph, we shall have won a prize worth fighting for. * * *

"The defeat of Germany is impossible. An indecisive war would be fatal to all alike. **The complete triumph of Germany alone would be a blessing to all neutral countries. It would also**

be less dangerous to our enemies than an endless continuation of the struggle. It insures the new ascent of civilization and a higher form of national life."

Dr. Johann Plenge, *Der Krieg und die Volkswirtschaft*, 1915, pp. 181ff. Plenge is professor of political economy at Münster. The "industrial purposes" of the war "which has been forced upon us"—note the *purposes* coupled with a claim of *defensive* war—are now being accomplished in the utter devastation of Belgium and northern France. The passage about "healing Belgium" is based on the assumption that Germany will incorporate it as part of her territory.

"With the full weight of Pan-Islamic power Turkey advances against Russia and against England. Against Russia, with her navy in the Black Sea and an army against the Caucasus. * * * But what a Turkish blow against south Russia will mean only the man can judge who remembers that *the Russian south is the granary, the coalpit, and the mine of the Russian Empire. That is to strike Russia in her vitals.* Russia must be thrust back from the Black Sea. We are not again to have to stem the tide of onslaughts before another decade. Only a Russia which has been thrust back from the Black Sea and directed toward the Indian Ocean (against England) or toward East Asia (against Japan) will no longer be a European danger."

Ernst Jäckh, *Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft*, 1915, pp. 26-27. Nowhere, unless in the preceding utterance of Plenge, is the connection between economic interests and war more clearly revealed. "Economic interests" as expounded by the Germans is camouflage for the ugly business of plundering neighboring lands to their own enrichment. Jäckh is at present associated with Rohrbach in the publication of a new weekly, *Deutsche Politik*, devoted to "Welt- und Kulturpolitik." In the issue of Aug. 10, 1917, he advocates a "Middle Europe" bloc and a possible combination with Russia and Japan against the Anglo-Saxon world.

"Let us not speak of peace, for such speeches are taken for weakness and only prolong the war. *Let us cease also in sickly, un-German fashion to oppose annexations.* Let us rather say manfully what we want, what we must and will demand as the prize of victory. Let us act without consideration for other countries. Then our enemies will see that we are strong, not weaker but stronger than before. Then they will see at last that their game is up."

Speech by Prinz zu Salm-Horstmar, member of the Prussian House of Lords, Jan. 1, 1916. [G., p. 49.]

"The German Empire must make its way with blood and iron to the fulfillment of its political destiny."

Speech by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, von Loebell, Jan. 17, 1916, in the Diet. [G., p. 11.]

"When weighed in the balance with our unpopularity after this war a simple restoration of the status quo ante bellum would mean for Germany not profit but loss. *Only in case the strengthening of our political, economic, and military position by the war decidedly counterbalances the enmity aroused shall we be able to say with a good conscience that by the war we have on the whole bettered ourselves.*"

From the book entitled *Deutsche Politik* (1916), p. xii, by the ex-Chancellor, Prince von Bülow. The preface, from which the passage is taken, bears date of May 15. The book was received enthusiastically by the annexationist press, but coolly by the Social-Democrats. [G., p. 15.]

"The power of Middle Europe is increased, that of the Russians thrust back toward the Orient, whence, not so long ago, it came."

Article in the *Deutsche Lodzer Zeitung*, Feb. 9, 1916, by General Ludendorff. [G., p. 24.] He is now quartermaster general and probably the brains of the General Staff.

"With a compromise peace, in which there is neither victor nor vanquished, Germany can not go on living. Therefore we must remain stern, and always sterner; therefore *our statesmen must in the peace negotiations be men of iron* and not, to use Bismarck's phrase, resemble soft wood that has been painted iron-gray. The German people mean not only to hold out but to conquer. To see things as they really are, that is Bismarck's way. What we must do we will do, and what we will to do, we can do."

Count von Reventlow in an address Apr. 1, 1916, reported in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* Apr. 4, 1916. [G., p. 175.]

"First of all, our enemy is in the west. * * * Ninety per cent of Germans burn with the feeling that we must reckon, once for all, with England and France. Secondly, terms of peace will be decided by the military situation on the day when peace is declared. Thirdly, our enemy must be either annihilated or conciliated, and * * * a policy of conciliation in the west is impossible. We have to fight our way through to the ocean,

and whatever stands in our way must be destroyed. Fourthly, *we maintain the old Balkan principle, 'the conqueror keeps what he has.'* * * * *There is nothing more to be said about Belgium.* We need an opening to the channel and we must have Antwerp. He who wants Belgium may come and take it from us. Fifthly, we must strengthen the German Empire; and that means strengthening the Empire's central power, which means Prussia."

Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, Oct. 27, 1916. This paper is the organ of the Krupp interests. Quoted in Quarterly Review, Jan., 1917.

"Here, then, lies the key to Germany's future, for nothing but a Belgium, under Germany's political and military influence, could provide the possibility of effectively threatening the British Island Empire itself, by enabling our fleet to create for England that risk which was to be the final purpose of its construction. * * * *Thus the military and political domination of Germany over Belgium is seen to be a compelling necessity*, arising from the geographical situation, the military relations of strength, and the political grouping of the Powers, just as clearly as from Great Britain's destructive will against Germany. * * *

"From an economic point of view, Belgium, even before the war, was an almost indispensable link in the world-encircling chain of German sea trade. Antwerp had become for the Rhenish, Thuringian, and South German industry an export harbor, the place of which could be taken by our North Sea ports only at the cost of considerable sacrifice in time and freights."

A secret memorandum of the council of the German Navy League, adopted June 17, 1916, at its annual meeting and transmitted to the Chancellor. Published by the Kreuzzeitung just before Christmas, 1916. Quoted in the London Times, Jan. 1, 1917.

"Such phrases as the Chancellor used in his declaration on December 12 stand in the strongest contradiction to the nature of the policy of might (*Machtpolitik*). Anyone who takes his stand upon this policy can not agree that our 'well-founded claims do not in any way contradict the rights of other nations.' For we have won for ourselves a justified claim to a strong frontier on the Flemish coast; we can show that this claim has been justified clearly by the experiences of the war. And yet we can not very well dispute the fact that it is contrary to the formal rights of the Belgian State. Is our claim to the Belgian line of the Meuse, to the iron region of Briey, to Courland, not thoroughly justified—

justified by the shifting of power during the war and by the experience gained? And yet this claim, too, stands in blunt contradiction to the rights of other nations.

"The more firmly one relies upon the policy of power, the greater is the certainty of the conviction that it will always be power which will decide between the nations of the earth."

Das grössere Deutschland, quoted in the Manchester Guardian, Jan. 4, 1917. Das grössere Deutschland is a recently established organ of the annexationists.

"*You have the upper hand.* It is not your enemies but you who are making victorious progress at the front; it is your enemies who are menaced by famine and not you. Your home army is rising to put at your disposal men, arms, munitions, food-stuffs, all in large quantities. *Demand, then, Germany, instead of giving way;* and if your enemies will not accept your demands then continue the struggle, remembering that you have to execute a judgment of God on these pirates, liars, and robbers. We Germans fear God, and nothing else in the world; and it will always be so. *Demand, Germany! and you will conquer.*"

Der Tag, quoted in the Manchester Guardian, Jan. 4, 1917.

"Messrs. Scheidemann and Erzberger¹ are not the German nation, nor does this Reichstag, which originated from the worst kind of party political incitement, reflect its real feeling. The German nation is ready for any sacrifice, but it demands the security that these sacrifices have not been and will not be made in vain. *Not courts of arbitration and paper treaties, but only an increase of power which will make us unconquerable in every direction can be the reward for these endless sacrifices.*

"If the German nation is going to strain its strength to the topmost limit, then it must have assurances that it will not be deceived in the reward for its sacrifices; therefore it demands clearness and truth. In feverish expectation it awaits, hitherto in vain, the relieving word; may it be spoken before it is too late."

Deutsche Tageszeitung, quoted in the Manchester Guardian, Jan. 5, 1917.

"Finally in January, 1917, when he [Bethmann-Hollweg] was again talking peace, I said, 'What are these peace terms to which

¹ Scheidemann and Erzberger were leaders of the Social-Democratic and Center Parties, respectively, who were advocating a peace based on "no annexations and no indemnities."

you refer continually? Will you allow me to ask a few questions as to the specific terms of peace? First, are the Germans willing to withdraw from Belgium?" The chancellor answered, 'Yes, but with guarantees.' I said, 'What are these guarantees?' He said, 'We must possibly have the forts of Liège and Namur; we must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to maintain a large army in Belgium. We must have the commercial control of Belgium.' I said, 'I do not see that you have left much for the Belgians except that King Albert will have the right to reside in Brussels with an honor guard.' And the chancellor said, 'We can not allow Belgium to be an outpost of England'; and I said, 'I do not suppose the English on the other hand, wish it to become an outpost of Germany, especially as von Tirpitz has said that the coast of Flanders should be retained in order to make war on England and America.' I continued, 'How about northern France?' He said, 'We are willing to leave northern France, but there must be a rectification of the frontier.' I said, 'How about the eastern frontier?' He said, 'We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier.' I said, 'How about Roumania?' He said, 'We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Roumania.' I said, 'How about Serbia?' He said, 'A very small Serbia may be allowed to exist, but that is a question for Austria. Austria must be left to do what she wishes to Italy, and we must have indemnities from all the countries and all our ships and colonies back.'

"Of course 'rectification of the frontier' is a polite term for 'annexation.' "

James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, 1917, pp. 365-366.

"When Scheidemann sent the message out into the world that what was French should again be French and what was Belgian again Belgian, the Paris Journal could conclude, from its point of view that German policy would sacrifice its national interests to those of the world. But we, of the great majority at home, and the compact front out there, protest that German soldiers should not give their blood in order that it should become a fertilizer for culture to those who hate us from the bottom of their hearts. * * * We need but one thing, namely, that, boldly and openly, hand in hand with our Allies, we set to our

work. Out of the diverse chords of the wills of nations there is formed what God hears as the harmony of humanity. The more the voices of our people join in the chorus of national interests, the more pleasing will the song be to God. **Through might to kultur and through kultur to might. The beginning and the end is might."**

Dr. Karl Mehrmann in *Das grössere Deutschland*, Jan. 27, 1917.
Quoted in *Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1917. Mehrmann is an editor and author.

"Anybody who knows the present state of things in Belgian industry will agree with me that it must take at least some years—assuming that Belgium is independent at all—before Belgium can even think of competing with us in the world market. And anybody who has traveled, as I have done, through the occupied districts of France will agree with me that so much damage has been done to industrial property that no one need be a prophet in order to say that it will take more than ten years before we need think of France as a competitor or of the reëstablishment of French industry."

Deputy Beumer in the Prussian Diet, week of Feb. 20–27. *London Times*, Feb. 27, 1917. Than the above passage there is nothing more cynical and cruel in this compilation. For the utter desolation which the Germans have wrought in the occupied territory there is here revealed a deeper motive. See below also.

"As a result of the experiences of this war the enemy countries will so protect themselves that their economically valuable possessions close to the frontier can not again be overrun so easily as was the case this time. We can not give up Longwy and Briey, because in a new war it will be impossible for us again to be in Longwy in 24 hours and in Liège in four days."

Deputy Fuhrmann in the Prussian Diet, week of Feb. 20–27, 1917. *London Times*, Feb. 27.

"We must also secure ourselves for the future. New sacrifices require new compensations, new demands. A sufficient war indemnity is necessary to guard against the dangers of the future, and also for the resumption of economic competition. *If our enemies are really not able to pay an indemnity, for what purpose, then, have we territory of economic value in our hands conquered with our blood?* Courland and Livonia offer ground for colonization. With them we can also protect the interests of the Baltic popula-

tion. At Briey and Longwy¹ we find coal and iron ore. The harbor of Antwerp we cannot do without; if we possess this, the individuality of the Flemish population can also be protected.

"The military safety of our frontiers must be attained even if military and economic objections thereto exist. As in the east our flank must be protected, so also must the right flank of our west front. Consequently the high defensive and offensive value of the Flemish coast is very obvious in strengthening our positions against England. Germany must be invincible."

Count von Westarp, leader of the Conservative Party, in the Reichstag, Feb. 27, 1917, quoted in the London Times, Mar. 1, 1917.

"The extent of our claims can not be discussed here, but, in any case, we might well consider the idea that *our enemies should pay us annually for a series of years from £250,000,000 to £300,000,000*, and that they should pay it in the first years, while they also will be short of money, in raw materials, which would render us good service in the restoration of our economic system. In the later years they would pay in gold for the redemption of our debt."

Kölnische Zeitung, quoted in the London Times, Mar. 3, 1917.

"It is absolutely necessary that Germany claim the occupation of the Belgian coast as a German naval base. It is equally necessary that it claim the occupation of Baltic Provinces inhabited by Germans, and it is equally necessary to obtain a rectification of the French frontiers, in claiming for Germany the occupation of the mining districts."

Speech of Deputy Roesicke (Conservative) in the Reichstag, May 15, 1917, quoted by the Journal des Débats, May 17, 1917.

"There lies in my house a memorandum composed by me for myself alone, which deals more precisely and exhaustively with the future of Belgium and arrives at the definite result that, if we do not get Belgium into our sphere of power, and if we do not govern it in German fashion and use it in German fashion, the war is lost."

Von Bissing, governor general of Belgium, in a letter to Deputy Stresemann, Hamburger Nachrichten, quoted in the London Times, June 3, 1917. This and the following extract, published after Von Bissing's death, are part of what has been called his "political testa-

¹ Centers of the coal region of northern France.

ment." See also articles by Vernon Kellogg in the *Atlantic Monthly*, August and October, 1917.

"There is no prospect that we shall ever be able to conclude with the King of the Belgians and his Government a peace by which Belgium will remain in the German sphere of power, and it is impossible that the Quadruple Entente, over the heads of its allies, shall ever accept our peace demands with regard to Belgium. **It only remains for us, therefore, to avoid during the peace negotiations all discussion about the form of the annexation, and to apply nothing but the right of conquest.**

"It is true that dynastic considerations have an importance which is not to be underestimated. For, in view of our just and ruthless procedure, the King of the Belgians will be deposed, and will remain abroad as an aggrieved enemy. We must put up with that, and it is to be regarded almost as a happy circumstance that necessity compels us to leave dynastic considerations entirely out of account. A king will never voluntarily hand over his country to the conqueror, and Belgium's King can never consent to abandon his sovereignty or to allow it to be restricted. If he did so his prestige would be so undermined that he would have to be regarded not as a support, but as an obstacle, to German interests. On the most various occasions the English have described the right of conquest as the healthiest and simplest kind of right, and we can read in Machiavelli that he who desires to take possession of a country will be compelled to remove the king or regent, even by killing him.

"These are grave decisions, but they must be taken, for we are concerned with the welfare and the future of Germany, and concerned also with reparation for the war of destruction that has been directed against us."

Idem, London Times, June 6, 1917.

[The Vorwärts protests to General von Ludendorff and the Prussian war minister against the purchase and circulation among troops, in hospitals, and schools by German Grand Headquarters of a Pan-German brochure advocating the incorporation of France as a federated state of Germany and the reduction of Poland, Finland, Courland, and the bulk of European Russia to the status of protectorates or annexed territories of Germany.]

"* * * This act of the army authorities is particularly glaring on account of the fact that the brochure is directed almost as

much against Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg as against the Socialists. * * *

Summary of dispatch from Copenhagen, quoting Vorwärts, New York Times, June 10, 1917. This whole matter of Pan-German propaganda in the army was recently made the subject of an interpellation in the Reichstag. Chancellor Michaelis explained that the Government was seeking to sustain the morale of the army and to counteract enemy propaganda.

"The hatred bestowed upon us by the whole world may be classified as the hatred of an inferior race for a superior one. To the devil with all talk of kultur! As if any soldier would have gone to the front for the sake of striving for kultur. What our armies, our sons, and brothers are fighting for is a greater Germany, with boundaries that will insure us against an attack by highway robbers such as we have lately been exposed to."

Alldeutsche Blätter. Quoted by Dagene Nyheter (Swedish daily paper), July 21, 1917.

"The task of the statesman in charge will be to remain at the time of the negotiations [for peace] in close touch with the high command of the army and to reckon on the military advantages gained by the blood of our brave soldiers, in order to make the best use of the possibility of new military blows. If he does this successfully, he can count on the approval of the army and of the people. The resolution [for no annexations and no indemnities] does not fit in with these conceptions and we unanimously reject it."

Count von Westarp in the name of the Conservative Party (July 20, 1917), concerning the resolutions in the Reichstag, quoted in Journal de Genève, July 21, 1917.

"A foreign policy in accordance with the Reichstag resolution,¹ as meant by the majority, can not result in victory, but only in the ruin of the German people and Empire. The German nation does not desire such a policy."

Hamburger Nachrichten, Aug. 9, 1917.

"Conservatives would further decline anything in the nature of a Scheidemann¹ peace. They hope, on the contrary, in spite of faint-hearted counsels, by the rejection of all Social Democratic

¹ A peace based on the formula "No annexations and no indemnities." For Scheidemann see note, p. 50; also note 1, p. 151.

International attempts at an understanding, to impose a German peace by the help of God and the German sword."

Erich von Puttkamer of the Prussian House of Lords in the *Kreuzzeitung*, Aug. 13, 1917.

"The ideal of the minority in regard to foreign affairs is German world dominion and a German peace which by the sword shall require the submission of the whole world to German dictation."

Vorwärts, Sept. 3, 1917. The minority here referred to is, of course, the group that voted against the Reichstag resolution for no annexations and no indemnities. The passing weeks make it increasingly evident that the Government finds itself unable to abandon the idea of a German peace imposed by the German sword.

"The annexationists cry in chorus that the majority of the people is not behind the Reichstag, and impudently affirm that the people are enthusiastic for their aims of conquest. This is laughable, but the German political system prevents the governors from coming in contact with the governed and from learning their real opinion."

Dr. David, in Vorwärts, Sept. 2, 1917. This closing passage strikes a hopeful note. The problem of the German people is to bring their governors into contact with real opinion within and without Germany.

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